Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BC Greece/8–947: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions ¹

secret

Washington, August 9, 1947—2 a. m.

Please deliver orally to foreign minister message given below, explaining that it is intended as informal statement of US position on Greek case before Security Council and as explanation of our reasons for giving support to Greek request for action under Chapter 7 of UN Charter. Inform FonMin that same communication is being made to Govts, of other seven members of Council who joined with us in voting for US resolution of June 27 and who have shown they share our belief in need to act positively to preserve Greek independence and Balkan peace. It is not being made to Govts, of Poland or USSR. Communication should be regarded as secret.

For your info, our purpose is to assure Govts. concerned that we have definite plan of action in mind and to counteract attitude of hopelessness or uncertainty recently displayed by some of them in face of Soviet veto. However, message is not meant to elicit direct instructions to representatives on SC and you should refrain from suggesting such action.

“It is the view of the US Govt that Greece is in grave peril. This peril results from the guerrilla warfare being waged against the Greek Govt by communist-led bands actively supported by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and by the Communist Party of Greece. It is perfectly clear that the govts of the three northern countries are working in close conjunction with the Greek communists with a common objective: the establishment in Greece of a minority, totalitarian govt which would be subservient to the communist-controlled countries.

The US Govt considers that the evidence obtained by the Subsidiary Group of the Security Council Investigating Commission, as set forth in a series of reports to the Commission and the Council, unquestionably proves that substantial assistance is being received by the Greek guerrillas from the northern countries and further shows that this assistance is of such importance as to constitute a very serious threat to Greek independence and integrity. In addition, the US has reports from its own and other sources which provide reason to believe that preparations are being made for the use, in support of the Greek rebels, of foreign armed forces on the pattern of the international brigades which served in the Spanish civil war. The US Govt believes that the potential intervention of such international brigades in the Greek situation seriously increases the grounds for apprehension that Greece will lose its independence or that even more serious consequences will ensue.

It is because of the obvious seriousness of the situation that this Govt has taken so active an interest in the Greek complaint to the SC. We believe that with the American assistance now being made available, and with the assistance which other nations and international organizations may be able to provide in the future, Greece can solve her domestic difficulties, provided she is relieved from the constantly growing threat from the north. We further believe that this threat can be checked if it is firmly faced by the great body of world public opinion which can be mobilized in the UN.

When the report of the Investigating Commission was first submitted to the SC, the US thought that the measures proposed in its Resolution of June 27 would prove adequate to reestablish order along the northern Greek frontier and that these measures were at the same time designed to offer maximum possibility of acceptance by the Council. They did in fact command the support of 9 of the 11 members of the Council, clearly showing that our views were shared by nearly all of the govts represented. However, the implementation of these proposals was frustrated by the veto of the Soviet Union.

During the debate on the US resolution, the situation along the Greek border grew worse rather than better. We believe that the evidence laid before the Council by the Subsidiary Group, taken in conjunction with the renewed request of the Greek Govt and the continued defiance of the SC and its Subsidiary Group by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, now more than ever obligates the Council to seek positive measures which would, if adopted, have a reasonable prospect of success. We believe that this course is required by the terms of the Charter, by common logic, and by the necessity for preserving the prestige of the Council. This Govt is firmly convinced that the standing of the Council before the world can never be maintained by avoiding the issues or by attempting to take measures which are obviously inadequate.

It is the conviction of the US that each member of the Council has a duty in a case of this kind to act in accordance with the facts and in conformity with the high principles of the Charter. Each member must live up to the trust reposed in it by the UN. Each member must take a stand for what it conceives to be the right, in the interest of international justice and peace.

Even though the efforts of the majority of the Council should be blocked by the exercise of the veto, the US does not consider that these efforts would thereby prove fruitless. On the contrary, a firm stand by the majority on this issue would demonstrate to the world the determination of nine of the eleven members of the Council to prevent aggression, whereas a failure by the Council to meet the issue squarely would be a signal to aggressors and potential aggressors that they could act with impunity, secure in the belief that their actions would be tacitly condoned.

We hope that the majority of the Council will join with us in supporting a finding and action under Chapter 7, not only for the fundamental reasons given above but also for the tactical reason that a clear decision by the majority of the Council, even though frustrated by a veto, would provide an almost indispensable foundation for effective future action within the framework of the Charter.

It is our thought that should the Council, having done all in its power to cope with the situation, for the present at least, be unable to afford Greece the necessary protection, the problem must inevitably be carried to the GA. If a substantial majority of the Council declares by its words and its votes that there exists in the Balkans a threat to the peace requiring action by the UN, this action by the majority will provide a powerful impetus for the Assembly and for the mobilization of world opinion. In case of continued failure of the SC to act we are confident that the GA will exercise its powers to the limit for the protection of Greece.

We do not propose at this early stage to harden our thinking with respect to the exact type of action which the GA might take, since much depends on the development of the situation in Greece. We would hope that the great majority of members of the GA would view the situation with the same degree of seriousness as the US Govt and we would count on an exchange of views with regard to proposals for action.

The US, for its part, would be prepared to comply with any GA recommendations for the solution of this problem. It would also be prepared to cooperate with likeminded members of the UN in taking any steps which might become necessary within the terms of the Assembly recommendations or within the provisions of the Charter to afford Greece the protection to which she is entitled under the Charter.”²

Marshall

1. Sent for action to the diplomatic missions in London, Paris, Brussels, Bogotá, Nanking, Damascus, Canberra, and Rio de Janeiro. It was repeated for information to the United States Mission at the United Nations and to the Embassies in Moscow, Warsaw, and Athens.

2. The Department noted in telegram 3024, August 13, to Paris that Ambassador Johnson, on August 12, made a statement before the Security Council along the lines set forth in the circular telegram of August 9, “omitting reference to possibility of international brigades intervention and adding statement that failure of SC to act as result of Soviet veto cannot preclude individual or collective action by nations willing to act so long as their action in accord with general principles and purposes of UN, especially when such action is in support of policy having approval of preponderance of non-permanent and permanent members of SC.” (501.BC Greece/8–1347)

   Ambassador Johnson presented, at the same time, a resolution which closely paralleled the Department’s instruction in telegram 337, August 5, p. 878. The texts of his statement and of the resolution he introduced are found in SC, 2nd yr., No. 74, pp. 1907 and 1910.