891.6363/7–1647: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
681. The Shah suspects that British Ambassador may be encouraging Qavam to take the initiative in drafting counter-proposals in connection [Page 923] with Soviet oil agreement (Embtel 675, July 25). I asked Le Rougetel about this yesterday, without mentioning the Shah’s suspicions. Le Rougetel says he thinks it would be unwise for Qavam on his own initiative, to present counter-proposals to the Soviets, but Le Rougetel finds it quite natural that Qavam would have such counterproposals prepared in case the Soviet authorities accept his (Qavam’s) expressed willingness to enter into further negotiations on subject.
As regards procedure to be followed Le Rougetel thinks it preferable for the existing Soviet proposals not to be submitted to the Majlis. If the Soviets fail to respond to Qavam’s already stated readiness to enter into further discussions he thinks the Iranian Government should let agreement of April 4, 1946 die a natural death. I am inclined to differ with my British colleague on this point. If Soviets do not accept Qavam’s invitation to negotiate further it seems to me preferable for him to carry out his undertaking of April 4, 1946, and submit the proposals to Majlis as agreed upon last year. Otherwise USSR will, always have a basis for accusing the Iranian Government of having failed to carry out a commitment.
Moreover it seems to me that Qavam’s idea of drafting counterproposals is a questionable decision. He could never ask for more safeguards than he included in his counter draft and could only retreat under pressure. Moreover, the very fact that he is willing to draft indicates an inclination towards some agreement. Qavam has expressed confidence in talking with the Shah that Soviets would not accept any agreement he was willing to propose, but I am not certain Qavam is correct, and even if he were, the end results would be prolonged disturbances between Iran and USSR over the petroleum question rather than a clean-cut decision in matter.
The foregoing raises the question again of basic attitude which we should assume towards Soviet petroleum activity in Iran. Some Britishers and I believe certain Americans think that a Soviet concession in northern Iran would reduce likelihood of pressure for cancellation of British and eventually American oil concessions on the Persian Gulf. This point of view is essentially that which brought about the British-Russian division of Persia into spheres of influence in 1907, soon after the British oil concession in southern Iran was first obtained. This point of view seems to me both wrong in principle and unwise in practice. In principle it tends towards sacrificing the sovereignty and integrity of a member of the UN in the interest of the great powers. If the policy received the just scorn of enlightened world opinion in 1907, how much more should we reject it today, when our UN policy is directly opposed to great power deals at the expense of small nations. In practice, a Soviet petroleum concession in northern Iran would be an entering wedge for increased Soviet activities and demands in Iran [Page 924] and the end result would be, in my view, more rather than less pressure against both the British and eventually against the American petroleum positions in Persian Gulf.1
I would welcome Department’s thoughts on these subjects. I think we should avoid an expression of our views to the extent possible at this juncture, but background guidance would be valuable.
Sent Dept. 681; repeated London 79; Dept. pass Moscow 73.
- In telegram 2517, July 28, from Moscow, Ambassador Smith expressed agreement with Ambassador Allen’s analysis in telegram 681, concluding that “While neither we nor British are in position to oppose oil concession to USSR in north Iran, we should certainly not encourage it on mistaken notion Kremlin will thus be quietly satisfied. In organisms of this kind both appetite and capacity grow with eating.” (891.6363/7–2847)↩