Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/1–3147: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

London, January 31, 1946—5 p. m.

690. Palestine Conference met yesterday for two hours. According Beeley (Embtel 658, January 30) following took place:

1. Bevin opened meeting with prepared statement which dealt first with October Arab proposals, secondly, partition and thirdly, British obligations to UN. Bevin said that he did not propose to discuss Arab proposals in detail because they were open to great objection that they would meet with immediate Jewish armed resistance and he doubted whether Jews would ever consent to them. Bevin said that according to Jamal Husseini’s opening statement (Embtel 577, January 28) Arabs would resist any kind of Jewish expansion and thus partition suggestion was subject to same objection as Arab proposals. British Govt is faced consequently with unwelcome prospect of imposing some solution. Bevin said that he wished to make clear to Arab Delegation that present belief British Govt is that in accord with its obligations to UN its next move after talks end would have to be, if agreement is reached, to refer agreed solution to UN for approval; if no agreement is reached, matter would also have to be referred to UN, either with or without a proposed solution suggested by British Govt in absence of agreement.

2. Continuing his statement, Bevin said British Delegation was reluctant to be forced to conclusion that only possible solution is one which British must impose. He asked Arab Delegation to consider, just as he had asked JA Delegation to consider, possibility of a bi-national central government combined with a large measure of local autonomy (see paragraph 6 below) for 2 communities.

3. Jamal Husseini said any solution would be difficult so long as Jews are armed. He asked whether British Govt is sincerely endeavoring to disarm Jews. Creech Jones expanded on difficulties of situation and said that it was almost impossible to disarm Jews. Husseini took up this point and asked whether British Govt is sincerely endeavoring to find a solution on basis of right and justice or whether it is following an appeasement policy under Jewish armed threats.

4. Arab Delegation reserved comment on Bevin’s statement and at end meeting it was agreed that Arab Delegation, when it had had time to prepare its comments on Bevin’s statement, would ask for next meeting—possibly on Monday.

5. Beeley said delegates from Syria and Iraq seemed especially depressed but all were gloomy.

6. Embassy mentioned to Beeley that it heard from outside sources (Embassy’s 677, January 30) that at January 29 meeting, Bevin had “dismissed” partition and urged Jews to consider some variant of Morrison plan. Beeley said that from what he had just told Embassy (see above) it would be clear that in carrying out Cabinet’s instructions to explore fully all possible lines of thought British Delegation was urging both sides, without in any sense having made up its mind, to consider carefully an intermediate proposal which was not strictly speaking, the Morrison plan although it had a number of features in common with Morrison plan. As an example of differences Beeley said the bi-national state British have in mind would involve two communities being actively associated with central govt from the outset, ultimate independence being goal. Purpose behind plan would be to “drive the two peoples in Palestine into a position of responsibility.” It was obviously desirable that Jews and Arabs should both have another look at possibilities inherent in a bi-national state since Cabinet is suspending final judgement until all avenues have been explored.

7. Asked whether British were sending JA Delegation latest edition [“]Morrison plan” Beeley said Colonial Office is sending JA Delegation, in form of mimeographed conference papers, October Arab proposals and Morrison’s speech July 31, 1946,¹ in Commons which is also being sent to Arab Delegation. Dept has copy. British do not intend at this stage to show either Arabs or Jews detailed proposals worked out by Grady and Brook because (a) proposals are a “US-British document and not sole property of British Govt”; (b) showing map might raise storm which could be obviated by negotiation and (c) some of proposals are obviously open to negotiation. While British wanted both Arabs and Jews to think about a bi-national state they had no intention of going in writing beyond Morrison’s speech as a basis for their thinking.

8. Beeley emphasized that while JA Delegation has promised to comment on Morrison’s speech of July 31 and while Arabs have promised to comment on Bevin’s statement of yesterday, in substance both will be commenting on bi-national state idea. It was impossible to keep two sets of negotiations exactly parallel.

9. Beeley said that British Govt’s efforts to get bi-national state considered had had interesting result of making Arab Delegation feel that it was being edged toward partition by gentle stages and of making JA Delegation feel that partition has been dismissed and that it is being urged toward Morrison plan. Both sides are indignant, their differing interpretations stemming from mutual distrust.

10. Asked what move would be if both sides dismissed possibility bi-national state, Beeley said that British Delegation would have “to think again,” and consider desirability of laying before Cabinet a report showing complete absence of any basis for agreement and asking Cabinet to choose one of four alternatives: (a) partition (i.e. Jewish state); (b) Arab proposals; (c) enforcement of some intermediate solution or (d) abandonment of mandate and putting problem without any suggestion to UN for solution. In this event British Delegation would be likely to put to Cabinet for decision at same time how and when Cabinet’s choice should be brought before UN.

Gallman

1. For extract of speech, see British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947), p. 2.