865.51/9–1647
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Ambassador Tarchiani |
| Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary | |
| Mr. Dowling, SE |
The Italian Ambassador called this afternoon to bring to my attention data on Italian financial requirements for the final quarter of 1948. He referred to his recent conversation with me1 and said that additional figures were being received by mail from Rome but that he believed the essential facts were shown in the memorandum which he was leaving with me.2
Tarchiani also left with me a note regarding the IEFC grain allocation to Italy3 and urged that this allocation be increased if at all possible. [Page 970] He said that contemplated shipments in the next few months would leave Italy with little more than a month’s supply of grain on January 1.
I told Tarchiani I was glad to have these figures and inquired whether there would be any objection to making them public if it seemed desirable. He replied there would be no objection, adding that most of the information had been made available to other countries participating in the Paris talks on the Marshall Plan.
The Ambassador then discussed the present situation in Italy. He said the recent wave of strikes, coming as the treaty entered into force and Italy’s economic resources were practically exhausted, were of course part of the overall strategy of the Italian Communist Party to force the De Gasperi Government out of office. He added that he did not believe Togliatti could overthrow the De Gasperi Government by parliamentary vote. If Togliatti failed, however, he might then attempt to set up a Communist government in Northern Italy which would undoubtedly receive recognition and assistance from Tito. The Italian Government in this event would take all possible measures to defend itself and to regain Northern Italy, but the armed forces permitted Italy under the Treaty were small, and even with the support of a majority of the population, a situation would exist akin to that in Greece today. He was still hopeful, though, that De Gasperi could win through, and that the Communist drive could be checked by means short of civil war.
After expressing the opinion that developments in Italy were related to general Soviet moves in Europe, Tarchiani said he felt the Soviets were pushing ahead in Italy rather than elsewhere since Greece and Turkey were now under “direct US protection”, both in a military and economic sense, whereas Allied troops were being withdrawn from Italy and the economic situation there was growing worse. He added that while he felt sure the Italian Communists could count on Yugoslav and Soviet support he wondered what assistance the Italian Government would obtain.
I commented that Italy could proceed under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, pointing out that Italy’s right to defensive action thereunder was not subject to the veto. Tarchiani agreed, but seemed doubtful that the Italian Government could hold out while appealing to the United Nations; he reiterated, however, that the Government would do everything possible to maintain and defend itself.
In conclusion Tarchiani said that his views were based on his own estimate of the situation; he had received no direct word from De Gasperi, he said, but if he did, he would let me know.
- This brief conversation, for which no record has been found, took place on September 10, for it is referred to as of “yesterday” in Tarchiani’s conversation with Armour and Dowling on September 11 (ante, p. 965).↩
- Note of Italian Embassy, No. 8275, infra.↩
- Note of Italian Embassy, No. 8274, p. 972.↩