Executive Secretariat Files
Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff
The Problem: Possible Action by the U.S. to Assist the Italian Government in the Event of Communist Seizure of North Italy and the Establishment of an Italian Communist “Government” in That Area.
[Page 977]facts bearing on the problem
1. The Communists were excluded from the Italian Government in June, 1947. Since then, their rapid increase in strength and power appears to have been checked, and their influence seems to have declined, although they remain the strongest single force in Italian politics.
2. Resenting their exclusion from the Government, and alarmed at the initial success of this first attempt since liberation to govern without them, the Communists have exerted increasing pressure through propaganda, popular demonstrations and strikes by constituent unions of the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation to bring about the downfall of the De Gasperi cabinet and the formation of a new government with Communist participation.
This pressure has recently been intensified. Following the introduction of a motion of no confidence before the Constituent Assembly, Communist propaganda has alternately threatened De Gasperi with defeat and pled with him to resign for the good of the country. Strikes have been increased in number and size, and a nation-wide “hunger” demonstration was held on September 20 in an attempt to intimidate the cabinet and Assembly before debate begins September 23 on the motion of no confidence. For the first time, the Communists have threatened the use of force to overthrow the government.
3. Following the signature at Paris of the Italian Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947, small US and UK forces have been maintained in Italy, primarily for reasons of stability and to ensure an orderly and peaceful transfer of Italian territory ceded to Yugoslavia under the treaty. The Italian treaty having come into effect on September 16, these forces must be withdrawn within ninety days of that date under the provisions of Article 73 of the treaty.
4. Annex VII of the Italian treaty, however, provides that 5,000 US troops shall remain in the Free Territory of Trieste, together with 5,000 British and 5,000 Yugoslav troops, until such time as the Governor of the Free Territory shall declare to the Security Council that their services are no longer required. Maintenance of the security and territorial integrity of the Free Territory is a direct obligation of the Security Council.
5. US policy towards Italy has been directed toward the support of a friendly, democratic regime in that country in order to safeguard US security aims in the Mediterranean.
discussion
6. There can be no question of the ultimate aim of the Italian Communist Party; this aim is the complete subjugation of Italy to Soviet control. There is, however, some question as to their immediate objective. It may be that they expect and desire no more at present than [Page 978] participation in the Italian Government, in the belief that the increased power and prestige to be derived from this participation would enable them to win the national elections in March 1948. A possibility exists, however, that they may have decided upon an immediate attempt to seize full power.
7. While consideration of their participation in the Government as the Communists’ immediate objective is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be said that it seems doubtful they could now overthrow the De Gasperi government by parliamentary means unless economic conditions grew worse. If conditions do worsen, discontent and disorders may well rise to a point beyond the ability of the Government to control with the limited armed forces permitted it under the treaty, thereby enabling the Communists to achieve their ultimate aim of full power.
8. If the Communists are persuaded they cannot succeed by constitutional means, and are convinced that with US assistance economic conditions will improve rather than worsen, it seems probable they will intensify still further their efforts to disrupt economic life and undermine the authority of the Government. The plan will be to reduce the country gradually to a state of chaos in which local and national administration will collapse and in which “peoples’ councils” can be set up in Communist-dominated areas as spontaneous expressions of the popular will. Any effort in this direction would be facilitated by the virtual control which the Communists and Nenni Socialists already exercise over the municipal governments of Milan, Turin, Genoa, Bologna and other smaller cities in the North.
Once established, these “peoples’ councils” could be joined together to form a Communist national “government,” whose authority might be expected to cover initially most of North Italy as far south as Florence. Appeals would then be issued to Italian regions in the south to recognize this “government” as truly representative of the Italian people.
9. In this situation, the Italian Government can be expected to exert every effort to maintain its authority in Rome and throughout Southern Italy, where the Communist Party is weaker and less well organized than in the north. Above the Po Valley, the Government might attempt to hold Venice, where the Christian Democrats are strong, and around which the greater part of US and UK forces will probably be concentrated while awaiting withdrawal. Its main effort, however, would have to be directed towards consolidating its position in the south, and even there it could not hold out for long without appreciable assistance from abroad. Cut off from industrial production of the north, and deprived also of the agricultural produce of the Po Valley, southern Italy would soon be almost wholly dependent upon imports [Page 979] for its very existence. Though assistance under the United States relief program would be used for the 20 million people in South Italy, rather than for the entire population of 46 million as at present, additional assistance would be required for an improvement in present living standards if stability were to be insured.
10. North Italy would likewise require foreign assistance. It is possible that basic food requirements might be met from domestic sources for an initial period, but coal and primary raw materials would be required almost immediately to maintain production and employment in urban centers. Communications with Yugoslavia would, however, provide means as well as a source for many essential materials. These same means would also serve for military assistance from Yugoslavia and the USSR; such assistance would most probably be extended covertly, with overt Yugoslav action limited to seizing for itself the border areas, notably the province of Udine, claimed during the Italian treaty negotiations.
11. The rise of Communism to power in Italy would seriously menace US interests. Apart from the influence this development would have on the future of Western Europe and the repercussions to be expected in South America, a Communist regime in Italy could nullify the achievement of US objectives in Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, failure of the Communist moves in Italy could only cause most favorable reactions throughout the Mediterranean and Europe, giving courage to the peoples of those areas in their own efforts to resist Soviet pressure.
conclusions
12. It is evident that the Communists are exerting the greatest possible pressure to obtain their renewed participation in the Italian Government by parliamentary means. It is not equally evident that they are prepared at present to resort to force to obtain their aims before the final withdrawal of Allied forces from Italy. This possibility cannot be excluded, however, and plans should now be made for action by the US in the event that Communist seizure of North Italy appears imminent. Soviet control of the Italian peninsula would jeopardize US interests in Europe and the Mediterranean, and the National interest would require that the greatest possible support be given the Italian Government in its efforts to maintain itself and eventually to regain the territory seized by the Communists.
Communist seizure of North Italy would probably be presented as purely domestic in character, without foreign aid or intervention. In the event that Yugoslavia seizes Italian border territory, the US should if possible treat this as a separate matter, bringing Yugoslav aggression to the attention of the United Nations and making it clear [Page 980] to the Italian people that we are acting in the interest of the Italian nation as a whole, regardless of the fact that Yugoslav aggression is against territory held by an illegal Communist regime.
13. It is believed that plans now formulated should apply to the period of ninety days within which US and UK forces must be withdrawn from Italy in accordance with the treaty. If action has not taken taken by the Communists in the near future, but appears likely to be taken after the final withdrawal of US forces, these plans should be reviewed not more than sixty days from now in order to determine the course of action to be followed by the US in the circumstances which may then exist.
recommendations
In the event of Communist seizure of North Italy, the following plan of U.S. action is recommended:
- a.
- The Italian Government should inform the Four Ambassadors (US, UK, USSR and French) in Rome (with the request that they notify the other signatories of the peace treaty) that it is no longer able to maintain effective authority in North Italy and that it consequently cannot accept responsibility for the execution of the terms of the peace treaty in that area.
- b.
- The Italian Government should inform the U.S. and, so far as may be applicable, the British Government, that in the light of the situation which has arisen in North Italy it is no longer able to guarantee order along lines of communication across Italy from Leghorn for the support of US forces in Italy and in Trieste; that it must therefore leave it to the U.S. to take suitable measures to protect legitimate American interests in that area; and that in this connection it remains prepared to render to the United States Government, within the limits of its ability, all possible assistance in servicing US forces in Italy and in meeting US obligations to the UN with respect to the Free Territory of Trieste.
- c.
- The US should immediately express concern publicly over the fact that disorder has broken out in Italy so soon after the entry into force of the peace treaty and should notify the Italian Government and the UN that in the light of this situation it has become necessary to suspend the withdrawal of US forces from Italian territory.
- d.
- The US should inform the Italian Government that in view of the situation which has arisen it will require additional military facilities for the time being and arrangements should be made to that end.
- e.
- The US should announce the suspension of aid to North Italy under the US relief program, at the same time making it clear that this aid will be continued for areas under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
- f.
- If the Italian Government makes a request to the US for direct military assistance, our reply should be that we are not disposed to intervene with US armed force in what appears to be a civil conflict of an internal nature in Italy but that we will continue to recognize the Rome Government as the legitimate Government of Italy and will regard all of our existing undertakings with respect to aid to that Government as still in effect.
- g.
- If, in the foregoing situation, Yugoslavia should make incursions into or seize Italian border territory, the US should vigorously take up this aggression against Italy with the appropriate body of the United Nations.
- h.
- These recommendations are designed to apply only to the period between now and December 12 (the expiration date of the period during which we are entitled to have forces in Italy). They should be reviewed in the latter part of November, and revised to fit the circumstances which will prevail after December 12.