Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

865.248/4–2947: Defense Files: Telegram

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Acting Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Lee)

secret

Washington, 29 April 1947.

WARX 97147 (Fan 749) Modernization of Italian Air Forces is subject. References Naf’s 1235¹ and 1258.²

1. After careful consideration including financial aspect of proposals for reorganization of Italian Air Force put forward by British Air Ministry and U.S. War Department and bearing in mind that our object is to build up an efficient Italian Air Force within the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty, we have decided that following is the best plan from all points of view.

2. Five fighter-type squadrons to be equipped with Spitfire IXs and two with P–51s all complete to operational role. Supply of fifty P–51 aircraft and specific-to-type aircraft maintenance equipment and spare parts for three years for the P–51s will be the only responsibility of American Government. British Government will assume entire responsibility for provision of all British equipment including ancillary aircraft, ground equipment specialist vehicles, etc., required by the Italian Air Force. Plan will be in essence that prepared by Air Ministry and already submitted to Italian Government with exception that P–51s are substituted for P–38s.

3. You should inform Italian Government that this is agreed Anglo-American plan and that they should discuss details including cost with the British and American authorities in Rome. In view of the early withdrawal of Allied forces from Italy, a decision by the Italian Government is urgently required.

4. For your guidance as regards British equipment, the cost of the Spitfires will be nil, cost of spares and other equipment will be nil so far as these are available from stocks in Italy, one-sixth cost price so far as they are available from surpluses outside Italy and full price for such equipment and spare parts as have to be supplied from new production. Air Ministry estimate that about 3 months’ aircraft spares plus a considerable proportion of the other equipment required such as MT, special equipment, ammunition, etc. can be provided from surpluses either in Italy or elsewhere but that major part of the spares required for 3 years’ backing would have to come from new production. Range and quantity of spares required would of course be for decision by Italians. According to Air Ministry scales of provision of spares total original sterling cost of British equipment is estimated to amount to pounds sterling 4,417,300 of which 2,149,000 worth (including all the Spitfires and a proportion of spares and other equipment) would be supplied free: 1,410,800 worth would be supplied for 305,000 and the remainder would be charged for at full price i.e., roughly about 857,500.

5. With regard to United States equipment, the over-all cost will include a nominal price for aircraft, spares for three (3) years, and associated aircraft maintenance equipment, plus the actual costs incurred in placing the aircraft in operational standard and delivery thereof, and packing, crating, and transporting three (3) years’ supply of spares and aircraft maintenance equipment. Due to deterioration in storage, if resolution of arrangements is long delayed, an increase in cost of placing aircraft in operational standard may be expected.

1. Naf 1235 (FX 73372), November 21, 1946, not printed. In this message SACMED mentioned his understanding that there were now available more modern types of combat aircraft than the P–38 and Spitfire 9, and urged that it was essential for the Allies to leave behind the most efficient air force possible within the treaty limits. (Defense Files)
2. Naf 1258 (FX 74126), January 6, 1947, not printed. In this message SACMED mentioned that pending details of the U.S. plan, the Italian Air Staff had withheld acceptance of the British plan and that reorganization of the Italian Air Force was at a standstill. He urged that delay in the American plan jeopardized the policy of leaving behind an efficient Italian Air Force. (Defense Files)