Office of the Historian

501.BC/7–147 Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret
London, July 1, 1947—5 p. m.

3607. Substance Department’s 2784, June 27 was conveyed today to Lascelles, head, Egyptian Department FonOff, who had following to say.

1.
He readily understood Department’s thinking this connection. Azzam Pasha1 had told Beeley2 in New York during special UNGA that Brit and Egyptian Governments should get together behind SC scenes and work out an agreed solution which SC could rubber-stamp.
2.
Azzam had been told that there were moral and formal objections to cooking up a solution behind back SC which might thereby lose some prestige. After making this point, which Lascelles thought should not be given exaggerated importance, Azzam was asked on what basis he thought there could be a behind-the-scenes settlement. Egyptians in British view would have to find way to return to terms roughed out in Bevin–Sidky agreement or there would be nothing to talk about.
3.
Lascelles said that observers might understandably assume that when negotiation impasse is reached the two parties are sulking and that exercise of good offices, in this case by Azzam or Arab states, might push or pull two parties into agreement.
4.
However, Lascelles could categorically assure Embassy that for its part British Government is neither sulking nor holding back: Bevin–Sidky agreement stretched British position to utmost and there is no concession British can now make to Egypt without jeopardizing British vital commitments to British people re Sudan or creating dangerous defense vacuum in Egypt between now and September, 1949.
5.
Some members WAFD pass lightly over Sudan issue and tell British that if British will shorten materially withdrawal date Egyptian public opinion will swing so far over to British that “British [sic] will get kind of treaty it wants”. Lascelles thought there was nothing to this vague line because WAFD itself has been taking an extreme attitude on question and resultant treaty, if any, would be of little practical value.
6.
Lascelles said that British Government appreciates fully political difficulties involved for Egyptian politicians in retreating from their stand. Perhaps Egyptians would not have gotten themselves into present box if they had realized that Bevin, in dealing with Sidky, had honestly and sincerely moved to maximum extent towards Egyptian point of view. Egyptians had tried standard Near Eastern trick of rating Bevin’s concessions at zero and endeavoring to negotiate from these British concessions as merely a starting point. Actually, British have no more concessions to make (Embassy’s 3364 of June 193).
7.
Lascelles said that Bevin had discussed to some extent British stand vis-à-vis Egypt with Secretary in Moscow. He knew of American interest in problem and since he had just given Embassy British view of situation he thought it logical to inquire informally how Department’s impartial eyes regard Bevin–Sidky proposals. He was speaking personally but he would like to know whether Department officials think these proposals are fair and reasonable. Does Department, for example, see any [apparent omission] to which British Government could move in direction of Egypt without jeopardizing vital interest? Embassy representative promised to put these questions to Department in same informal manner as Lascelles posed them. Lascelles appeared to be honestly curious to know Department’s views and to have in back of his mind idea that FonOff may be too close to B–S proposals to see them altogether in perspective.

[Here follows paragraph 8 on Arab leaders who might attend the Security Council meeting.]

Douglas
  1. Abdel Rahman Azzam, Secretary General of the Arab League.↩
  2. Harold Beeley, officer in the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office immediately responsible for Palestine affairs; at this time a member of the British Delegation to the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly.↩
  3. Not printed.↩