Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BC/7–1147: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

top secret

Washington, July 11, 1947—8 p. m.

308. In the Dept’s view, should it be necessary to make the statement which is contemplated in the final paragraph of Deptel 298 to New York,¹ the statement might well contain the following points:

(a) It is the opinion of the United States Government that the use of the veto in this case is especially regrettable, since the United States resolution of June 27 avoided raising the question of responsibility on which there is a difference of opinion among the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States resolution did not differentiate among any of the states concerned but merely attempted to set up machinery for investigation and conciliation, the kind of action which the Security Council should normally take on the basis of Chapter VI of the Charter in a case of this kind. A proposal of this nature does not raise major political issues and the use of the veto on such a proposal is contrary to the spirit of Part I, paragraph 8 of the Four Power Statement of June 7, 1945.² The use of the veto in this case likewise obstructs the operations of the Council, contrary to the recommendations contained in the General Assembly resolution of December 13, 1946,³ and frustrates the desires of nine of the eleven members of the Security Council to set up machinery for pacific settlement in one of the disturbed areas of the world.⁴

(b) When a Member of the United Nations comes to the Security Council seeking protection from the intervention of its neighbors and when a majority of the members of the Security Council find that such intervention is taking place, the United States Government believes that the Security Council must find a way to afford such protection. If it is not able to do so, its fundamental purpose is lost.

This Government will not sit idly by while the territorial integrity and political independence of a Member of the United Nations are challenged. We wish to make it very clear that we shall not hesitate to exhaust every available means within the framework of the Charter to provide Greece with whatever protection she may need in the future. We do not consider that our obligations in this regard are ended merely because the Soviet Union has seen fit to block the passage of constructive proposals which would have afforded Greece the protection the Charter guarantees to her.

(c) The continued failure of the Security Council to take effective action in this case would not, in the opinion of the United States Government, forbid or preclude individual or collective action by States willing to act, so long as they act in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United Nations. This is particularly true when such individual or collective action is in support of a policy or course of action which has the approval of a clear preponderance of the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.

(d) The United States Government believes that Greece had every right to expect the protection which would have been afforded by the United States resolution and it is apparent that the majority of the members of the Security Council agreed with us. We do not believe that the present resolution affords the degree of protection which we feel the situation actually demands. It is thus the intention of the United States to continue to follow very closely the situation which now exists in the area. We recognize, however, that a commission with investigatory powers limited geographically would, in a sense, serve as an international witness in Greece to any further assistance to guerrillas from Greece’s northern neighbors and we are therefore willing to accept such a commission.

Marshall

1. Dated July 7, not printed.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1047.
3. For text, see editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, p. 355.
4. For a further expression of the Department of State attitude toward a possible Soviet veto of a proposal for an effective border commission, see telegram 434, July 29, to Tehran, p. 924.