867N.01/1–2147
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Lord Inverchapel called at his request. He stated that he was calling as a result of instructions contained in a somewhat lengthy telegram which he abstracted for me. He said that the telegram opened with a somewhat plaintive review of United States participation in the Palestine problem. It referred to the action of this Government regarding the Anglo-American Commission report in accepting the recommendation regarding immediate immigration of 100,000 but taking no attitude on the other recommendations. It referred then to the Grady mission and our action in being unable to support its recommendations. Finally, it referred to the statement of October 4.1 The telegram [Page 1009] went on to say that the British Government believed that it was essential, in entering the discussions about to open in London, to have as correct a view as possible of the probable attitude of the United States Governments.
The Ambassador went on to say that it seemed probable to the British Government that the results of the discussion in London would not be an agreement upon a solution between the Jews, the Arabs, and the British Government. It was thought unlikely that any solution could be agreed to by Jewish and Arab leaders, but it was possible that a particular solution might be less objectionable to the Jews and Arabs than another and that it might be possible to find one which might be acquiesced in, however grudgingly, with the minimum of opposition. It was for such a solution that the British Government must seek.
In order to get the maximum support for such a solution, the British Government would probably report it to the United Nations General Assembly and ask for its approval. It was therefore necessary for them to know as much as possible about the probable attitude of the United States Government.
It seemed to the British Government that in all probability it would have to take one of three possible courses after the discussions terminated: first, to propose a solution based on partition; second, to propose a solution based on some form of cantonization along the lines suggested by the Grady–Morrison report; and third, to conclude that no solution which it suggested would be acceptable and to surrender the mandate to the United Nations, leaving the problem with the General Assembly.
The Ambassador was instructed to ask me what the attitude of the United States Government would be in the first case mentioned above—that is, would it support in the General Assembly, and with what vigor, a solution based on partition? From the President’s statement of October 4, it seemed probable that the United States would support such a solution. Mr. Byrnes, in his discussions with Mr. Bevin, had put it forward and urged that it be considered, but Mr. Bevin could not free himself from some doubt as to our attitude.
Secondly, the Ambassador was instructed to inquire whether any of the other solutions would, from the point of view of our Government, be preferable, or whether there was some suggestion which we could make which he had not made.
I said to the Ambassador that he would of course understand that I was not authorized to speak on behalf of this Government and would have to consult with the Secretary of State, who would undoubtedly wish to consult with the President. I was willing to give to the Ambassador [Page 1010] my immediate impressions for what they were worth but would give him the reply of our Government in a few days.
I said that I thought the solution which it would be easiest for the American Government to support would be one based on partition. This was based, in my judgment, both on American domestic considerations and upon consideration of the inherent difficulties of the problem. In other words, I thought it more likely that the opposition to such a solution would be vocal rather than physical than would be the case as to any other solution. I said that in my opinion the British Government, in the London discussions, should explore this possibility as earnestly and fully as possible both in an effort to work it out and in an effort to convince the Jews that the British Government had done its best for such a result. I said that I thought the decision and the responsibility for the decision was clearly on the British Government. Its officials could call the atmosphere of the discussions and the possibility of compromise far better than anyone else. In my opinion it was more important to find a solution with the maximum possibility of being put into effect than it was to pick out any particular solution because of the theoretical or dialectical advantages.
Third, it seemed to me that this was about the last chance to find a peaceful solution and that if this chance were lost I saw little hope of avoiding the most serious results in the Middle East. I therefore felt sure that this Government would take a most sober view of the situation and would not approach it from any opinionated point of view.
I said to the Ambassador that one factor seemed to me essential to any possible solution. That was a provision opening up possibilities of immigration. These possibilities ought to comprehend the taking, in a comparatively short time, of approximately 100,000 Jews and some reasonable immigration thereafter. I said that the Arab opposition to immigration was based upon the Arab conviction that it was advocated as the vehicle for changing the Arab majority in Palestine into an Arab minority. This did not seem to me to be necessarily the result. The Arabs already had a substantial majority and the Arab birth rate was considerably higher than the Jewish. This offered possibilities for immigration provisions which would not do great violence to the present ratio of population and which would relieve Jewish pressures.
The Ambassador then inquired about my view as to the other two solutions. I said that past experience led me to believe that the Morrison–Grady proposals would be considerably more difficult for us than the partition proposal, but that it might be possible to explore a solution combining the two, with the ultimate decision as to partition [Page 1011] being left with the General Assembly at some fixed later date, when more experience might be available as a guide to judgment.
For the British Government to surrender the mandate to the General Assembly without proposals did not seem to me to be a solution, but almost amounted to a confession that a solution was not possible and an invitation to a great deal of confusion. I thought that this course should be adopted only as a last resort and in the default of any suggestion other than the maintenance of the status quo by force.
The Ambassador asked whether by “acquiescence, however grudging” I meant the absence of opposition, because if I meant this he thought such a situation not likely to result as the result of any proposal. I said that I did not mean the absence of opposition because I assumed that, whatever proposal was put forward, the leaders on one side or the other, and perhaps on both, would have to make speeches against it in order to maintain their own position. I thought that there was a difference between this sort of opposition and the determined sort of violent resistance which was going on at the present time in Palestine and which had to be put down by the actual exercise of force and coercion. I felt very sure that the American Government would not participate in such an enterprise.
The Ambassador then expressed once more Mr. Bevin’s hope that some form of legislation could be proposed in this country for the reception of a substantial number of displaced persons while the discussions in London were going on. I told the Ambassador that General Hilldring2 was exploring the form of such a resolution with leaders in Congress at the present time and that we hoped by next week to be able to lay the matter before the President, get his decision, and inaugurate some legislative action.3
- By President Truman; see telegram of October 3, 1946, from President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee and footnote 76, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 701, 704.↩
- Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.↩
- Mr. Acheson transmitted this memorandum of conversation to the Secretary of State on the morning of January 22. Later in the day, he suggested in a separate memorandum that the latter might “wish to discuss this memorandum with the President in your meeting with him tomorrow, Thursday, at 12:30. My recommendation is that I be authorized to confirm to Lord Inverchapel the views outlined in the memorandum.” (867N.01/1–2247)↩