501.BC Greece/6–947: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
252. 1. Dept’s principal objective in Greek case is to enable SC to fulfill its responsibilities with respect to settlement of the dispute by terminating border violations by Greece’s northern neighbors through adoption of substance of Investigation Commission’s proposals.
2. Dept considers essential proposals of Commission are those contained in paragraphs A through E.1 Introductory material preceding proposals A through E included in text of Commission proposals consists of conclusions of fact and should not be adopted by SC as recommendations. Furthermore, viewed as conclusions of fact, this material is considered inadequate by Dept. It should be omitted from SC recommendations if this can be accomplished without loss of any supporting votes or without jeopardizing adoption of proposals by SC.
3. The Investigation Commission has found acts by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria which in our view constitute aggression. We believe that most members of SC and world opinion will agree. Although this aggression is real and if continued might require enforcement measures, the nature of the aggression is such as not to create a military emergency necessitating immediate action under Chapter VII. In this case there is an opportunity for pacific settlement if Greece’s northern neighbors are willing to end their aggressive actions against Greece. In a case of this kind the Charter contemplates exhaustion of the means of pacific settlement prior to taking enforcement measures. We believe that USSR would veto any recommendation for the settlement of the dispute which contained a finding of aggression under Article 39 or of direct responsibility of Greece’s [Page 866] northern neighbors. However, it is much less likely that USSR would veto constructive proposals for settlement not containing such findings and approved by a large majority of SC. We realize that failure of SC to make an immediate finding of aggression might have unfortunate effects on UN. However, if SC effects a settlement of the dispute and puts an end to violations of Greece’s border by her northern neighbors, any unfortunate results from its failure to make such finding would be minimized.
4. In Dept’s view, therefore, objective set forth in para 1 above is most likely of attainment if SC does not attempt to make (a) any decision with respect to “conclusions” (Ethridge 652), (b) any formal finding within the meaning of Chapter VI with respect to responsibility, or (c) any determination under Article 39.
5. In our view, subject to your concurrence, the most effective way in which to obtain agreement in SC to Commission’s proposals would be for US representative to carry on comprehensive consultations with all permanent and most other members of SC in advance of SC proceeding. These consultations should take place as early as practicable in order that other representatives may have time to obtain instructions from their govts. In these consultations you should make it clear that if SC is prevented by a veto from adopting the Commission’s proposals, the US is determined to pursue the matter until a satisfactory solution is reached.
6. For your info only in case of a veto we are considering what other remedies can be sought in UN, specifically the possibility of asking SC to make a finding under Article 39 and the possibility of action in the GA. Dept is also considering what additional action in its international relations consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN should be taken to prevent recurrence of actions of aggression against Greece by her northern neighbors in contravention of the Charter.