761.91/7–1147: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran
434. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. We have read carefully M12 July 10 in connection urtel 624 July 11.1 Personal representations of Razmara,2 together with your and MA comments, have been studied at length by War and State. War 82395 July 18 reply to MA was drafted in consultation with Dept. Text top secret Dept questions and JCS answers3 last Oct re US strategic interest in Iran being forwarded by courier to you personally.
For your background information in answering official Iranian representations concerning US military assistance to Iran and in giving guidance to MA in this connection, War [Department] estimate present Soviet military disposition vis-à-vis Iran is as follows: Soviet troop concentrations along northern border Iran are now, and have been for some time past, adequate to overcome speedily any resistance Iran could offer. No new Soviet troop movements of significance along Iranian border and no change of command which would indicate imminence of Soviet military action against Iran have been reported. Obviously, a surprise attack is within Soviet capabilities. It is not believed that at present any assistance could be brought to Iran which would appreciably enhance Iranian resistance. Principal immediate [Page 925] strategic target in Iran of any Soviet attack would doubtless be AIOC installations Abadan. Slight possible augmentation Iranian ground defenses could not hamper probable Soviet airborne operations in this connection. Tribes, in or out of Iranian Army, could offer at best guerrilla resistance to Soviet operations in Iran. In event of Soviet-Iranian hostilities, basic Iranian interests would be helped or hurt primarily by military and political developments in other theaters.
Also for your background information, State estimate Soviet political disposition vis-à-vis Iran is as follows: In context overall Soviet foreign relations, internal economic and political situation Soviet Union indicates that Soviet Govt will seek to avoid any overt act of aggression in near future. In face of difficult defensive position imposed on USSR by SC findings of satellite support to guerrilla warfare in Greece, it is not expected that Soviet Govt will at this time undertake military action against Iran. Any such action would pre sumably be undertaken only in light of global political and logistical factors of significance to Soviet Union. Any conspicuous increase of US assistance to Iranian Army at this time would probably launch a barrage of Soviet propaganda of some plausibility that US was undertaking to establish an effective base of military operations in Iran against the Soviet Union. It is recognized that failure of Iranian Majlis to approve Soviet oil proposal would probably be seized upon by Soviet Govt as propitious occasion to intensify its propaganda efforts to bring about “a friendly Govt” in Iran. Such propaganda might well be accompanied by infiltration of Russian-supported refugee elements across Azerbaijan border (penultimate paragraph, MA 3082, June 10).
Implicit in Iranian representations and Emb comments on US military assistance to Iran is inference of similarity between situation in Greece and Turkey on one hand and Iran on other. Our policy of military assistance to Greece and Turkey is based on urgent appeal to replace Britain as source of supply. Failure on our part to meet that appeal would have led to obvious immediate deterioration of situation. In effect, therefore, US assistance to Greece and Turkey is intended to maintain status quo defensive attitude those countries. None of these circumstances applies in case of Iran. We recognize similarity of geographical position of all three countries vis-à-vis Soviet Union and similarity of Iranian situation in the past to Greek-Turkish situation today and dangers that may develop in Iran in the future. At same time, present relations between Iran and Soviet Union give little basis for such new US commitments to Iran as may be interpreted by USSR, American public, and world opinion as interference in Iran or threat to Soviet Union. Any initiative on part of Iran [Page 926] or US to worsen present Iranian-Soviet relations might bring about very situation which we seek to avoid and would not be in interest of Iran, US, or world security generally. As further limiting factor upon additional military assistance to Iran at this time, recent Dept confidential survey of American public opinion reveals that while 61% approve US policy toward Russia, only 34% approve of sending military supplies to Greece.
With regard to your suggestion concerning material assistance to Iran at present time, Dept is supporting fullest implementation military supplies agreement, in anticipation Majlis approval, at lowest possible cost to Iran consistent with similar FLC agreements with other countries. Dept is now actively supporting Iranian request for up to twelve ships from Maritime Commission. Further, new Military Mission agreement4 and Iran pilot training in US is receiving favorable study. There is danger that further US military assistance to Iran at this time might be more provocative than helpful.
Your suggestion that I make specific public reference to Iran on appropriate occasion will be borne in mind.
Pertinent to possible future Iranian appeal to UN is statement of US Rep Austin to SC on June 27 on occasion of report by Commission of Investigation of Greek Border incidents, as follows: “Any intelligent person in possession of the facts cannot fail to recognize the use here of force, no matter how devious the subterfuge. We must recognize what intelligent and informed citizens already know. In supporting guerrillas in northern Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania have been using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. They have in fact been committing the very kind of acts which the United Nations was designed to prevent, and have violated the most important of the basic principles upon which our organization was founded.” In case proposal for effective border commission is vetoed in SC, US believes that failure of SC to act does not forbid or preclude individual or collective action by states willing to act so long as they act in accordance with general purposes and principles of UN. This is particularly true when such individual or collective action is in support of policy or course of action which has approval of clear preponderance of permanent and nonpermanent members of SC. (Deptel 2992 July 11 to London5). Above position is, of course, tentative and for your strictly confidential information.
[Page 927]In the premises, we feel that security of Iran depends in large measure upon determination of Iranian Govt to stand up for country’s independence and upon measures within its own competence to reduce plausibility of excuse for intervention by any predatory power. To these ends Iran would be well advised to turn its attention energetically to measures which would tend to unify divergent elements of the country in support of honest, progressive Govt well-disposed to all friendly foreign powers. Implementation of such attitude would expand economy of country and lessen causes of internal discontent and insecurity.
- Not printed; it reported that while the U.S. policy of aid to Greece and Turkey was recognized in Iran as a tremendous step forward, it also created the impression that the United States was building a dam across two-thirds of a river, leaving the other third open (761.91/7–1147).↩
- Gen. Ali Razmara, Iranian Chief of Staff.↩
- See Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring’s memorandum of September 26, 1946, to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee and the Committee’s response of October 12, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 515, 529.↩
- The agreement extending the life of the American Military Mission with the Iranian Army was signed at Tehran on October 6, 1947; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1666, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3306.↩
- Not printed.↩