868.00/3–1147
The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to your letter of 5 [6] March 1947 on the Greek situation, the War Department has obtained from the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington an estimate of the military equipment initially required to accomplish a reequipment of the Greek army to make it more effective for the conduct of operations against the dissident bands in Greece. Urgent efforts are being made [Page 106] to determine the availability of the items included in these estimates, which it is understood the British are unable to furnish. The War Department is making inquiries through the Military Attaché in Greece to determine the adequacy and appropriateness of the British estimates, and War Department staff officers have been sent to consult with U.S. officials in Greece. In accordance with your indication as to priority, this determination of availability is being made on a basis of according Greece a higher priority for equipment than that accorded Iran, which to date has had top priority among foreign programs in War Department planning.
It does not seem practicable or desirable to set up a committee outside the established mechanism by which the Departments now conduct their operations around the globe and charge it with the whole range of responsibilities, from legislation to consultation with the Greeks, which pertain to military assistance to Greece. The War Department proposes to handle the matter through the War Department General Staff which controls the machinery by which it might be practicable to implement the War Department side of the program. The Director of Service, Supply and Procurement has designated Colonel Wolfe, of his Division, to handle all matters of procurement and shipment which fall within the province of the War Department. It would seem that the formal and informal relationships through SWNCC would continue to be an adequate medium for integrating policy and general supervision of the program. The Assistant Secretary of War is specifically charged with the policy and general supervision of the program in the War Department.2
The immediate problems are the determination of availability of equipment by the War and Navy Departments and the determination by the State Department of ways and means by which this equipment can be transferred to the Greeks.
The War Department agrees with the view that the independence of territorial integrity of Greece and Turkey is of importance to the security of the United States. In the case of this present emergency concerning Greece and Turkey, we had little forewarning since apparently we had reason to believe the British would continue the needed support for some time. I believe that we should now critically analyze our policy with a view to determining a course of action which [Page 107] achieves the results we desire on a preventative basis rather than on a basis of a critical emergency, such as the current Greek problem. The analysis that you propose in your letter of 5 March 1947, with reference to the British Empire, is a major step along the line of determining the forehanded action which might prevent situations drifting to a point where the only possible successful measures are those of a critical and highly expensive nature. There are other places in the world aside from portions of the British Empire where crises may arise which adversely affect our security, and there are some places, such as the Americas, where no one is going to assist in maintaining stability, except ourselves. We should be particularly careful to be forehanded in such areas.
In keeping with a forehanded determination of over-all policy, it might be well to direct the efforts of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information to keep in step with the conclusions as to developing policy, with a view to establishing beforehand the public support necessary to back this policy with required authority and appropriations. Perhaps the people and the Congress should be informed frankly of the drastic emergency measures which may be required in case we fail to undertake either timely or adequate preventative action in the various areas throughout the globe which are important to our security. It is not enough that the heads of the Executive Departments understand the cost of the foreign policy required to achieve our essential objectives. The Congress and the people must also come to realize it if we are to have any hope of winning this battle.
I offer the above thoughts for your consideration, believing that we are now engaged in a battle to save the peace and that we have not yet completely appraised the cost of this battle and of the measures that must reasonably be taken to assure the preservation of the peace. A complete appraisal should show the total cost of measures required and the probability of meeting this cost with the resources likely to be available. I feel that such an analysis will show that, from the standpoint of resources in funds, manpower, military equipment, etc., we have little chance of meeting the requirements unless we press a policy of preventative action in all areas in which we are vitally concerned.
Sincerely yours,
- The record copy of this communication in the files of the Defense Department is dated March 11, 1947.↩
- On April 1, Acting Secretary Acheson replied in part: “The formation of such a committee was suggested only because of our feeling that the situation is an urgent one and of our desire to provide arrangements that would carry out our proposed program with utmost speed and efficiency. If, in the opinion of the War Department, the program can be expeditiously handled through the existing machinery of the General Staff and SWNCC, the State Department has no objection to proceeding on such a basis. However, should it be deemed more feasible in the future to set up some special arrangements, I should like to feel free to advance the suggestion again.” (868.00/3–1147)↩