Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/7–747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] July 7, 1947.

There are attached hereto the outlines of four plans¹ for the future of Palestine which have been worked out tentatively by members of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in cooperation with members of the Office of Special Political Affairs. These plans are in outline form and are not fully developed in detail. It would be difficult to refine them much further without the assistance of other Offices of the Department. Other Offices have as yet not been called upon in view of the necessity of maintaining the utmost secrecy in the matter.

The plans as outlined are as follows:

1. A plan for a uninational Palestine state.

2. A plan for a binational Palestinian state; that is, a single state in which there shall be recognized Arab and Jewish communities.

3. A plan for partition in which a Jewish state shall consist of approximately 1,500 square miles of the territory in which the Jews are in the majority.

4. A variation of this plan for partition in which the Jews, in addition to the territory assigned to them in Plan no. 3, would have also the Negeb, which is composed of approximately 5,000 square miles of land in southern Palestine; most of the Negeb is desert; and it is sparsely inhabited; although there are a few villages and towns in it and nomadic Arabs wander through it from time to time.

No partition plan has been prepared which would give to the Jews a state on the territory of which there are at present more Arabs than Jews since it is felt that a partition on such a basis would be extremely difficult to defend in the light of the principles of the Charter. The Jewish state outlined in Plan no. 4 would contain territory on which there are approximately 450,000 Jews and 310,000 settled Arabs.

Suggested Procedure for Handling of Palestine Problem by the United States Government in Connection With the Coming Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The suggestions set forth below are tentative and subject to revision in accordance with changes in the situation.

In considering the procedure which we should follow with regard to the Palestine problem, which is to come before the General Assembly of the United Nations in the middle of September, we should bear in mind the following:

1. It is improbable that any plan or plans for the future government of Palestine proposed by the Special Committee of Investigation will be acceptable both to Arabs and Jews. It is also possible that such plan or plans will be of such a nature that Great Britain, now the mandatory power, will be unwilling to undertake without assistance to enforce any of them.

2. It is probable that the Special Committee of Investigation will propose several plans for the future government of Palestine, a majority plan and one or more minority plans.

3. There will undoubtedly be extensive debate before the General Assembly or a Committee of that body as to the plan which should be adopted. This debate will probably be extremely heated and there may be threats on the part of various states to withdraw from the United Nations in case the General Assembly should approve a plan which in their opinion would be contrary to the principles of that organization.

4. It is probable that groups of American Zionists supported by members of Congress and other prominent Americans will do their utmost before the General Assembly meets and during the course of the debates to influence the American Government to take a public position with regard to the Palestine problem which would be agreeable to the Zionists. This pressure will become more and more intense from now on.

5. An examination of the various statements and resolutions emanating from Executive and Legislative officials during the last twenty-five years would indicate that in general this Government has taken the position that the mandate for Palestine, which incorporates the substance of the Balfour Declaration, is recognized by us as an international commitment; that the United States Government favors mass Jewish immigration to Palestine; and that it might look with favor upon some arrangement providing for a partition of Palestine, provided such an arrangement gave promise of being workable.

6. It appears probable that it will not be possible, except through the use of force, to continue mass Jewish immigration to Palestine or to establish a workable Jewish state in the whole or in a part of Palestine. The situation today in Palestine is different from that envisaged at the time the mandate was instituted and during the early years of the mandate when it was still considered that a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem could be found. It is therefore proposed that:

1. The United States will not take any public, definite position with regard to the future government of Palestine until:

a. The Special Committee of Investigation has presented its report to the United Nations;

b. The British Government and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs have stated their views with regard to the various proposals contained in that report.

2. At an appropriate time during the debates following the expression of the views of the three parties mentioned in 1 (b), the United States will present its views. The timing of the presentation of the views of the United States will depend upon the circumstances.

3. The plan for the future government of Palestine to be presented by the United States will depend to an extent upon the international situation and the situation in the General Assembly developed as a result of the report of the Committee and of the debates. In the light of the present situation, it is our belief that Plan no. 1 would be preferable from the point of view of the international position of this Government since that plan is based on principles of the character upon which the Charter of the United Nations is based.² There might however be changes in the situation as the result of the Committee’s report and of the debates which would prompt us to present one of the other plans or a variation of any one of the four plans.

4. The United States delegation should exercise special care, in presenting the view of the United States, to make it clear that our proposals are Intended as an elaboration or an improvement upon some plan already tentatively suggested since we must not permit ourselves to be maneuvered into such a position that the plan finally adopted by the General Assembly should be considered as primarily an American plan. If the plan finally adopted should be considered as primarily an American plan or as a plan decided upon as a result of American pressure, we should probably be held primarily responsible for the administration and enforcement of such a plan.

5. We should so shape our tactics that we can retain a considerable amount of flexibility in determining our final position until the final decision with regard to the future of Palestine is made by the General Assembly. By so doing, we might be able to exert in the final stages of the discussion an ameliorating influence which would avert a breakdown in the proceedings of the General Assembly with a subsequent resort to wide scale violence as a means for the settlement of the problem.

6. Before making any proposals of our own at the Assembly regarding the future government of Palestine, we should in advance privately notify both Zionist and Arab leaders what our attitude is and what we intend to do, and endeavor to prevail upon them to go along with us.

7. We should also consider the advisability of announcing publicly our present intention not to take a position with regard to Palestine until we consider that an expression of views by us might be helpful during the course of the proceedings of the General Assembly.

8. In order to facilitate the work of our representatives to the General Assembly, it is suggested that we consider the advisability of:

a. directing one of the delegates of the United States to the General Assembly to concern himself solely with the Palestine problem and of relieving the other delegates of any responsibility for that problem.

b. arranging for the delegate selected to receive his orders direct from the President or from the Department of State, and for him to have a staff, including liaison officers, distinct from the regular staff of the United States delegation to the General Assembly.

1. None printed.
2. In a memorandum of August 27 to Mr. Lovett, Mr. Henderson stated: “It is realized that Plan I for a uninational Palestine is idealistic and may not be attainable; that Plan II may likewise not be acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs. Either one or a variation thereof would, however, in our opinion be preferable to Plans III and IV. Close study invariably indicates that the seeming advantages of partition are outweighed by the real disadvantages which this type of solution would create.” (867N.01/8–2747)