851.00B/10–1747: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
4485. A number of reliable sources of different political orientation (some having definite reservations about De Gaulle) have separately expressed to me in the past several days their belief that while the Communists would, of course, like to return to the government in order better to prevent French recovery, particularly by sabotaging the Marshall Plan, the Communists are now convinced that because of the rapid hardening of anti-Communist sentiment resulting from the recent open reactivation of the Comintern and their all-out efforts to sabotage French economic recovery, the other political parties will not in the near future permit them to reenter a coalition government, Therefore to carry out Moscow’s orders to sabotage at all costs French recovery the Communists are necessarily obliged to adopt more “open and revolutionary” tactics than they previously employed regardless of whether or not such action may harm their standing throughout the country at large.
In speculating on what line the Communists may follow after the municipal elections, the above mentioned sources believe that in view of De Gaulle’s growing strength “which will be obvious to all from the election results” the Communists are now convinced that a final showdown with the General is inevitable. The question for the Communists [Page 779] is therefore: “When, tactically, is it most advantageous to the Communist cause for the showdown to occur?”
My informants state they have information which indicates that the Communists now feel that the sooner they join battle with De Gaulle, the greater will be their chance of success. That is, they believe that De Gaulle’s RPF, although now solidly established in the country, is still not well organized. Furthermore, the Communists know that at present a considerable number of Frenchmen as well as a number of political leaders of the left, center and moderate right, have certain misgivings about De Gaulle and believe that a middle-of-the-road coalition government (such as now exists) is not only the most desirable formula but still has a chance of succeeding. The Communists reason that no such government can solve France’s problem chiefly because no such government has the prestige or authority to take the necessary steps to end Communist sabotage. Therefore they feel that persons who now still prefer a center coalition solution will become progressively disillusioned and several months hence will all flock to De Gaulle. In view of these factors, the Communists have come to the conclusion that the showdown with De Gaulle should come now rather than some months hence when the Gaullist organization will be much more firmly established and the General’s following and public support throughout France so great that the Communists would not be able successfully to oppose him.
My sources believe that should this estimate of the Communist views be correct, soon after the elections the Communists will increase the tempo of their already violent attacks against the government (particularly through the use of the CGT in fomenting strikes, etc.) with a view to causing the collapse of the Ramadier Government and creating a situation— “not excluding public disorders”—where De Gaulle will make a “premature” attempt to return to power, an attempt which the Communists (posing as “defenders of the Republic”) believe they will be able successfully to oppose through use of the general strike, mass demonstrations of force, disorder, intimidation, etc. By defeating De Gaulle now, the Communists would, of course, eliminate from the political picture the one individual who, because of his prestige, represents the most dangerous rallying point of French anti-Communist forces.
While it is possible that events will not bear out the above predictions on Communist tactics, it would be dangerous at this juncture to discount the possibility of such developments particularly in the light of the very definite hardening of the position the CGT has recently taken against the government. While this CGT action is in part for electoral purposes—particularly to permit the Communists to go on [Page 780] posing as the “sole defenders of the working class”—the Communists know that the CGT action such as the present subway and bus strike is alienating the petits bourgeois and middle class. It is possible therefore that the present stiffening of the CGT is designed not only for electoral purposes but is also the prelude to stronger action after the elections to bring about a situation which the Communists believe may favor the destruction of the Socialists and the elimination of De Gaulle.
The Gaullists are of course alive to the dangers inherent in this situation and can be counted on to do everything possible to avoid having their hand forced. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the Communists would be successful in eliminating De Gaulle even if they were able to force a showdown in the immediate future. Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the present coalition government or one like it, will be unable to cope with the Communist tactics. In this connection the strong and successful stand taken by Ramadier in dealing with the metro strike has strengthened his prestige and consequently his position in recent days. If the Communists overplay their hand an increasing part of the population, which thus far has been rather apathetic, may turn actively against the Communists and by less support enable the government to adopt measures to deal with the Communists which thus far have been deemed politically inexpedient.
I need hardly add that hope of American financial and moral support—and the degree of certainty with which that support can be anticipated—will continue to constitute probably the most important force in strengthening the will to resist among all non-Communist Frenchmen whatever their political persuasion.
Sent Department 4485, repeated Moscow 504, to London by pouch.