Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BC Greece/8–2647

Memorandum by Mr. Cyril E. Black of Mr. Mark F. Ethridge’s Staff¹

secret

[New York,] July 21, 1947.

Subject: Policies of Security Council Members as Reflected in the Work of the Balkan Commission of Investigation

[Here follow sections on Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, and Syria.]

USSR

It was clear from the start that the aim of the Soviet Delegation was to keep the work of the Commission focused on the Greek domestic situation and to take advantage of every opportunity to use the Commission as a springboard for propaganda directed against the Greek Government. This attitude was clear from the insistence of the Soviet Delegate that the Commission remain at Athens for the entire period of its work, including the writing of its report. The Soviets objected from the start to the Commission’s moving to Salonika to hear Greek witnesses and objected strenuously to the U.S. proposal that it visit Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Once it had sensed the trend of Commission feeling, however, the Soviet Delegation conceded the necessity that the Commission leave Athens and concentrated its efforts on obtaining a maximum hearing of the EAM case against the Greek Government. Also, once it had accepted the principle of sending Commission teams out to make such investigations, it took steps to assure that the number of visits made to villages allegedly destroyed by the Greek gendarmerie, or other places connected with the alleged reactionary policy of the Greek Government, be visited roughly in equal proportion to the trips requested by the Greek Government to places connected with guerrilla attacks. In addition to their efforts made in this direction through the regular Commission machinery, the Soviet Delegation also went to considerable lengths to introduce into the Commission’s work materials useful for EAM propaganda such as letters from captured guerrillas held in jail or sentenced to death by the Greek Government.

Of equal importance to these tactical efforts to direct the attention of the Commission to domestic conditions in Greece was the strong opposition expressed by the Soviet Delegation to the United States efforts to introduce the Macedonian question into the Commission’s debates. While the Macedonian question was introduced merely for the purpose of clarifying the political objectives of the guerrillas, the Soviet Delegation declared that it did not come within the competence of the Commission because it was a territorial question. The great sensitivity of the Soviet Delegation on this point was generally regarded at the time as a reflection of its deep concern lest the Commission pry further into the propaganda directed by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments with a view to detaching the province of Macedonia from Greece. While the Soviet Delegation did not succeed in its efforts to prevent the Commission from introducing the Macedonian question, it prevented a fuller investigation on the part of the Commission which might have uncovered a great deal more material than was actually included in the Commission’s report.

The decisive evidence regarding the Soviet attitude toward the subject of the Commission’s investigation, however, was its preparation of minority conclusions (Report, Vol. I, pp. 183–238), and its refusal to subscribe to the proposals approved by nine members of the Commission. (For the Soviet objections to these propposals, see Report, Vol. I. pp. 252–253.)

[Here follows a section on the United Kingdom.]

1. Transmitted in a memorandum of August 26, 1947, to four officers of the Department by Harding F. Bancroft, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs; the transmitting paper noted that Mr. Black’s memorandum had been approved by Mr. Ethridge.