At the suggestion of Mr. Armour, the Policy Planning Staff has looked
into the question of our current policy toward Spain. I attach a Staff
paper on the subject.
I recommend that if you approve this paper, it be transmitted, in
confidence, to Mr. Armour for his guidance.1
[Annex]
top secret
PPS/12
[Washington,] October 24, 1947.
U.S. Policy Toward Spain
The Policy Planning Staff has studied the question of our relations
with Spain, which are unsatisfactory not only from the political
point of view but from the viewpoint of our military planners. On
the one hand, we have hoped to bring about the replacement of the
totalitarian regime of General Franco by withholding from his
government the benefits of international political and economic
relationships. On the other, we are confronted with the fact that
General Franco remains firmly in power and that his regime has
actually been strengthened by demonstrations of international
hostility.
At present, our relations with Spain are governed in part by the
United Nations Resolution of December 12, 1946, recommending that
member states withdraw their Chiefs of Mission from Madrid and that
Franco Spain be excluded from organizations connected with the U.N.
For example, the U.S. recently took an active part in the expulsion
of Spain from ICAO, and in various
other ways we have affirmed our opposition to the Franco government
on ideological grounds. In the economic sphere we are withholding
all forms of Government assistance; Government credits have been
refused, sales of surplus Government property to Spanish buyers have
been prohibited, and [Page 1093]
Government purchases in Spain cut to a minimum. This official policy
has had the effect of discouraging private U.S. credits and trade
and has contributed to the increasingly serious economic situation
in Spain.
The Policy Planning Staff agrees that it would be highly desirable to
bring about the replacement of Franco by a regime fully
representative of the Spanish people, if it were possible to do so
without violent internal or external repercussions. It would be
desirable if a plebiscite could be held and some form of coalition
government established which would restore to the Spanish people the
freedom and rights of which they have been deprived by the
totalitarian police methods of the present government.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of effective opposition to
Franco, either within or without Spain, which could bring about an
orderly change in government.
By adroit maneuvering, occasional concessions, and relentless police
persecution, the Franco government has forestalled action by its
opponents. There is no indication that the Army, on which the
strength of the regime rests, is disposed to withdraw its support.
Spokesmen for the old Republican, Socialist and Monarchist parties
have been unable so far to compromise their differences or to agree
on any program of joint action. Except for the Communists, the
opposition parties are divided and disorganized; a concrete
political ideal or a leader able to capture popular imagination is
lacking.
The Department last Spring initiated conversations with the British
with the object of agreeing upon a joint plan of action to eliminate
Franco and to replace his regime with one based on democratic lines.
The approach contemplated was an objective explanation to Franco of
the views of the United States and British Governments, emphasizing
the gains which would accrue to Spain from a change in regime. Our
explanation was, in addition, to be directed to high ranking
Generals, members of the opposition, and to all interested
Spaniards, upon whom we would urge the necessity of change. It was
contemplated for us to point out that the nature and timing of the
change was entirely up to the Spaniards themselves, thus avoiding
grounds for Spanish resentment against foreign intervention.
The British have indicated that they do not consider this plan
workable, on the ground that: (1) Franco’s interest in maintaining
his own power would lead him to refuse, under any conditions,
voluntarily to step down, and (2) leaks regarding the suggested
action would undoubtedly occur, with resulting embarrassment and
difficulties. The Department plans to raise the question again with
the British at the conclusion of the present General Assembly of the
U.N. At the same time, consideration may be given to a suggestion
that the Vatican might be persuaded to take an active part in
bringing about the retirement [Page 1094] of Franco, a possibility which is actually being
explored by members of the Spanish opposition.
While the Policy Planning Staff does not feel that
it should make suggestions concerning current operations, it
nevertheless has serious doubts as to the results to be expected
from such a course. The Staff remains unconvinced that the
leaders of the present regime in Spain would accept the proposal or
that a sufficiently cohesive opposition exists to take over the
government successfully. Even if the plan should be accepted with
the consequent retirement of Franco, there would seem to be a strong
probability of an ensuing political struggle leading only to
internal chaos and resultant advantage to the Communists with all
its ominous implications.
However, in the unlikely event that one or more of the contending
opposition groups should eventually gather sufficient strength to be
in a position to take over the functions of government, and in the
event that our political support is sought by one of these groups,
we should decline. On the other hand, we should be prepared to make
available our good offices, in the event they are requested by two
or more of the opposition parties, for the purpose of bringing these
parties together.
The Staff believes that, in the National interest,
the time has come for a modification of our policy toward
Spain. The net result of our present policy has been: (1)
to strengthen the Franco regime; (2) to impede the economic recovery
of Spain; and (3) to operate against the maintenance of a friendly
atmosphere in Spain in the event of international conflict.1
It is the recommendation of the Policy Planning
Staff that instead of openly opposing the Franco regime, we
should work from now on toward a normalization of U.S.-Spanish
relations, both political and economic. Insofar as possible
this should be done in such a way as not to strengthen the Franco
regime. While no public announcement should be made of our views, we
should have in mind the objective of restoring our relations to a
normal basis, irrespective of wartime ideological considerations or
the character of the regime in power.
The Staff feels that the principal step now open to the United States
is a relaxation,2 on our own initiative and entirely aside
from our U.N. position, of our restrictive economic policy with
regard to Spain. Steps should be taken whereby the various controls
we have imposed are quietly dropped, so that normal trade may be
resumed between the two countries. Elimination of official
restrictive measures as such would naturally be followed in a short
time by the opening up of [Page 1095] private trade and the possibility of financial assistance in the
rehabilitation of the Spanish economy. Thus, instead of contributing
to the rapid deterioration of the economic situation, as we are
doing at present, we would provide the opportunity for Spain to
develop its resources and play a normal part in the revival of world
commerce and industry.
Before any economic measures can be taken, the question of Spain is
expected to come up in the United Nations. Spain is on the agenda of
the Political Committee and we may be called upon to take a position
in respect to one aspect or another of the problem. The Staff is of
the opinion that at the present session of the General Assembly,
this Government should do everything possible to minimize discussion
of the Spanish question. We should endeavor to discourage any
action, whether under the Resolution of December 12, 1946, or in the
form of a new resolution. In particular, we should refrain from any
mention of our previous support of the action of the United Nations
in condemning the Franco regime. The Department’s position paper on
this subject states that we should reaffirm such support. This, the
Staff believes, should not be done.3
In the event that a resolution is introduced seeking to impose
economic sanctions, break diplomatic relations, or otherwise
strengthen last year’s resolution, we should oppose the proposal. On
the other hand, if a resolution should be introduced recommending
that the provisions of the December 12, 1946, resolution now be
rescinded, we could either vote in its favor or abstain. The Staff
is inclined to the opinion that, in line with its recommendation for
a change in our policy toward Spain, we should support such a
resolution,4 stating that the measures opposing
Franco have not proved efficacious and that their continuation does
not appear warranted by circumstances.
