Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

501.BC/10–3047: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser (Joyce), at Trieste, to the Secretary of State

restricted   priority

Trieste, October 30, 1947—11 a. m.

149. Reference Department’s telegram 511 to New York for Austin repeated Trieste 85, Rome 2186, Belgrade 707.

1. Upon receipt text draft instruction to Senator Austin from Foreign Office British political adviser here on 25 October cabled London repeating message Washington and UK delegation New York stating General Airey strongly recommended only text of proclamation No. 1 be communicated Security Council with no mention of any undertaking to apply provisions permanent statute during continuance AMG in UK-US zone in accordance Article 1, Annex VII.

2. On October 27 British political adviser received text of Foreign Office cable of October 24 to New York instructing Cadogan to address note chairman Security Council with same wording as Department’s draft instruction to Austin substituting Government of United Kingdom with Government of United States when required.

3. After consultation with General Airey General Moore, head AMG and myself, British Political Adviser Sullivan on October 28 sent cable Foreign Office repeated Washington, Rome, Belgrade and New York the text of which follows:

• “1. In General Airey’s view any attempt in the present circumstances to go beyond Article One of annex VII or any commitment on our part, however carefully phrased, to apply other provisions of the treaty would be fraught with danger. Such a policy could only safely be pursued either by an authority having complete control over the British-United States and Yugoslav zones or as the result of a radical change of policy in which the permanent separation of the two zones would have to be recognized as a basic element. The first alternative involves the expeditious appointment of the governor and consideration of the second might be regarded as premature.
• “2. The State Department’s proposal appears to involve [as an applicable provision] the appointment by AMG (in consultation with Italy and Yugoslavia) of a provisional council of government, the preparation of electoral rolls and possibly the holding of elections at least at local government levels but any of these measures would be seized upon by the Yugoslavs as a pretext to demand closer integration with their already communised zone. The resulting political tensions would throw a very severe strain on General Airey’s present resources. Even annex VII envisages as a prerequisite the appointment of a director of public security with authority to enforce a security policy over the whole territory.
• “3. In this connection General Airey has just received an agenda proposed by an economic mission from the Yugoslav military zone of the free territory every paragraph of which contains a Trojan Horse. Stress has already been laid on the economic and financial conditions which render it impracticable at present to raise the barrier between the two zones. From the political standpoint General Airey feels bound as long as the governor has not assumed office to oppose the present Yugoslav tactics of infiltration and ‘fanning out’ whether in the form of penetration of AMG local administration (which they and the Communists have boycotted and sabotaged during the last two years) or of participation at a higher government level on the strength of Article Two of annex VII.
• “4. Finally the implementation of an undertaking such as the State Department proposes [is] not only dangerous from the standpoint of security but also places a burden on AMG beyond its military capabilities. It would in fact require a team of very highly qualified civilian experts such as the governor might reasonably expect as advisers on his personal staff.
• “5. General Airey therefore adheres to his recommendation in which I and my United States colleague concur that the communication to the Security Council should be limited strictly to the text of proclamation No. 1. My United States colleague is reporting in the above sense to the State Department.”

4. I pointed out to Airey and Sullivan that their apprehensions were perhaps unjustified by virtue of fact that draft communication to chairman Security Council quoted Article 2 annex VII “as and when those provisions prove to be applicable, etc.,”. Also draft note includes statement that “the actions of the commander, British-United States zone will be guided mainly by the needs of the population and its well-being”. In addition, the last paragraph of draft instruction to Austin particularly refers to protection of basic human rights and public order and security which provided a safeguard on how far if at all other provision of permanent statute could be applied under present circumstances.

5. Airey and Sullivan nevertheless feel that on British side they should go on record as they did in their cable quoted above. I explained that although my views had not been requested on American side I had no objection to their putting in their cable that I concurred with their views.

6. My personal feeling is that if Airey and Sullivan interpretation of draft communication to Security Council is the correct one I can only agree with their analysis as does General Moore and head AMG. In any event my view was that the Airey–Sullivan cable might bring forth a clarification of the intent of draft communication to Security Council. Our policy of firmness as reported in Airey’s cables to CCS and my two situation reports (my telegrams 98 Department, 103 Rome, 70 Belgrade September 19¹ and 116 Department, 112 Rome, 80 Belgrade October 3) has been to consolidate Anglo-American position without zone and to take all steps to frustrate Communist penetration and intimidation. Department’s telegram 47, September 22; 69, October 14; and 79, October 23² I understood to mean that this policy was generally approved. If it is now the policy to “open up” the Trieste question by [revising?] certain provisions of the permanent statute I believe that the Anglo-American position here would be seriously undermined and inevitably deteriorate due to Communist infiltration and increased agitation.³

7. General Airey has received no policy directives from CCS since September 15. A clear policy directive alt this time I believe to be imperative and hope may be forthcoming soon.

Sent Department 149, repeated Rome 125, Belgrade 93.

Joyce

1. Not printed.
2. None printed.
3. In telegram 150, October 30, from Trieste, not printed, U.S. Political Adviser Joyce urged the Department that General Airey’s views be solicited before committing him to a course of action he might consider dangerous (501.BC/10–3047).

   In telegram 151, October 30, from Trieste, not printed, Joyce reported that the British Foreign Office had cabled Cadogan to take no action along with the United States pending receipt of Airey’s views (501.BC/10–3047).