711.60H/6–747: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

top secret

612. Developments reported mytels 569, May 30 and 584, June 2,1 although unimportant in themselves suggest two possible lines cleavage [Page 807] which, I believe, it should be the purpose of our basic policy to seek to exploit (1) Yugo national interests are bound to conflict from time to time with Russian interests. Mytel 569 suggests Yugos may not always blindly follow Russian instructions. Also considering manner in which Tito and company like to strut around it would be surprising if they were not at times irked at not being masters in their own house; (2) as mytel 584 suggests there is clearly difference of opinion in government circles as to desirability better relations with western powers. Moderate faction must realize some betterment desirable. Extremist faction blinded by hatred and suspicion. I am convinced this accounts in large part for contradictory trends often noted by Embassy in acts of Yugo authorities.

When I arrived here French Ambassador2 emphasized necessity of firmness in action but suavity in approach. I have every reason from my experience here to feel his advice was good. Disagreeable gestures and publicity are not going to soften this government in its present mood; if, however, we are tough to point of specific retaliation when this government does not remedy our specific legitimate grievances and we remedy situations where we [they?] are justly aggrieved we may eventually persuade some elements in government to do something to improve relations.

I make following recommendations:

1.
Adverse official publicity should be limited cases where positive arguments clearly over-balance resentment which such publicity arouses even in less extreme circles here.
2.
We should be equally careful about administering any pin pricks such as disagreeable lectures. As general rule they are useful locally to express specific but not general disapproval.
3.
In absence specific reasons to contrary ordinary courtesies should be observed.
4.
Tortuous as Yugos are we must be straightforward with them . . . . At their own game we can neither beat them nor hope gain their confidence.
5.
We must really strive eliminate their just grievances (e.g. we should deliver proved quislings they demand) and we must act with justice in cases as they arise.
6.
Any action our part entailing material advantages to them on the balance should be taken only for compelling reasons and should be made contingent wherever possible on reasonable concessions on their part.
7.
If any action prejudicial to Yugos is contemplated it should if possible be timed as specific retaliation for some legitimate grievance we have against them and they should be warned in advance. Any withdrawal by them should be followed by an equal withdrawal by us.
8.
Embassy should always be kept informed of proposed statements or action and if possible consulted.
9.
Voice of America broadcasts should be greatly stepped up to give quick devastating factual answers to flood of vicious anti-American propaganda published here. Foreign broadcasts are widely and avidly listened to here.

If such program is to have any hope of success it must be adopted substantially as a whole. I am not in any case optimistic of success but such, program should tend to work two possible cleavages mentioned above and to indicate whether correct relations with this government are possible. I realize that probably nothing short of world domination will satisfy Communists and that it is forlorn hope that in this government elements can be found curb fanatical Communist drive but even if we fail I believe above program well calculated to place us in favorable position. We must remember that present Yugo regime has achieved impressive record of reconstruction; that under circumstances its economic record compares favorably with that of pre-war regimes and that it seems to have done better recovery job than of similarly placed non-Communist countries. There is therefore little reason suppose that time is on our side or that something favorable will turn up.

It is vital in shaping policy to keep basic objectives constantly in mind irritating as day to day business is. Quite apart from basic advantages above program I believe that personal relationships with local officials are better than cloak and dagger methods in gathering information and that through such relationships we have better chance of getting our day to day business transacted.

Cabot
  1. Neither printed.
  2. Jean Payart.