891.6363/8–2947: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
816. There is no evidence that either Qavam or members of Majlis are wavering in their determination to refuse Soviet oil proposals. At closed session of Majlis yesterday, representatives of all parliamentary groups spoke against any kind of oil agreement with USSR. Iranian people of all classes have been unified on this point more strongly than on any subject since my arrival here. Soviet insistence on letter of April 4 agreement and now their attacks on Shah are being referred [Page 946] to here as kind of “Pearl Harbor” assault needed to solidify Iranian opinion against agreement. It looks more and more from where I am sitting that Soviets have blundered and are continuing to do so. The respected views of Embassy Moscow in this regard have been noted with interest (Moscow’s 2659, August 16) and while I agree fully that present Soviet tactics will undoubtedly result in making British position in the south more difficult (considerable amount of sentiment among Iranians against any foreign oil concessions is already being engendered by the very bitterness the Soviet demands have aroused), but Soviets have certainly solidified opinion against them in Iran and have made a situation easy to handle, at least on the first round, which I feared would be difficult. It seems to me the Soviets are succeeding in pushing Iran definitely into the anti-Soviet camp although they have one of the most fertile fields for Soviet propaganda here that can be found anywhere in the world.
In my judgment, for what it may be worth, Soviet insistence on the letter of the April 4 agreement and Soviet refusal to negotiate were decided upon in Moscow not because such tactics would put the USSR in a strong position before world opinion as our Embassy in Moscow suggests, but because it was the only tactics a totalitarian government could follow by the very nature of totalitarianism. The USSR could not afford to let the world and its own people see that the great USSR could be forced by a little country like Iran to negotiate a case of this kind. Totalitarians cannot retreat or admit weakness. Inflexibility and threats may be effective temporarily in area where it can be backed up by troops, but in any country free to make its own decisions and willing to do so, such tactics embitter whatever friends USSR may have. Certainly such has been the result in Iran. What the future holds we shall see.
I may add my fullest agreement with most of the views expressed in Moscow’s 2659, August 16.
Sent Dept 816; repeated London 103.
Department pass Moscow 95.