741.83/5–747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

top secret

I received Mr. Balfour1 this morning in response to Mr. Balfour’s request of Mr. Acheson to discuss the Egyptian question.

1.
Mr. Balfour first brought up the matter of reported American offers to “mediate” between the British and Egyptian Governments (See tel. No. 2548, May 1, from London). He said that his Government was quite aware from conversations both here and in London that the American Government had no intention of offering “mediation” in the Anglo-Egyptian differences. He showed me, however, the attached three telegrams2 indicating that some of the Egyptian press and the Moscow press are playing up alleged American offers of mediation. The British Foreign Office, Mr. Balfour said, sees in this publicity preparation for an attempt to evade what he called Stalin’s “commitment” to Mr. Bevin. He referred to the Bevin–Stalin interview at Moscow in the course of which Stalin had stated that he had no intention of opposing British policy with regard to Egypt, et cetera,3 (He agreed with my comment that perhaps the Foreign Office was attaching too much importance to what might have been a casual remark of Stalin with his tongue far in his cheek.) Mr. Balfour feels the Foreign Office believes that the Soviet Government desires to use American “mediation” as an excuse for active Soviet interference in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. His Government therefore desired to know whether in the light of these press reports the Secretary would [Page 772] be prepared to issue a public denial that the U.S. was offering to “mediate” or had any intention of so doing. I told Mr. Balfour that while I personally saw no objection to the issuance of such a denial, the decision would depend on the views of those more familiar with the question.
2.
Mr. Balfour then read several telegrams concerning our consultation with Ambassador Tuck as to the relative desirability of having the Anglo-Egyptian treaty brought up in the General Assembly or in the Security Council and our subsequent report that the Egyptians had definitely decided to raise the issue in the Security Council on May 18. In the light of the foregoing the Foreign Office hoped that we would have no further discussions with the Egyptian Government on this question. They felt further talks would not prove helpful. I said that I would pass on his request and again said that personally I saw no reason why we should not comply.
3.
His third question concerned the attitude of the United States when and if the question is raised by Egypt in the Security Council. He left with me the attached top secret telegram4 setting forth British hopes. In brief, they hope that the United States will support the British position that the evacuation of British troops by September 1949 as set forth in the pending Protocol should not be accelerated. The British fear some effort in the Security Council to endeavor to speed up British evacuation to an earlier date. I said that I would likewise pass on this request.
  1. Sir John Balfour, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy.
  2. None printed.
  3. The British record of the Bevin–Stalin conversation on March 24 (see vol. ii, p. 278) contains the following statement: “Generalissimo Stalin said that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering in the carrying out of British policy in Egypt.”
  4. Not printed.