865.51/9–1147
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)
| Participants: | Ambassador Tarchiani |
| Mr. Armour, A–A | |
| Mr. Dowling, SE |
When the Ambassador called at his request this morning he said that in a brief conversation with the Acting Secretary yesterday1 Mr. Lovett had requested any suggestions which the Ambassador might have regarding assistance for Italy. The Ambassador said that unfortunately he had been unable to think of any concrete measures which would not require Congressional action, although it was clear by now that Italy would run out of dollars long before any action which Congress might take. He said Italy would be able to finance her requirements this month and it might be possible to pay for October requirements, but there would be nothing at all left for November [Page 966] imparts. He said he had not received complete figures from Rome but his own estimate was that within the near future Italy had in sight only some $37 million; this figure would have to be reduced proportionately if there were any delay in final settlement of the Army accounts, from which Italy expected to realize approximately $4 million, or in the POW account totalling perhaps $5 million. On the other hand, his estimate of Italy’s needs to the end of December was $120 million. As he understood it the only immediately available source of assistance was the relief program for Italy which is generally expected to total about $120 million. Of this amount, about $35 million had been committed in the present quarter, leaving about $85 million for the balance of the program. He understood further that it was contemplated that about half of this amount would be spent in the final quarter of the year and the rest in the first quarter of 1948. He hoped, however, we would give consideration to stepping up shipments in the final quarter, in anticipation that funds under the Marshall Plan would be available for the first quarter of next year. He said the essential commodities for Italy were, of course, wheat and coal; he realized there were difficulties in procurement and transportation, but if Italy’s requirements for these two items could be covered under the relief program he felt that they would get along somehow.
I told Tarchiani that we would give consideration to his suggestion and that we would see what could be done in this connection.
After thanking me, the Ambassador turned to the question of Italy’s admission to the UN. He said that of course none of us knew what the Soviet attitude on Italy’s application would be, now that the treaty was coming into effect, but he feared the USSR would continue to oppose Italy unless the other ex-enemy states were also admitted. He added that he knew and sympathized with our attitude in this matter, but that he hoped if we could admit some of the ex-enemy states Italy could also get in. I said we had particularly grave doubts that Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania were willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter and that I did not see how we could vote for all of the ex-enemy states. At the same time, Italy could count on the same warm support for the Italian application which we had already given in the Security Council. The Ambassador said that the Italian Government was most grateful for this support and he knew we would continue it.
Referring again to the coming into force of the Italian treaty on September 15, Tarchiani said there were two matters to which he hoped we would give special consideration. One was the delimitation of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier. He said the Italian Government had not accepted the Four Power Boundary Commission’s recommendations, which he felt deviated from the treaty provisions and made [Page 967] too many concessions to Yugoslavia. The area involved was not great, but it meant a great deal to the Italian people, and he hoped this unfavorable frontier would not be imposed on Italy. The second matter was the possible return to Italy of the US share of Italian naval vessels distributed under the treaty. He said he understood we did not want to use these ships, and he felt their return to Italy for scrapping would make a tremendous impression on the Italian people. He said the scrap metal was needed for Italian industries, and the return of the ships, perhaps for some specific purpose like the production of agricultural machinery, would be a gesture which would capture the Italian imagination.
In conclusion the Ambassador said he hoped very much that any action we might take in regard to these matters could be announced before September 23 when debate began in the Constituent Assembly on the motion of no confidence introduced by Nenni. He said De Gasperi would surely be hard-pushed in the debate; the Communist-instigated strikes were becoming increasingly grave; Togliatti had just threatened the use of violence if necessary to overthrow the Government; and every effort would be made to charge De Gasperi and his pro-Western policy with responsibility for all of Italy’s ills. He felt the vote would be extremely close, and further evidence of American support and assistance might be the deciding factor.
I promised Tarchiani that I would look into all these questions immediately, adding that as he knew we would be as helpful as possible.
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩