501.BB/5–2747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

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Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly

The attached memorandum,1 prepared at your request, and reviewed in EUR and NEA, analyzes the statements on various aspects of the [Page 1089] Palestine problem made by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the General Assembly. The voting record of the Soviet bloc, the Arab States, and the United States on the principal roll call votes taken at the special session is also appended.2

The memorandum indicates that, despite an apparent shift in the Soviet position at the final meeting of the Assembly, there is no real inconsistency in the various statements of position made by the Soviet Delegation. Throughout, the statements seem designed to straddle the fundamental issue. The Soviets supported full debate on the substantive aspects of the Palestine problem; non-voting participation in the discussions by the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee; consideration of the possibility of immediate termination of the Mandate and an independent status for Palestine; independence after partition if a bi-national state proved to be impracticable; and representation for the Great Powers on the special investigating committee.

In the opinion of a number of delegations and of most, if not all, of the United States delegation, the Soviets thus succeeded in “playing both ends against the middle” in such a way as to gain credit both with the Jews and with the Arabs. It is believed that this non-committal position was maintained to the end because the Soviets are not yet ready to come out forthrightly on the side of the Arabs, preferring to do so later at a moment when the Soviets could reap the greatest benefits in the Moslem world. Meanwhile, as might have been expected, the Soviets made every effort to direct criticism against the mandatory Power.

The efforts of the United Kingdom and United States to avoid discussion of the substance of the Palestine problem at the special session, and to create a neutral committee without Great Power participation, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain credit for a certain degree of leadership in the Palestine question. Gromyko exploited this opportunity by (1) appearing to champion the principle of full discussion; (2) generally favoring immediate independence and termination of the Mandate; and (3) arguing for Great Power participation in the Committee—with the implication that the Soviet Union was the one Great Power willing to assume its responsibilities in relation to this matter.

The course pursued by the Soviets appears to leave the USSR in an excellent tactical position for the future.

  1. Dated May 27, not printed; it was drafted by officers of EUR and OA.
  2. Not printed.