Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Palestine/7–1447

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 123

Jerusalem, July 14, 1947.

Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—the Fourth Week.

Sir: I have the honor to report that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine continued, in a series of hearings, to probe ever more deeply into the attitude of the various Jewish and other representatives who appeared before it during the week commencing on Monday, July 7, 1947. Following the hearing given Mr. D. Horowitz, head of the Jewish Agency’s Economics Department, on July 4 (reported in my despatch no. 118 of July 7, 1947), the Committee called David Ben-Gurion, the Executive’s Chairman, to appear for questioning. This was on the morning of July 7th.

For three and one half hours, Mr. Ben-Gurion, with Moshe Shertok of the Agency’s Political Department seated behind him, was questioned by all members of the Committee. This period was highlighted by sharp exchanges with the Indian (Moslem) member, Sir Abdur Rahman. At times, in fact, both raised their voices and showed feeling as the Indian attempted to pin Ben-Gurion down on various points. Aggressive in manner, and loud of tone, the Indian refused to pay any attention to the attitude of the audience, which was approximately 95% Jewish, and which made its sentiments known almost to the point of open ridicule. The Iranian member, unable to cope with listening jointly to Ben-Gurion, his Indian colleague, and the audience, sharply insisted to the Chairman that the audience not make its views known so audibly. The Chairman admonished the audience to that effect, with Ben-Gurion supporting him, but without notable success.

The prolonged examination of Ben-Gurion cannot be fully recorded here. We shall set forth, however, his replies to certain questions:

1. When the Chairman asked whether the Jews’ controversy with the Mandatory might be solved if the Jewish-Arab conflict were to disappear, Ben-Gurion said the Jews had no conflict with the Arabs . . . .

2. If the U.N, decides to set up a Jewish State, then the U.N. should be prepared to use force to attain that end, if necessary . . . .

3. When the Chairman asked if Arab occupancy of the country for 1000 years meant anything to him, Ben-Gurion replied that in this case it did not . . . .

4. When the Chairman said that the use of the term “National Home” in the Mandate implied reservations, Ben-Gurion stated that there were only two reservations in the Mandate, first, that the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities should not be prejudiced and, secondly, that the status of Jews elsewhere should not be prejudiced . . . .

5. The Czech asked if Ben-Gurion would be willing to consider a compromise, to which the latter replied they had informed the British they would consider a State in a viable part of Palestine . . . . At this point the Czech made a remark that has disturbed the Agency . . . . He said, “You know, Mr. Ben-Gurion, politics is the art of knowing what is possible” . . . .

6. In reply to the Canadian’s question, Ben-Gurion said that if the Government were to leave Jews and Arabs alone in the country, the Jews could take care of themselves . . . .

7. After telling Ben-Gurion to “be precise”, the Indian asked if the Jews based their case on the Balfour Declaration . . . . Ben-Gurion replied that the Jewish claim was 3000 [3500] years old and had merely been confirmed by that Declaration . . . .

8. Asked by the Iranian how he reconciled the delay in establishing an independent state in Palestine until the Jews have a majority here with the principle of self-determination of peoples, Ben-Gurion, after long consultation with Shertok, replied that delay was justifiable in this case because whereas the Jews desire a state wherein all citizens will be equal, the Arabs have officially announced that they would continue restrictions in matters of land sales and immigration . . . . .¹

[Here follows an account of further testimony by economic experts of the Jewish Agency on July 9; for texts, see UNSCOP , volume III, pages 94–103.]

With the appearance of Dr. Chaim Weizmann on the morning of July 8, there was not a seat to be had in the auditorium. For other sessions, the hall had been from one-third to one-half empty, but all classes of Jews turned out to hear their star performer.

Dr. Weizmann spoke for approximately two hours in a well-modulated tone which contrasted pleasantly with intense pitch often attained by Mr. Ben-Gurion. The former President of the Zionist Organization reminisced at length of his experiences in the days when he was the guiding hand of the Zionist effort, “and gradually shaped his discussion toward an appear “to sweep away the White Paper” and for partition along the lines recommended by the Peel Commission “plus the Negeb”. He had words of praise for the British Government and its efforts on behalf of the Zionists in the past, which was also in vivid contrast to the torrential flow of denunciation of that Government which had been poured forth by the Agency. The “High Command” of the latter organization—Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Kaplan—occupied front row seats in the auditorium while Weizmann was speaking, and it was evident that they did not like everything they heard, particularly in the question period which followed his discourse:

1. When the Chairman asked if force should have been used to quell Arab resistance to Jewish immigration, Dr. Weizmann replied that if the Mandatory had been firm in the beginning, force would not have been needed . . . .

2. The Chairman asked if Feisal, in his agreement with Dr. Weizmann,² had not made a reservation to the effect that promises of Arab independence must be carried out . . . . (the Agency, in mentioning the Feisal–Weizmann Agreement, had failed to mention that point) . . . . When Weizmann replied that there was in fact such a reservation, the Chairman then asked if Feisal, in view of what later happened at Damascus, was not justified in considering the agreement void . . . . Ben-Gurion put his head in his hands when Weizmann said, “Yes, I think he was, and we never pressed the point” . . . .

3. When asked by the Indian member if Palestine was not included in Feisal’s Arab States, Dr. Weizmann replied “Definitely not. He was ready to exclude Palestine.”³

While Dr. Weizmann was talking, the Secretariat of the Palestine Government issued a communiqué, the core of which follows:

“. . . . The findings and sentences (of terrorists Nakar, Weiss and Habib) have been confirmed by the General Officer Commanding.

“It will be remembered that as a result of the attack on Acre Prison on 4th May 1947, 251 convicted criminals were set free and loosed on to the community.”

With one voice the entire Hebrew press proclaimed that this was a “brazen challenge” to the United Nations and its Palestine Committee, and the confirmation would probably “drag the country into a whirlpool of blood . . . .” One representative of the Jewish Agency’s Security Department remarked to an officer of the Consulate General that “the Government are masters of timing” … obviously implying that the Government had chosen that moment to goad the terrorists into deeds which would discredit the Jewish Community.

Recalled to the chair for further questioning, the first thing David Ben-Gurion did was to make it clear to UNSCOP that Dr. Weizmann spoke for nobody but himself. One further important point raised at this time was the question of the Holy Places. Mr. Ben-Gurion agreed that international supervision was needed for the sacred shrines to ensure their freedom and safety, but he warned the Committee that in the Agency’s view the Holy Places were not cities nor towns, simply buildings located therein. “For example”, he said, “Jerusalem is not identical with the Holy Places.”⁴

During the afternoon of the same date, UNSCOP decided in a closed meeting that it would not visit Cyprus to inspect the condition of Jews there. At the same meeting, it was also agreed that another approach should be made to the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging for it to give testimony,⁵ and that invitations to testify should also be sent to the Arab States.

The vote on the decision not to visit was as follows:

Against the visit: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Peru and Sweden.

For the visit: Guatemala, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Iran and the Netherlands.

On another vote as to whether UNSCOP should hear representatives of the deportees on that island, the members found themselves in the following lineup:

Again hearing: Australia, Canada, India, Peru and Sweden.

For hearing: Guatemala, Netherlands, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Iran and Czechoslovakia.

As soon as the Committee’s decision not to visit Cyprus became known, the Jewish Agency issued a statement:

“The Agency feels that this decision would be widely misunderstood, especially in view of the fact that it was taken at the same time as it was agreed to renew the appeal to the Arab Higher Committee.”

[Here follow accounts of the testimony on July 9 of the Vaad Leumi (the Jewish National Council) and Rabbi Fishman; see UNSCOP , volume III, pages 103–117.]

Overshadowing the testimony of the Chief Rabbinate and representatives of the Agudath Israel on July 10, was the Arab Higher Committee’s rejection of the new UNSCOP appeal for cooperation⁶ mentioned earlier in this despatch. The Department will be aware from the preceding despatches in this series of our inability to discern any weakening in the Arab attitude toward the maintenance of the boycott, so the actual rejection of UNSCOP’s appeal was not unexpected.

[Here follow accounts of the testimony of the rabbinical witnesses on July 10, of the Anglican Bishop of Jersualem, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland in Jerusalem, and representatives of Jewish Women’s Organizations on July 11, and of the Communist Party of Palestine on July 13; see UNSCOP , volume III, pages 122–164.]

As the fourth week ended, it found the Committee conscientiously immersed in the intricacies of the problem, and the terrorists in their kidnapping ventures. Two British intelligence sergeants were overcome in Nathanya and carried off on the evening July 11. The Irgun and/or Stern gang were obviously preparing for the impending execution of the convicted terrorists mentioned above. Unless the very extensive search undertaken by the military—with the alleged cooperation of Haganah—proved successful, few doubted that the two sergeants would be murdered at about the time the executions are announced, presumably by what the Irgun called in a recent broadcast, its “Committee of Retribution”.

Respectfully yours,

Robert B. Macatee

1. For the text of the hearing of Mr. Ben-Gurion, see UNSCOP , vol. iii, pp. 48–71.
2. This agreement, dated January 3, 1919, was signed at London by Amir Faisal on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz and Dr. Chaim Weizmann on behalf of the Zionist Organization; for text see George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946), p. 437, or The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People (New York, May 1947), p. 16.
3. For the text of the testimony of Dr. Weizmann, see UNSCOP , vol. iii, pp. 72–86.
4. For the text of the continuation of the hearing of Mr. Ben-Gurion, see ibid., pp. 86–94.
5. For letter of July 8 from Judge Sandstrom to the Arab Higher Committee, see UNSCOP , vol. ii, p. 6.
6. For the Arab Higher Committee letter of July 10, see UNSCOP , vol. ii, p. 6.