Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/1–3047: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

London, January 30, 1947—7 p. m.

677. Neumann and Shertok gave Embassy today following report re yesterday’s talk:

1. They confirmed paragraph 1 Embtel 658, January 30.

2. Re what took place at meeting (paragraph 2 reference telegram) they confirmed outline of proceedings but emerged with strong impressions far beyond Embtel 658.

3. Ben-Gurion’s opening statement of JA objectives included:

(a) Large scale immigration because approximately 1,200,000 Jews needed [in?] Palestine.

(b) Full development of Palestine for benefit of whole area.

(c) Statehood.

4. Most of talking was done on a free and easy basis by Bevin, who, together with Creech Jones, went over the various solutions which had been suggested. They say that from way Bevin emphasized difficulties of partition they gathered that British delegate had “dismissed” partition as a practicable solution although Bevin did invite JA delegate to draw a map showing their idea of partition. Among objections to partition mentioned by Bevin were:

(a) It is [not?] possible to partition Palestine into two viable states.

(b) Partition would never receive UN approval.

(c) Arab states would object intensely, fearing Jewish state as beach-head for Zionist expansion.

(d) Many Zionists schemes to increase absorptive capacity of Palestine were impractical.

(e) Ben-Gurion’s figure of 1,200,000 Jewish immigrants is out of all reason.

5. Bevin, they say, then turned to Morrison plan which he explained except for an accident would have been known as the “Bevin plan”. He referred continually to “bi-national state”. JA delegate is said to have not understood at first what he meant by this, but it soon became unmistakably plain that Bevin wanted JA delegate to consider some variant of Morrison plan involving Jewish and Arab provincial Govts, together with a central govt including both Jews and Arabs. Above both would be superimposed the mandatory or trustee with certain powers. Bevin indicated Jews might have “a substantial measure of control over immigration” in Jewish province. Bevin asked why Jews objected to Morrison plan (see paragraph 2, reference telegram). Would they not put their objections in writing, comment if they liked on the October Arab proposals and, if they wanted to do so, put forward a concrete plan for partition or otherwise.

6. Shertok pointed out to Bevin difficult position in which JA would be placed if it were itself to put forward partition. Bevin said that this could be done without prejudice JA’s position (paragraph 2 reference telegram).

7. Creech Jones made it clear there could be no return to régime of 1922–37 for reasons stated reference telegram. They say he made additional point that Arabs regarded White Paper as undertaking to them and hence British could not return to status quo ante although British felt they were not hampered by past undertakings in working out some new régime.

8. Shertok then said that if pre-White Paper policy were restored Jews would be willing to defer their claims for statehood. If it is not restored JA must press its claim for statehood.

9. Bevin, until corrected by Neumann, kept referring to the Anglo-American committee as the “American Committee”. He said that personally he would have been prepared to accept all ten recommendations but US would accept only recommendation for the 100,000. Bevin reiterated to JA delegate his statement to Parliament that his reputation is staked on finding a solution for Palestine.

10. Next meeting will take place with JA delegate at [apparent garble], date not yet fixed next week. British agreed to send JA delegate for study copies of Arab proposals and copies of the latest edition of the Morrison plan. British mentioned latter as though it were on hand ready for delivery, but up to this afternoon JA delegate had not received it.

11. Leaving subject of meeting itself, Shertok and Neumann both expressed extreme pessimism. Latter felt that his earlier doubts had been confirmed by yesterday’s talks. Far from recommending that Rabbi Silver should come to London he was himself thinking seriously of returning to US from London after next meeting, leaving his JA colleagues to carry on.

12. Neumann said that although Bevin had insisted that British had no interest in remaining in Palestine it was clear to him from emphasis Bevin placed on Morrison plan that Bevin is seeking a way to justify some form British occupation and administration of Palestine. Any variant of Morrison plan, Neumann said, would mean:

(a) Restrictions re area which Jews may develop, and

(b) Restrictions on immigration, neither of which could be accepted by JA. Shertok said that any concessions re area would have to be compensated by concessions re sovereignty. Neumann feels that talks are “likely to end ingloriously” in spite of JA goodwill.

13. Neumann and Shertok both said that since “apparently” British plan to reject both mandate and partition, time might soon arrive for US intervention. They hoped that the telegram which would be sent as a result of their interview (i.e., this telegram) would cause US Govt to consider carefully what it could do. Both expressed interest in arrival Ambassador Gardner,¹ whom they thought would be suitable person to exercise US “good offices”. Embassy promised to report above to Dept.

14. Embassy said that British kept it informed of developments in both sets of conversations and that from British sources it had received impression that British delegate yesterday only described various possible solutions objectively without favoring any one solution. Neumann and Shertok agreed that Creech Jones had emphasized that British are not backing any one scheme against another and that everything Bevin said was within this framework. However, they said, it was abundantly clear that “Bevin was boss” and that from the emphasis he placed upon it he favored Morrison plan in some form.

Gallman

1. O. Max Gardner, the Appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who died before he assumed the position of Ambassador.