811.42700 (R)/7–2147: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
2472. Deptel 14901 re talks on atomic energy policy. My estimate of attitude of people in Soviet Union and satellites on atomic bomb is as follows:
In Soviet Union population initially impressed by reports on atomic bomb. More lately they have been told on one hand by primary sources of authority, including Stalin, that bomb is not a “decisive” weapon; while on other hand they see in press and public utterances constant reference Soviet official efforts to secure destruction existing bombs and to American “atomic diplomacy”. Present attitude seems to be one of apprehensive uncertainty. In neighboring satellite states, so far as can be determined by talks with diplomatic representatives, there is some doubt as to actual potential of bomb. These people have heard our claims on one side and Soviet rebuttal on the other. They do not know what to believe and they are inclined to discount much of the reporting as propaganda.
I agree that it is highly desirable to explain our atomic policy and reasons therefor, but presentation must be handled with greatest care. With respect to Soviet Union, we must weigh carefully advantages of informing a relatively few people on the actual effectiveness of the atomic bomb against the actual disadvantages of providing Soviet Union with propaganda ammunition and confirmatory evidence of [Page 580] their constantly reiterated charge of atomic diplomacy. Same general considerations would seem to apply to neighboring satellite people except that here more weight can be given to desirability of informing much larger number of listeners on actual potentialities of atomic warfare.
It seems that best line would be to avoid undue emphasis on the effective power of the bomb but rather to assume that the listeners know and stand in the same awe as we. Element of horror can be retained by indirection and by citation as reason for our vital concern for effective atomic control. I do not think we should point up factual description of atomic explosion. Necessary details can be given to support our arguments for control.
I agree with idea that we launch series in connection with reopening atomic negotiations in Security Council and tie them as closely as possible to news comment thereon. These discussions are given lengthy but completely one-sided report by Soviet press and radio although we give Mr. Gromyko2 a nation-wide press and radio network to support and defend Soviet position before people of US.
We suggest that discussions stress the peaceable possibilities of atomic energy as the servant of man and that these are only realizable if we are able, through the establishment of real control, to prevent this gigantic force from becoming the master of man. We must take for granted that no matter how talks are handled, they will be attacked in Soviet Union and by Communist press elsewhere as sabre rattling and atomic diplomacy, but I believe that on balance, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
A variation which might be more effective if technically feasible would be development of discussion of our policies and reasons therefor only in form of comments on significant atomic news such as statements by Austin,3 Osborn4 or Gromyko. Background data could be prepared in advance to use only when timely rather than as straight canned remarks by prominent Americans whose identity probably unknown here anyway and of secondary importance. This approach would be more subtle, timely and less vulnerable to accusation of straight propaganda.
- Not printed.↩
- Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations.↩
- Warren R. Austin, United States Senator from Vermont; Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.↩