Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Palestine/9–3047

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

top secret

[Washington,] September 30, 1947.

United States Position With Respect to the Question of Palestine¹

the problem

The problem is to determine the position which the United States should take in the General Assembly with regard to the Palestine question.

recommendations

1. The United States Delegation, in dealing with the Palestine question, should be guided by the following basic objectives:

a) to assist in every way in the finding of a solution of the Palestine problem at this session of the General Assembly.

b) to secure the maximum possible agreement between Arabs and Jews and among the Members of the United Nations.

c) to implement the United States position on the Palestine question, as set forth below, by methods best calculated to safeguard the strategic, economic, and political interests of the United States in the Near East.

d) to achieve a United Nations recommendation regarding the Palestine problem and, to this end, to implement the United States position in such a way that the final recommendation of the General Assembly can not be regarded as an “American plan”.

2. With regard to the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Mandatory Power, the U.S. Delegation should be guided by the following considerations:

a) The General Assembly has been asked by the United Kingdom to make recommendations on the future government of Palestine. However, in accepting this task the General Assembly has not accepted responsibility for the Government of Palestine.

b) The United Kingdom is at present the responsible administering authority for Palestine. This responsibility was incurred by agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War and is expressed in the terms of a mandate approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Both on legal and policy grounds the United Kingdom should continue to discharge this responsibility until arrangements have been made to supplant it or a settlement in Palestine has been effected.

3. The United States Delegation should follow the lines laid clown by the Secretary in his speech of September 17, 1947, namely: “While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the special committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that committee.” To this end, the U.S. should give support to the majority plan in principle with a view to perfecting the plan in certain of its features. In extending this support, the United States should endeavor to secure certain modifications and clarifications of that plan, either initiating or supporting the following principal modifications (for a detailed position analysis of the majority plan see Annex A²):

a) Clarification should be sought with regard to the problem of the viability of the two states. On page 53 of the UNSCOP report it is stated that “the creation of two viable States is considered essential to a partition scheme”. Yet on page 48 of the report it is indicated that the Arab state will be forced to call for financial assistance “from international institutions in the way of loans for expansion of education, public health and other vital social services of a non-self-supporting nature.” Moreover, the technical note on the viability of the proposed states prepared by the Secretariat (pp. 55–56) is not conclusive as regards the viability of the Arab State. In view of the central importance of the question of viability as stressed in the Committee’s report, a special subcommittee of the Ad Hoc Committee should be established to consider this question.

b) The city of Jaffa (70,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews), placed within the Jewish State under the majority plan, should be assigned to the Arab State as an enclave. This would substantially reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State and eliminate a fertile source of Arab objections. In view of the provisions of the majority plan for freedom of transit and visit, the normal objections to an enclave are not believed valid in this case.

c) The eastern boundary of the Western Galilee area of the Arab State should be redrawn to include Safad (9,500 Arabs and 2,500 Jews) for the same reasons given in b above. An enclave would not be necessary in this case.

d) In order to include the Arab areas in the southern part of the Gasa sub-district within the Arab State, it is believed desirable for the point of intersection in this area to be moved southeast to a point on the frontier of the Gasa sub-district.

e) The southern portion of the Negeb, allocated to the Jewish State by the majority plan, should be included in the Arab State. This area, useful only for seasonal grazing purposes, is inhabited by an estimated 60,000 Arabs. There are no Jewish settlements.

4. A vote should be taken in the Ad Hoc Committee on the majority plan in principle. If the vote is such as to indicate that a two-thirds majority could not be achieved in the Assembly, the minority plan should be put to a vote. The United States will not vote for the minority report. In the event that either plan receives a vote sufficient to indicate that it would probably command a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, a subcommittee should be established to work out details.

5. If an impasse is reached and a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly cannot be attained for either the majority plan or the minority plan, the United States Delegation should:

a) State that in view of the difficulties experienced within the committee it has become obvious that the necessary two-thirds majority cannot be obtained, for either the majority or minority plan, but that it would seem highly undesirable to disregard the work of UNSCOP entirely.

b) Initiate or support the establishment of a special sub-committee for the purpose of attempting to formulate a plan combining the best features of both the majority and minority reports, or any other workable and just plan which stands a reasonable chance of adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly.

c) Use the attached outline (Annex B³) as a basis for its work in the sub-committee in an endeavor to secure a workable solution.

6. If agreed recommendations do not result from the procedures outlined above, the Department, after consultation with the Delegation, will transmit further instructions to the Delegation.

[Here follow those sections under the heading “Discussion” dealing with the provisional agenda of the Second Session of the General Assembly as they related to Palestine, the roles of the General Assembly and of the Mandatory Power, and the report of UNSCOP.]

Basic Considerations

The position taken by the United States Delegation in the General Assembly on the Palestine question should take full account of the following principal factors:

1. The Near Eastern area is of high strategic significance in over-all American policy. Consequently the maintenance of good will toward the United States on the part of the Moslem world is one of the primary goals of American foreign policy.

2. The policy of the United States toward Palestine over the span of the years since the First World War shows a consistent interest in the establishment of a Jewish National Home. The United States has frequently stated its support of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and has indicated that it might look with favor upon some arrangement providing for a partition of Palestine, provided that such an arrangement gave promise of being workable.

3. The position taken by the United States with regard to the report of the Special Committee on Palestine must indicate the confidence of this Government in the United Nations and United States support of the procedures for which, in this case, it assumed a large initiative.

4. The plan for Palestine ultimately recommended by the General Assembly should be a United Nations solution and not a United States solution. It is essential that the basic position to be taken by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly with regard to the Palestine report and the specific tactics followed by the Delegation be such that the final recommendation of the General Assembly cannot be labeled “the American plan”.

5. It is a matter of urgency that the General Assembly should agree at this session upon a definitive solution of the Palestine problem. The only immediate hope of restoring order in Palestine and thus promoting stability in the whole Near East lies in agreement by the United Nations upon a solution which the interested parties cannot expect by agitation and violence to alter.

6. It is essential that any plan for Palestine adopted by the General Assembly be able to command the maximum cooperation of all elements in Palestine.

7. It is probable that the Arab States will reject any solution that creates a Jewish State or province or permits further Jewish immigration into Palestine; it is possible that they will withdraw from the United Nations in case any such solution is adopted. It is difficult to predict whether any solution short of immediate independence would obtain even the reluctant acquiescence of the Arab States, prevent their withdrawal from the United Nations, and preclude armed strife in the Near East.

8. The position of the United Kingdom Government as set forth in its statement of September 26, 1947 is:

[Here follows the British position.]

9. The Soviet Union has thus far avoided taking a position, but the Embassy in Moscow and other observers are convinced that, in the final showdown, the Soviet Union will support the Arab States. The Soviet Union at the Special Session of the General Assembly favored the establishment of “one dual, democratic Arab-Jewish state” in Palestine or, if that proved unfeasible, partition of the country. In the Special Committee the Czech member favored the majority report while the Yugoslav member favored the minority report.

10. The United States position on Palestine should be established with due regard to the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for important questions. Concerted opposition of the Soviet bloc and the Arab League states and their Moslem supporters could defeat any proposal which did not command almost unanimous support of the other Members of the United Nations.

1. There were two earlier drafts of this position paper. One was provided to SPA for comment by NEA (memorandum of September 22 by Mr. McClintock to Mr. Rusk, 501.BB Palestine/9–2247) but a copy has not been found in Department of State files nor is its date known. A copy of the draft of September 24 is filed in a folder entitled “Palestine—Sept. through Oct. 1947” (records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Lot 52–370, Box 5).
2. Entitled “Detailed Position Analysis of Majority Plan”, not printed.
3. Entitled “Scheme of Partition with Union for Common Interests”, not printed.