860S.00/10–3147
Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Inverchapel)1
I have been considering what should be the policy of His Majesty’s Government with regard to the future of the Free Territory of Trieste.2
2. In recent months it has become clear that Yugoslav policy is fundamentally opposed to its survival. The Yugoslav zone has been turned into a Communist state, closely integrated into Yugoslavia. Once a Governor has been appointed both the Anglo-American and the Yugoslav troops pass under his command, and sooner or later he will almost certainly have to dispense with their services; the barrier will be down between the two zones and the City of Trieste will be filled immediately with communist formations disguised as Slav citizens returning to their homes. There is a real danger that the Governor will [Page 119] find it impossible to carry out his functions and maintain order. He will have lost the A.M.G. machine; and the police on whom he must rely for the maintenance of order will have been seriously weakened by the incorporation of the communist police force built up in the Yugoslav zone which he will have no choice but to admit into the security forces of the territory. In these circumstances outside communist pressure acting in concert with the well-organized fifth column in the Free Territory may well lead to a communist administration of the whole Territory. If so it would be only a short step before the population would be ready to petition the Security Council with an appearance of unanimity for incorporation into Yugoslavia.
3. In the economic field, the assumption on which the Four-Power Financial Commission based their reports have failed to materialize. The negligible growth of trade through the Free Port, the incipient withdrawal of Italian capital and equipment, and the communist influence over the trades unions, all render it impossible for any administration, no matter how efficient, to ensure a reasonable degree of prosperity for the Free Territory without a constant and heavy supply of credits which the United Nations would almost certainly be unwilling to grant.
4. In view of these considerations, I have come to the conclusion that no Governor, no matter how strong, will be able to ensure the lasting independence of the Free Territory, far less its prosperity; and I would therefore favor a partition of the Territory by which the Italians would regain sovereignty over what is now the Anglo-American zone. Basing myself on impressions formed at the New York meeting of the C.F.M., it would not surprise me if it turned out that the Russians and Yugoslavs would also accept partition—although there may be difficulties over the frontier line in the Gorizia area. We have considered both the strategic and financial implications of this proposal. The British Chiefs of Staff have reported that, assuming that there is no hope of genuine Yugoslav co-operation in the maintenance of the Free Territory, it is in our strategic interest that the territory be partitioned and Trieste thus revert to Italy.
5. In his first talk with me on 28th October, Count Sforza spoke about the Trieste situation. He said that a lot of feelers had been put out on the Yugoslav side but that he was not certain that these approaches had been entirely genuine. They might be manoeuvers designed to benefit Italian communists at the next elections. He had been pursuing negotiations with the Yugoslavs on commercial and other matters and had hoped that these might lead to definite indications of their real intentions about Trieste. I did not discourage him from pursuing his conversations.
[Page 120]6. If partition were to come about as the result of a Yugoslav initiative, the communists would claim that it was they who had restored Trieste to Italy. It should be our object therefore to anticipate any such claims by the the communists by our own action. In any case I should not be surprised if the Trieste issue comes up “on the side” in the course of the London meeting of Foreign Ministers, and for these reasons I think that we should begin to clear our minds on the subject.
7. Meanwhile I would propose that we should henceforth stall on the appointment of a Governor (even in the event of the Russians suddenly showing a disposition to agree to a suitable candidate) and thus facilitate the possible discussion of partition at the appropriate moment.
8. His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to continue to maintain their contingent of the Anglo-American force for this purpose on the assumption that the United States Government would be ready to do likewise and that the United States Government would also continue as at present to pay for all supplies for the civil relief program.
9. I shall be grateful if you will put my views as set out in the preceding paragraphs to the State Department at a high level and ask them to consider the matter urgently and let me have Mr. Marshall’s reactions thereto.
- There was no covering memorandum for this document.↩
- In telegram 5748, October 28, from London, not printed, Ambassador Douglas reported that “Bevin is now considering recommendationis on Trieste prepared recently by FonOff officials immediately concerned with this question” and that “as soon as they had been cleared by Bevin they would be communicated to the Dept.” (860S.00/10–2847)↩