740.00116 FW/5–2947: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]
top secret

1338. I have read with interest Belgrade’s 513, May 15 to Department repeated Rome 36 and Leghorn. Quite apart from larger issues of policy involved, it is in my view unrealistic to expect that Allied military authorities can, even though not yet formally relieved of responsibility for arrests of quislings and war criminals at large in Italy (Deptel 30 May 2 to Leghorn, repeated to Rome 633 and Belgrade [Page 805] 282)1 continuously and effectively round up such persons with the limited means and personnel remaining at their disposal. Even recent arrests to which we have taken exception have, as stated in Leghorn’s 44, April 10,2 been undertaken by Italian civil police and British military together. American military authorities have been kept informed on British initiative in all instances, but in view of Department’s position have been unwilling participate even to this extent. The inevitable result has been the misunderstanding described in Leghorn’s 58, April 19 to Department, repeated Belgrade from Rome 55,3 British will now suspend action except to inform Italians of known or suspected whereabouts of alleged criminals.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I can only agree with Belgrade’s observation that there has been long delay in establishing Allied screening teams to uncover undesirables in camps under Allied military control (as directed in FAN 757, May 244) but I do not think the military authorities should be accused of “culpable negligence” since they had long tried to obtain governmental approval of and personnel to implement plans for screening insofar as establishment of prima facie case of guilt in individual cases is concerned, it has always been assumed here that burden of proof is on Yugoslav Government and I have firm impression that that government is notoriously unwilling or unable to back up its sweeping [Page 806] demands for Yugoslavs in Italy with positive identification and details of alleged crimes. I hope there is no disagreement that in general, extradition can only be effected when the authorities under whose jurisdiction accused may be are satisfied that a prima facie case exists.

Re penultimate paragraph Leghorn’s 72 May 8, repeated Rome 28 and Belgrade 11,5 I trust Department will soon be able instruct me what to tell Italians re paragraphs 2 and 3 Deptel 360, March 14, sent Belgrade as 127, March 11.6 In this connection, I hope assistance which SACMED will be committed to give Italians will be confined to providing them with available information re whereabouts of individuals. Actually, I anticipate that if there is to be any pressure exerted on Italians, it will be in direction of dissuading them from mass arrests and hand overs which Yugoslavs will probably demand and which in view of overcrowded conditions here and likely Italian desire remove major obstacle to normalization of Italo-Yugoslav relations, will be acceded to insofar as shaky Italian police force resources permit.

In this connection I refer to Department circular infotel May 7, 6 p. m.,5 re British suggestion DPs now in Allied camps Italy be transferred to US zone Germany. I am inclined agree with British expectation that Yugoslavs and persons claimed by Soviets as their citizens will be exposed to danger and feel that our own moral position vis-à-vis both British and Italians will be strengthened if we remove at least “Greys”7 from danger. Would Lei [While I?] understand War Department reluctance accept any more DP’s in US zone Germany, I believe that on balance their impact would be less than if they remain here.

Sent Department 1338, repeated to Belgrade 60, repeated to Leghorn 44, Frankfurt 33.

Dunn
  1. Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 513, May 15, from Belgrade, p. 799.
  2. Not printed.
  3. The text of telegram 58, April 19, from Leghorn, transmitted as telegram 868, April 19, from Rome, not printed, reported on recent measures by British military authorities in Italy to apprehend alleged Yugoslav war criminals and quislings at large in Italy or currently in Allied-controlled displaced persons camps. The message pointed out the problems that resulted from the absence of agreements between the Department of State and the British Foreign Office on the following matters: (a) whether Allied military authorities were to continue to be responsible for the apprehension of alleged Yugoslav war criminals and quislings at large in Italy; (b) which Yugoslavs were to be subject to forcible repatriation to Yugoslavia; (c) what procedure was to be adopted to identify Yugoslavs held in Allied camps in Italy for forcible repatriation (740.00116 EW/4–1947).
  4. Not printed; it transmitted instructions intended to govern the work of British-American teams that would screen Allied displaced persons camps in Italy for persons eligible or not eligible for the care of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The screening teams were to identify persons who were eligible for care by the IGCR, those who were willing to be repatriated to Yugoslavia, and those who might be subject to involuntary repatriation. The recommendations of the screening teams were to be examined by a Review Committee consisting of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and his American and British Political Advisers, and the findings and conclusions of the Review Committee would in turn be referred to the United States and British Governments for final action. The following categories of persons were to be considered subject to involuntary repatriation to Yugoslavia: (a) persons enlisted in German armed forces unless it could be shown that their enlistment had been involuntary; (b) those who had committed atrocious crimes, or war crimes against the Allies; (c) those against whom a prima facie case could be made to show that they had voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy. (800.4016 DP/5–2447)
  5. Not printed.
  6. Ante, p. 779.
  7. Not printed.
  8. As the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees assumed responsibility for displaced persons in Italy, “whites” were those persons eligible for IGOR care, “blacks” were those subject to involuntary repatriation, and “greys” were those who for various reasons were not eligible for IGOR care but who were not subject to involuntary repatriation.