501.BB/5–747: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State
552. I have given most careful thought to substance urtel 705, May 3, 10 a. m., and while offering my comment as to advisability unofficially communicating Department’s views Egyptian Government I would request elucidation on one point which is not clear to us.
Urtel states that on technical grounds US considers GA to be appropriate organ for solution Sudan question rather than SC. Furthermore, while admitting that troop question is clearly within jurisdiction SC, Department rightly points out resulting disadvantages if Egypt brings controversy with UK to SC which would result in aligning USSR with Arab states.
[Page 773]In view above, is it Department’s thought that both questions, namely Sudan and troop evacuation, might be referred GA in preference SC?
Before recording our reactions concerning advisability communicating informally your views to Egypt Government I wish review local situation as it now stands regarding Anglo Egyptian controversy.
From careful sifting information obtained from reliable sources I am convinced that question as to which organ of UN controversy should be referred has passed into realm of internal politics. I have been categorically informed by person mentioned in my top secret despatch 2275, February 28, 1947,1 that while Nokrashi greatly desires treaty, his motivating ambition is to go down in history as man who got British out of Egypt. To him, Sudan question while important, has become secondary.
Nokrashi considers that time has become of essence. He feels sands running out for his tenure office. Cabinet changes expected shortly may weaken rather than strengthen his government. He therefore opposes going before GA because he regards it as a time consuming move since under charter it cannot make decisions without reference to SC. Nokrashi is also unwilling consider GA because political rivals including Haikal Pasha, whom he feels is treading on his heels as candidate for his office, are insisting on going to GA in hope that lapse time will provide opportunity for accession to power.
On other hand, Nokrashi is fully aware dangers going to SC which he anticipates may refuse hear Sudan question and may refer entire case back to interested parties under Article 33. He is also aware King Farouk and many others including Abdel Hady Pasha, Chief Royal Cabinet, Badawi Pasha of Plague Tribunal and on whose judgment he relies heavily oppose taking case to UN. Nevertheless Nokrashi regards appeal to SC as best chance secure UN action on British evacuation and will abandon it only if such evacuation can be secured by other means not including direct negotiations resumed at Egyptian request.
Source above referred to maintains that Nokrashi now more expectant of coming to America has expressed hope he may be received by President Truman with whom he could discuss matter before case comes before SC. Nokrashi has further intimated that if at that time some indication could be given SC that British would announce, as in case India, that evacuation would take place without reference to treaty say by December 1948 he would drop case before UN and undertake prepare way for signature of treaty with proviso deferring settlement Sudan question.
[Page 774]These assertions emanating from above source are offered for what they are worth. I feel they follow closely Nokrashi’s thinking but I cannot now evaluate his ability carry country on conclusion treaty which would postpone Sudan question.
In light this background and Nokrashi’s evidently firm intention of going to SC which he will abandon only if given something better, Department may wish review its course of future action.
It may also be pertinent to inquire what reaction might be on part of British to step contemplated urtel under reference. British feel they are on firm ground if Egyptians pursue matter (particularly of Sudan) with SC. Might we not be accused of weakening British position if we were to advise Egyptians that appropriate organ for solution controversy is GA and not SC?
Has Department given consideration to approaching Egyptian Ambassador in Washington in event that it should be decided take step contemplated reftel?
In my opinion it is almost certain that if we were to communicate even informally views as set forth in urtel to Egyptian Government, matter would become public knowledge almost immediately. Egyptians would also almost certainly obscure fact that US had confined advice to appropriate organ of UN. Matter would be played up as intervention on our part leading towards resumption of direct negotiations with British.
Should Department decide, however, communicate views informally to Egyptian Government through this Embassy it might best be done by conversations either with Badawi Pasha or with Abdel Hady Pasha or possibly by contacting Jacquet, Belgian juridical counselor at Ministry Foreign Affairs, whose opinions like those of Badawi and Abdel Hady carry much weight with Nokrashi.2
- Not printed.↩
- In telegram 745, May 10, to Cairo, the Department concurred in the views expressed in this telegram and notified the Embassy of its decision not to make an approach to the Egyptian Government to discuss the Anglo-Egyptian problem or its submission to the United Nations (501.BB/5–747).↩