501.BC Greece/6–2647: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
us urgent
280. For Senator Austin. Following the helpful discussion between you and members of the Department on last Friday, the following [Page 867] guidance is provided as to the presentation of the United States position on the Greek case before the Security Council.1
The case is one of peculiar difficulty for the Security Council because the acts complained of by Greece and substantiated by the report of the Commission of Investigation are a part of a world-wide Communist effort to subvert governments and institutions not subservient to the Soviet Union. The Government and Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent those of Bulgaria and Albania, have been carrying on activities under the direction of the USSR the purpose of which is (1) to separate Macedonia from the remainder of Greece in order to make Grecian Macedonia a part of a new Macedonian state, and (2) to set up eventually in the remainder of Greece a Communist-controlled government which would force Greece into a Soviet-dominated Balkan bloc. These activities have included the despatch of arms and military equipment to Greek guerrillas, the training and sending to Greece of reinforcements for the Greek guerrillas and the extension of aid through many other means to the Greek subversive Communist movement. There is some possibility that organized Communist groups are now being made ready in other countries to go to Greece to furnish direct military support to the guerrillas.
The above information is for your background only. In the light of this background, it is of the greatest importance that you have before you the following considerations during the discussions of the Greek case in the Security Council:
- (1)
- A clear line of differentiation should be drawn at all times between the role of Greece on the one hand, and the role of the three northern neighbors on the other. We cannot concede in any way that Greece is guilty of interference in the internal affairs of the other three countries. These three countries, however, are guilty of armed intervention in Greece and we can not agree that any developments which may have taken place or are taking place in Greece can be regarded as any justification whatsoever for such intervention.
- (2)
- In keeping with the Commission’s report, criticism should be directed principally against Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent against Bulgaria and Albania.
- (3)
- Security Council should not permit itself to be drawn into a long debate about either the domestic or foreign policies of Greece. While the U.S. Representative should not attempt to justify all acts of the Greek Government, he should defend the Greek Government as [Page 868] expressive of the will of the Greek people and as a government struggling in adverse circumstances to preserve the independence and integrity of Greece. In assessing the various actions of the Greek Government, the Security Council must bear in mind the situation in which the Greek Government is endeavoring to carry on the reconstruction of Greece.
- (4)
- The occurrence of a large number of typical Balkan border incidents should not be allowed to divert attention from the systematic, aggressive policies of the three northern neighbors, expressed in support for guerrilla warfare in Greece and directed toward the overthrow of the Greek Government.
- (5)
- U.S. participation in the Security Council debate should clearly establish an American view which lays the ground-work for further action in the Security Council or the General Assembly if the policies and activities complained of continue.
- (6)
- During the proceedings, we should not accept any kind of a resolution the purpose of which would be to place any blame whatsoever upon Greece for the armed interference by other countries in Greece’s internal affairs.
- (7)
- During the proceedings relating to the terms of reference of the Continuing Commission, we should steadfastly refuse to agree to amendments which would permit such a commission to concern itself in any way in Greek internal affairs and with the work of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, and which would seriously reduce the effectiveness of the American Mission for Aid to Greece. Care should be taken in this connection to prevent the Soviet Union and its satellites from using the threat of a veto in order to bring about the setting up of a Continuing Commission which, because of its terms of reference or composition, would be of questionable value. A Soviet veto of a resolution providing for the setting up of a Commission would be preferable to the acceptance of compromises which would reduce the effectiveness of such a Commission. Specifically, the U.S. Representative should insist that the Continuing Commission should have complete freedom of entry into all areas in which it wishes to conduct investigations.
You are authorized to support on behalf of the United States the recommendations of the Commission of Investigation, particularly that portion contained in paragraphs A through E on pages 248–251 of the Commission’s report.
- The Security Council, on June 27, began formal consideration of the Report of the Commission of Investigation. For Ambassador Austin’s remarks that day and the text of his draft resolution, which was based on the recommendations of the Commission, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 51, pp. 1117, 1124.↩