891.6363/8–2047: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran
497. Iranian Min called at Dept Aug 19 on instructions his Govt. In utmost confidence he showed translation telegram received from Qavam covering most recent developments re Sov desire for oil concession in Iran. From telegram it appeared Sadchikov had adopted extremely disagreeable attitude toward Qavam. In cable Qavam showed apprehension re possible Sov reaction should Majlis refuse oil concession and anxiety over support he could expect from US and other interested govts should Sov Union take action against Iranian independence. Qavam felt such action might cause condition of insecurity in Iran in which case he was not clear what help other than moral support would be given Iran, held in the claws of Russia. Qavam requested detailed discussion with authoritative quarters here and telegraphic transmission their comments.
Min said he would “appreciate as clear and concise statement as possible of US attitude re various points raised. Min was told that several points in telegram appeared relate Iranian internal affairs and it would not therefore be appropriate for Dept to comment on them. With regard to our attitude re oil concession Dept made statement somewhat as follows:
[Page 940]- (a)
- It would not be proper for US or any other power to endeavor influence Iran in deciding whether or not it should give such concession Sov Union. We believe Iranian Govt alone is in position to make such decision. It is Dept’s opinion therefore that US would be in better position to continue support integrity and independence Iran before UN if we did not participate in such decision.
- (b)
- We assume of course that in making decision this kind Iranian Govt would consider carefully what effect might be upon economic and political independence Iran. It seems clear that Iranian Govt would not in making decision this kind permit itself yield external pressure but would consider Iranian national interests from long-range point of view. Otherwise it would be difficult for Iran to develop as independent prosperous country. We do not believe furthermore Iranian Govt would permit any kind of pressure to cause it to overlook existence of UN or lose confidence in determination of US and other members of UN to continue support principles Charter UN.
Dept continued that when US assured Iran that it would support before UN independence and integrity Iran in case they should be threatened it was promising more than “moral support”. Dept considers “moral support” to mean merely expressions of sympathy. It is becoming more and more evident that active support through UN could be much more effective than mere expressions of sympathy and concern. Dept did not understand why Qavam referred to Iran as being within “claws” of Russians. Iran is still independent country and not satellite state and therefore not in “claws” of any foreign power.
Nouri1 said he was confident US would support Iran before UN in case of attack by Sov Union but in case all efforts to aid Iran through UN should be frustrated by Sov veto what could Iran expect? Would US be willing to aid Iran by direct means including force?
Dept replied it was impossible for US at this time to state what it would do in case Sov Union disregarding obligations assumed by it in Charter UN should launch armed attack upon Iran. It seemed likely that launching such attack would at once place terrific strain upon UN and might threaten entire structure world security. In case structure UN should be destroyed or distorted by act of Sov aggression of this character we could not at this time predict what result would be. In any event effects would be profound and felt far beyond Iran. It was difficult for Dept to believe Sov Union would wish to imperil UN by committing such overt act of aggression since UN was one of fundaments of world peace and therefore continued existence that organization was important to Sov Union as well as US.
Nouri said he understood Iranian Govt feared not only that Sov Union would engage in act of overt aggression but also that it might [Page 941] endeavor overthrow Iranian Govt by infiltration and numerous sly acts aimed against stability of country. Boundaries between Iran and Sov Union were extensive. It would be easy for Sov Union with its tremendous resources to send surreptitiously across these borders agents who by false promises and lavish expenditure money might stir up or buy up various groups. It might be difficult for Iran to present sufficiently clear-cut case to UN to warrant action until it would be too late to save Iran. Everyone had seen how effective were Sov tactics employed in Greece.
Dept replied that of course such possibilities existed. It should not however be overlooked that UN and world in general had much better understanding this type aggression than they had year ago; that aggression of this kind was now much more readily recognized; and that if Iran would endeavor keep its own house in order and follow internal policies which would cause people of country to regard their govt as beneficial to themselves this danger might be met.
Nouri said he personally realized impossibility US state in advance what it would do in case Sov Union should commit acts aggression against Iran. He could understand that actions of US in case of direct or indirect Sov aggression must be dictated by circumstances of the moment.
Min observed that any kind arrangement between Sov Union and Iran re oil concession would be like arrangement between cat and mouse. Iran could not afford come out and play with Sov Union any more than a mouse could venture out of its hole to play with a cat.
He stated he had recommended to his Govt some time ago that if Majlis should decide reject Sov oil proposal it should at same time make it clear that Iran intended develop by its own efforts such oil lands as might exist in northern Iran and that it would be willing to sell to USSR at world prices such oil as might be produced in that area.
Dept pointed out that USSR at one time permitted numerous foreign concessions in its territory and after considerable experience had decided to cease granting concessions to foreigners. If Iran therefore decided to develop its own resources in northern Iran it would merely be following policy similar to that adopted by Sov Union.
Nouri indicated he had also suggested alternative method for rejecting Sov oil proposal namely that Iran might inform Sov Union it would not in future grant any oil concessions to foreigners except through multi-lateral agreement under aegis UN.
Sent Tehran as Dept’s 497 rptd London as Dept’s 3599 and Moscow as Dept’s 1626.
- Fathollah Noury-Esfandiary, the Iranian Minister.↩