711.90F/1–1747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
| Participants: | Secretary Byrnes |
| Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary | |
| Mr. Henderson, Director, NEA | |
| Crown Prince Saud, Saudi Arabia1 | |
| Ambassador Sheikh Fuad Hamza | |
| Sheikh Asad al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Minister to the United States |
[Here follow discussions of political problems in the Near East, particularly in connection with Greater Syria, and of the extension of United States financial assistance to Saudi Arabia; for texts, see pages 738, 1329.]
Palestine
The Prince said that he would like to touch upon the matter of Palestine during the course of his discussions since, unfortunately, there were differences of opinion between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United States in this regard. He pointed out that Zionism was a threat to the Arab world and opposed to the objectives of the United States in the Near East because: (1) it had certain connections with communism, (2) it was anti-democratic, aggressive and totalitarian, and (3) it was anti-God. He said that the most urgent measure to adopt with regard to Zionism was to prohibit entirely further Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Zionist demand for mass Jewish immigration to Palestine was not based on humanitarian motives, but was merely a political maneuver in order to convert the Jewish minority in Palestine into a Jewish majority against the wishes of the local population. Such a maneuver was not in accord with the principles of the United Nations.
Mr. Byrnes described his recent conversation on the subject of Palestine with Mr. Bevin. He pointed out that he had stressed to Mr. Bevin the importance that the coming conference in London be attended by representatives of the British Government and of Jews and of Arabs. Mr. Byrnes had learned from personal experience that unless parties with different views had frank discussions with each other, there was little hope that their views could be composed. On the other hand, he had found that by means of discussions it was frequently possible to find solutions for problems which on their face [Page 1008] appeared insoluble. He stressed the fact that he had not asked Mr. Bevin to decide on any specific kind of solution of the Palestine problem. In fact, he had felt that it would be preferable for the British to approach the conference without having committed themselves in advance to any given solution.
The Prince said that the Arabs would not be willing to sit at a conference table with the Zionists. They had nothing to discuss with the Zionists. They merely asked that the British refuse to admit further Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Secretary replied that apparently the Zionists and the Arabs agreed in one regard, that was that they had nothing to say to one another. The Arabs took the attitude that they would not carry on conversations except on the basis of the cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the Zionists insisted that they would not participate in a conference unless it was agreed in advance that a Jewish State was to be established in Palestine. He still felt that no matter how divergent the views of the Arabs and Jews, it would be helpful to talk the matter over.
Mr. Byrnes added that he was particularly appreciative of the restrained and reasonable manner with which the Arabs were accustomed to discuss with him the problem of Palestine. Palestine represented one of the most difficult international problems in the world today and it, therefore, should be approached with moderation and in a conciliatory spirit.
[Here follows concluding paragraph; see page 741.]