711.61/7–1447
Memorandum by the Adviser in the Office of Special Political Affairs (Notter) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rush)
The developing crisis has already reached a stage at which, for our guidance in the period of the next coming months, we need a topflight decision with respect to the Soviet Union.
There are various ways in which we could put what is really in our minds, and in most of them, we would pose a question which, constitutionally and on other various grounds, could not be answered. Those questions would be inadmissible.
The one admissible question which would provide the basic guidance we have to have would be: “Are we prepared to use armed force against the Soviet Union on any given conditions, and if so, what are the given conditions upon which we could not for our own safety allow Russian action to proceed unchecked?”
I would urge that this question be raised with Mr. Cohen,1 Mr. Lovett,2 and the Secretary.
If you raise it, you may wish to recall to mind that in the early Autumn of 1941, a similar question had to be propounded in regard to Japan. The consensus of the views of the heads of the armed services and the Secretaries of War3 and the Navy4 and the Departments was that if the Japanese penetrated farther south than the tenth parallel in the South Pacific (specifically at Kra), the United States would be obliged to fight. The reason we did not act upon this view is that the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor immediately before the the Japanese moved that far south.
The developments occurring are primarily strategic—in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and in the UN. From them we can make certain inferences. (1) We are free to infer that the Soviets have made a decision to test out whether or not the United States will employ armed forces to check Soviet expansion in Greece. It is recalled that when Mr. Acheson sent the Greek message to Congress, [Page 578] he said that we would not send forces. That theory is now undergoing a test in Northern Greece, carried out by means of Albanian and international brigade forces. (2) We are free to infer that the Soviets believe that the United States will not be able, for reasons of anticipated economic weakness, political compulsions, and immediate military inadequacy, to interpose any effective obstacle to their broad strategic plan. (3) We are free to infer that the Soviet thrust is directed toward Italy, Greece, Dardanelles, Turkey, and Iran, and in sequence will lead to subordination and military alliances (if not full control in the case of the Dardanelles) as opportunity shows the point of relatively least resistance. Possible action with respect to Mongolia and Manchuria, not to say Southern Asia, may, however, be pursued almost simultaneously. (4) We are free to infer that the Soviets still do not want war, but believe that despite us they can gain their strategic objectives of control not only of the heartland of Europe and Asia but actually of the shores of these continents at every point of “major vulnerability from sea and air. (5) A more immediate inference is possible that as a part of the plans, forced withdrawal of American occupation divisions in Austria, Trieste, and Germany may be sought,—which might be achieved through American belief that the presence of our troops would now mean risk of our being pulled into hostilities with the U.S.S.R. through incidents. (6) We may infer a Soviet decision not to break up the UN but to use it as a means of weakening other members and facilitating Soviet plans by preventing UN action in time.
Since these inferences would not accord with an accurate understanding of American opinion and convictions, the evident Soviet calculation may turn out to lead to a basic miscalculation which could precipitate war.
Guidance as to whether we shall try to reach accommodations on specific issues as they arise one by one in the coming months and to give ground if necessary to avoid armed action, or whether we shall try the first but prepare for action in order to avoid retreating toward greater loss of our strength of position is urgent in order that our UN actions shall conform to the top-side view on the future course to take toward the U.S.S.R. Unless we are prepared to call a halt somewhere—whenever that point or line is reached,—we should certainly avoid strong courses whose only outcomes could be tough talk, and (because of weak action following) demoralization in the countries which we may ultimately need as allies.
I suggest that the decision is partly being made by default in the absence of a reasoned conscious position. For illustration: Mr. Bevin [Page 579] and Mr. Bidault5 have courageously struck out in Paris on a decisive line of action; they could only have done so on the basis of a calculation that the United States would back them up, and in order that they will not be let down, we must now back them up on every major issue whether or not we prefer to do so on each issue. We have arrived at the point where the Soviets’ positive direct and indirect actions are not alone building up a crisis situation, since counter action is now gaining a momentum and direction which only we can deflect or otherwise govern. We can do that only if we have a top-side decision, and that decision will have to be implemented in the UN as well as in direct relations.
- Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State.↩
- Robert Lovett was Under Secretary of State from July 1.↩
- Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of War in 1941.↩
- Frank Knox was Secretary of the Navy in 1941.↩
- Georges Bidault was Minister for Foreign Affairs of France in the Ramadier cabinet. With British Foreign Secretary Bevin, they had taken the lead in arranging for the Paris Conference in July to discuss methods to make use of the offer by Secretary of State Marshall for a program of European economic recovery.↩