865.248/5–1447: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
1146. ReDeptel 619, May 1 and mytel 1056, May 6.1 I have now seen War Department WX 97755 of May 92 concerning provision of P–51 craft for Italian Air Force. MTOUSA has raised question whether they (reference paragraph 5 A of WX 97755) or Embassy should now carry principal burden of discussion with Italian Government regarding implementation. Since De Gasperi indicated to me that cost would be a principal factor in Italian decision whether to accept, and since details of cost will apparently fall to FLC, I have agreed that Embassy and FLC will negotiate, keeping General Lee fully informed.
Paragraph 5 C of WX 97755 appears ambiguous and leaves open possibility that FLC may charge an amount as yet unknown for the aircraft and spares in addition to $90,000 for packing, crating and transportation, and rehabilitation of aircraft. Please clarify whether remainder of $92,000 figure mentioned Deptel 619 intended cover cost of aircraft. I informed De Gasperi that total is $92,000.
OFLC Rome has no instructions or information regarding program, or manner of payment. (Paragraph 5 E of War Department Signal). Suggest Department instruct FLC Rome, Paris or Washington, or all three, which will handle cost negotiations.
Ruling in paragraph 5 D, namely that Italians will receive no credit toward P–51’s for payments on P–38’s which they have already bought is likely to prejudice joint nature of program outlined in Fan 749. I am informed contract price for P–38’s was $160,000, which more than covers present estimate of P–51 program, and believe it entirely possible [Page 903] that if War Department ruling stands Italians might refuse any or all of the Spitfires to be provided by the British, preferring to utilize American craft of both types insofar as treaty limitations permit. Additional factors leading to this conclusion are that British, although intending turn over Spitfires free, apparently intend to charge hard sterling cash amounting about 800,000 pounds for maintenance parts to be purchased out of current British production; furthermore that guns now mounted in Spitfires (reference paragraph 5 F of WX 97755) are Lend-Lease equipment which cannot be sold by British and therefore present additional complicating factor. If, as War Department states, maintenance parts and spares for P–38’s are difficult, if not impossible, I suggest that Italians be allowed to return P–38’s for scrapping or other disposal and use the credit for the P–51’s.
Regarding training of flying and maintenance personnel (paragraph 5 B of War Department Signal 97755) I am informing military through PolAd, in response to their request for views, that important point is that US personnel instruct Italians in use and maintenance of the P–51 craft. Whether this instruction takes place in Germany or Italy I do not consider immediately important, so long as no US military personnel associated with the project remain in Italy after R–Day plus 90.
Sent Department 1146, repeated Leghorn 36.
- In this telegram, not printed, Dunn reported that he had spoken to Prime Minister De Gasperi on May 5 and had informed him of the proposal in the Department’s 619 of May 1. De Gasperi expressed appreciation for the generosity of the U.S. offer. (865.248/5–647)↩
- Not printed; it directed General Lee to explain that the proposal of Fan 749, April 29, was an agreed Anglo-American plan which the Italians should promptly accept, and suggested that USAAF personnel take part along with RAF representatives in discussions with the Italian Air Force. (Defense Files)↩