860S.00/11–847: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State

secret   urgent

2199. Secretary British Embassy1 disclosed last night that Sullivan’s conclusions re solution Trieste question (Trieste’s 162 November 6 to Department) parallels present British Foreign Office thinking. In his words “British have thrown up their hands in despair.” This would represent definite shift from Foreign Office’s position month ago (London’s 5454 October 9 to Department2) and our comments, thereon (Embtel 2096 October 11 to Department3). Staff British Embassy here divided over Trieste issue. Counselor agrees with Sullivan’s conclusions, Political Section strongly disagrees, and Ambassador apparently still uncertain.

Whatever ultimate solution of Trieste political problem may be, I think our broader interests compel us to maintain status quo and even remotest suggestion treaty revision would be most unfortunate right now. Intimation to Yugoslav Government that our firmness so short-lived, would have disastrous effect on efforts to check their enterprises in Greece and Austria.

FTT has symbolic as well as intrinsic importance, Trieste represents today the continuing concern of US in Eastern Europe. Troops there are stabilizing influence throughout this whole region. It has been and remains a proving ground for both American and Soviet intentions. Our withdrawal under whatever guise would not mean loss only of Trieste but would be encouragement incalculable proportions to Soviet purpose in world’s troubled regions.

Moreover, haste in treaty revision on so crucial issue as FTT before effectiveness of treaties can be tested, would surely put US great disadvantage [Page 124] in forthcoming negotiation major treaties. Yugoslavs may well have been waiting for just such sign of US–UK growing tired of Trieste problem. All our effort here has been to convince them we will stand fast on all points. We think they have been impressed and I cannot agree that our Trieste policy, difficult as it has been, has not been successful. I therefore regard Sullivan paper as serious development and hope Department will find way to have full exchange of views before British Foreign Office plans crystallize.

Sent Department 2199, repeated Trieste, London, Rome.

Cannon
  1. George Lisle Clutton.
  2. Not printed; it reported that Admiral Conolly’s office had heard of a proposed Italo-Yugoslav deal for the division of the Free Territory of Trieste (860S.00/10–947). Admiral Conolly was Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters.
  3. In this telegram, not printed, Ambassador Cannon reported that the rumor of a proposed Italo-Yugoslav deal for the partition of the F.T.T. could not be confirmed in Belgrade although the military and the naval attaché had each received a similar report (860S.00/10–1147).