Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

761.91/8–1947: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, August 19, 1947—1 p. m.

4483. Thoughts Moscow’s 305, August 16¹ re latest Soviet move in Iran were tried out informally August 18 on Pyman, Eastern Dept, who observed that in his view whether or not Soviets have made diplomatic blunders depends upon whether USSR is prepared to use open force against Iran. If not, Pyman regards Soviet move as “blunder”.

2. Pyman showed Embassy Le Rougetel’s August 17 telegraphic report re his latest interview with Shah who expressed view on this occasion that there were dangers in allowing Majlis to get down to work. When asked for his opinion Le Rougetel reminded Shah that if Shah’s supporters block indefinitely opening of Majlis for business Shah must be prepared to accept Soviet blame for delaying tactics of his friends. Shah said he understood this and indicated that he would immediately use his influence to stop obstructionism of anti-Qavam and pro-Shah minority.

3. Le Rougetel has reported to FonOff without comment call upon him by Nikpey during which later told same story reported Tehran’s 90, August 15.

4. Asked what advice Le Rougetel would be instructed to give Qavam if latter should seek British Govt views, Pyman said that he thought an instruction to Le Rougetel would be drafted in next few days. He was not sure how far his own thinking would prevail with his superiors but he had in mind saying that the sooner Qavam presents oil agreement to Majlis and the sooner Majlis rejects it the better. Pyman reverted to his idea set forth in paragraph 3 Embtel 4154, July 30 and it seems probable new instructions may contain this idea as possibility for Iranian consideration. On this occasion Pyman phrased his proviso as follows: northern area will be reserved for exploitation by Iranians alone and if Iranians find oil there this oil will be offered to USSR at world prices. Pyman said it seemed to him that if Majlis coupled with turn-down some such formula it might meet to some extent Soviet strategic fears as well as take care of Soviet fiction that oil from northern Iran is needed by USSR. It seemed to him that if USSR continues to press Iran for oil agreement in the light of such a proviso, outline of real Soviet policy towards Iran would be clearly apparent to world—in fact at least five of seven Soviet veils will have disappeared.²

Repeated Moscow 269, repeated Tehran 63.

Clark

1. See footnote 1, p. 934.
2. According to telegram 4499, August 19, 8 p. m., from London, the Iranian Ambassador called on Foreign Secretary Bevin on August 18 to inquire what help Iran might expect from friends, such as Great Britain, in case of Soviet attack. After stating he would need time to study the matter, Mr. Bevin expressed the view that the “Iranian Government ought to make it known to world that it had not tried to back out of its undertaking to USSR to present oil agreement to Majlis. Bevin said that he had always envisaged negotiations between USSR and Iran as being conducted freely whereas it seemed to him that at moment ‘USSR is behaving in a very take it or leave it manner.’” (891.6363/8–1947)

   Telegram 4499 also noted that the Iranian Ambassador in Washington was going to ask an identical question of the Department and expressed Mr. Pyman’s hope that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would say anything that might be interpreted by the Iranians as indicative of diversity in American and British attitudes.