891.6363/9–547: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
846. Certain divergencies between British Ambassador’s instructions concerning Soviet oil question (London’s 69, August 301) and my own [Page 947] (Department’s 487, August 18) have been apparent for some time and threaten to be serious at this stage. British Ambassador’s latest instructions narrows the difference to manageable proportions but there is still a basically divergent approach.
It is now evident to me (this in strictest confidence) that Bevin has wanted to tell the Iranians flatly that British Government thought Iran should ratify the April 1946 agreement without change. Fortunately, Le Rougetel and Bevin’s advisors in Foreign Office were able to persuade him not to insist upon this most unwise move. If he had done so he would have accomplished nothing toward bringing Iran and USSR together on the oil question and present Iran animosity against USSR would have been directed full blast against Britain, cries of a nefarious deal between Britain and USSR at Iran’s expense would have arisen and I have no doubt that we would have been forced publicly to disassociate ourselves from British policy in the matter. Le Rougetel and I have discussed subject frequently at length and he is fully appreciative of foregoing considerations.
Bevin’s latest instructions to Le Rougetel while less damaging were categoric and it seems clear that Bevin not only retains his hope that Iran and USSR will enter into an oil agreement but also that Britain should use its efforts to bring this about. Le Rougetel informed Qavam two days ago and the Shah last night that the British Government felt that if the Majlis refused to ratify the 1946 agreement, refusal should be done in such a way as to make it clear that the door remained open for further negotiations. The Shah pressed Le Rougetel to tell him whether I had received similar instructions. Le Rougetel replied that His Majesty should ask me direct, that he understood there were certain divergences in our instructions but that he felt they concerned tactics rather than fundamental considerations.
Le Rougetel is most anxious that there should be as little difference between American and British approach in this matter as possible and has come to see me a number of times on it. I assured him today of my equal desire to avoid divergent counsels, with their attendant confusion on Iranian minds but that I could do nothing which the Iranians might construe as pressure on them to grant an oil concession against their will. I said that when Iranians asked me whether American Government also felt that Iran should expressly leave the door open for future oil negotiations with USSR I would reply that my instructions did not specifically cover that particular point but that I thought my Government considered it a matter for Iran to decide itself.
A few Iranians (notably Shah who will undoubtedly ask me very pointed questions on this subject when I see him tomorrow) already [Page 948] suspect that British Government wants Iran to enter into some kind of oil agreement with USSR. I feel strongly that we should continue not to advise Iran on the subject one way or the other. We are on unassailable grounds it seems to me, if we continue to repeat to all enquirers that we regard the granting of commercial concessions or privileges within Iran to be the sole prerogative of the Iranian Government, that our policy is to do what we can within the UN to remove the fear of outside aggression or pressure so that Iran can reach its decision in an atmosphere of freedom and independence and that it would not be proper for us or any other power to endeavor to influence that decision. I hope my excellent instructions of August 18 (Department’s 487) will not be changed in any way. As long as we stick to this line and convince the Iranians of our sincerity they can be depended upon to take no action which would jeopardize Iranian independence.
Sent Department 846.
Department pass London 107 and Moscow 97.