Office of the Historian

860S.00/11–647: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser (Joyce), at Trieste, to the Secretary of State

secret   urgent
Trieste, November 6, 1947—5 p. m.

162. Re London’s 5748 to Department of November 3, noon.1

1.
In its No. 6122 of November 2 to Foreign Office British Embassy Washington refers to Foreign Office cable just received “about the future policy toward the FTT”. In response to my query November 4, British PolAd here stated he had received nothing from London on this. He immediately cabled Foreign Office requesting information.
2.
Sullivan on November 4 completed draft study of administration British-US Zone FTT and also on ultimate future FTT.2 Study concludes in general that provisions of Italian treaty concerning Trieste have been “frustrated”. He believes southern zone FTT was lost on day it was agreed allow 5,000 Yugoslav troops to form part of contingent to be placed at disposal of Governor. He suggests direct agreement on Communist frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia eliminating ipso facto the free territory settlement. The US and UK would maintain a token force in their zone as corollary to stationing of Yugoslav troops southern zone and as assurance they do not intend to evade responsibilities until final settlement. The SC would be invited to take note of this decision and if it not approved to produce solution which would resolve problem both zones on practical and equitable basis. This would relieve UN as well as British and US Governments of present commitment which he considers unworkable. He doubts whether it would be worth provoking grave international crises over Trieste and if and [Page 122] when we reach a show down with Slav-Communist bloc or if some radical change takes place in Security Council or in a solution such as he suggests might in any event impose itself. He concludes that only realistic conclusion is perhaps that there is no alternative to eventual absorption of Trieste by Yugoslavia and that Anglo-Americans are merely fighting rearguard action to delay this inevitable consummation.
3.
Sullivan assures me his paper will not go forward to Foreign Office until carefully considered by all concerned here. He announced yesterday that chief of Southern Division Wallinger3 of Foreign Office will arrive Trieste November 10 accompanied by Ambassador Peake who is returning Belgrade from London. I can not help but feel that Sullivan’s reporting to Foreign Office on Trieste’s position over more than 2 years might have influenced Foreign Office and War Office thinking perhaps along lines suggested in his paper.
4.
I disagree entirely with Sullivan’s conclusions as does General Airey and General Moore. His analysis, while perhaps “realistic” on a local basis and as providing convenient formula for retreat from a most difficult commitment and position it is nevertheless in the long range vital interests of both US and UK Governments to continue to abide by and endeavor to enforce the treaty here. Anglo-American position here, I believe, should be further consolidated and strengthened and not the slightest indication should be given that we are even considering a retreat.
5.
Airey and I have discussed Anglo-American policy regarding Trieste and agree on the following principles:
(a)
Trieste can not be dealt with on own merits alone and disassociated from general European background.
(b)
This winter and next spring will be crucial in present political battle to contain Communism in Europe and Trieste is stronghold which must be firmly held until battle turns our way. There are already indications that Communist tide in Europe is ebbing.
(c)
Our difficulties in Trieste should not blind us to fact that difficulties on other side of line are perhaps more pressing. We have now established here healthy and effective military government and feel that we have situation firmly in hand. We do not believe in the inevitability that Trieste will fall to Tito and we know no justification politically, economically, or morally for his obtaining it. Trieste with its port and over 260,000 Italian inhabitants would [should] not be submerged by the Slav-Communist bloc. Its absorption into Yugoslavia could only increase Communist power in Italy and elsewhere.
(d)
We should, therefore, steadfastly adhere to Article 1 of Annex VII of treaty and resist Slav-Communist penetration, infiltration and intimidation until international situation clarified.
6.
In accordance with Department’s instruction No. 2 September 24, 1947 addressed to me I assume that foregoing represents American policy and propose to follow this line in conversations with Peake and Wallinger. I shall appreciate Department’s comment as well as Cannon’s.

Sent Department 162, repeated Rome 130, Belgrade 99, London 2.

Joyce
  1. The reference is dated incorrectly. Regarding telegram 5748, October 28, see footnote 2 to memorandum of October 31, p. 118.↩
  2. In despatch 34, November 15, from Trieste, not printed, U.S. Political Adviser Joyce forwarded a copy of Sullivan’s report, “British/U.S. Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste and the Problem of its Administration in the Immediate Future.” (860S.00/11–1547)↩
  3. Geoffrey Arnold Wallinger, head of the Southern Department of the British Foreign Office since June 23.↩