851.00/10–2947: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
4635. For Armour and Hickerson from the Ambassador. I welcomed your 4071, October 25 which parallels so closely our own thinking here and which gave me authoritative backing for the things which I have been saying to some of De Gaulle’s people. I shall hammer away at them at every opportunity.
I have not seen De Gaulle personally since the elections, because such a meeting would be publicized by the Gaullists for their own ends and misinterpreted by Ramadier, Bidault and other members of present government. I cannot therefore be absolutely certain that the views which Palewski has expressed to me are shared in full by the [Page 794] General, but in view of their past relationship and the fact that Palewski’s prognostications have usually been confirmed, I think we must go on the assumption that they are substantially correct in the present instance. The statement issued by De Gaulle also tends to bear them out.
I could not agree more with your analysis of the principal obstacles to De Gaulle’s governing effectively. But I think that however dangerous the constitutional issue may be, it will continue to rank high on the list of his objectives, for this question lies at the very basis of his philosophy of government and is a matter on which he has repeatedly and publicly expressed the strongest views. For the accomplishment of the task which he will have to face if he assumes power, some revision of the constitution may, as a matter of hard fact, be necessary. I think too that De Gaulle would have some justification for recalling that the present constitution received the affirmative support of only 30 odd percent of the voters, many of whom now favor revision and in fact only voted “yes” last year because they felt that any constitution at that time was better than none.
To my mind the constitutional question as such is probably secondary, at least at this stage to the problem of De Gaulle’s relationship with the Socialists, many of whom can be expected at this time to oppose at least such constitutional changes as strike at basic liberties. In this connection, the manner in which De Gaulle acts will be as important as what he does. As I have already reported, the Socialists are in a key position, although torn by the tremendous pressure now being directed against them from the right and from the left. If De Gaulle endeavors to destroy the Socialist Party he may succeed, but he would undoubtedly draw to his camp far fewer followers by such tactics (and would force the rest into an unwished for alliance with the Communists) than he would if he endeavored to reach a working agreement with them. For De Gaulle it is not merely a question of gaining the support of certain Socialist parliamentary leaders, but also the question whether those leaders would be in a position to swing their followers into line. In particular, he must obtain the support of Socialist leaders who are backed by anti-Communist trade unionists.
In view of De Gaulle’s temperament and past record, I fear that in spite of these considerations he will favor a frontal attack on the Socialists. The victory which he has just achieved has unquestionably gone to the heads of his followers and cannot be expected to have been without effect on his own thinking.
At any rate this is, I think, the key question at the moment and the one on which I am exerting every particle of influence I can.
I think we have all shared the view that if it could succeed in establishing its authority a coalition government made up of middle of the [Page 795] road parties, such as we have had under Ramadier, guaranteed the best hope for working out in the long run the enormous economic and political problems of France on a democratic basis. For reasons which it is useless recapitulate here, it is now inescapable that this experiment has failed. When faced with the dilemma of De Gaulle or Communism, there is no doubt that the majority of the French people will pick De Gaulle. I assume that in our own interest we will do the same, even though that choice must boil down to the lesser of two evils, since after elimination of middle parties failure of De Gaulle would leave road open for Communists. I think that we should do everything in our power to lessen the shock and to eliminate or reduce the very real dangers which will accompany the return of De Gaulle to power, whether next week or six months hence, and which are a matter of grave concern to many Frenchmen as well as to ourselves. Not the least among the things which need to be done in this connection is for De Gaulle to separate himself from reactionary rightists who have climbed on his bandwagon.
In conclusion, I feel it necessary to add that while De Gaulle may have learned some lessons during the past two years, I think we would be indulging in wishful thinking if we concluded that he had undergone any fundamental change. In the circumstances, I think we must be prepared to anticipate very real difficulties in dealing with him on specific questions; almost certainly in respect to Germany, and very probably in respect to Indochina and North Africa.