851.00/5–1247: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
u.s. urgent
1927. French political developments culminating in the recent governmental crisis which resulted in the at least temporary exclusion of the Communists from a Coalition Government for the first time since the liberation have brought us to a point where a thorough analysis of our general policy toward France, and more particularly toward the present Ramadier Government is required. The subject is of great complexity and offers no guaranteed solution. However, its immediate and vital importance in the light of future possibilities is such that I am transmitting my observations by telegram rather than despatch despite their length.
I think it clear that given existing political conditions the party composition of the present government is from our viewpoint the best that could be hoped for. In the first place it excludes the Communists on the extreme left and reactionary elements on the right, and combines the fundamentally democratic forces of the center and left which still represent the views and command the support of a majority of the French Parliament and people despite a general public feeling of disillusionment with governmental fumbling and incoherence. If a really strong democratic France is to be established such a coalition is not only desirable but in fact offers the best chance of success. Furthermore, its component elements are oriented toward us through mutual belief in the new basic conception of liberty and human decency and through deep fear and distrust of ruthless Soviet [Page 710] imperialism. Most important is the fact that the present government is essentially Socialist and is headed by a Socialist. It has thus the support of substantial anti-Communist elements of the vital trade union movement and if it succeeds it will unquestionably gain increased working class support.
While the foregoing considerations lead inevitably to the conclusion that it is in our own very real interest that the Ramadier Government succeed, its chances of so doing without substantial outside support seem very doubtful. Ramadier is faced with crucial economic problems—both immediate and long-range—which must be held to manageable proportions if the economic and hence political situation is not seriously to deteriorate. Conditions of life for the average worker and salaried employee are such that there is very real hardship, with consequent discontent. This makes them vulnerable to exploitation by extremists, particularly the Communists who are artists in this line. Among the government’s acutest problems is the food (particularly grain) shortage, which has led to a reduction in the bread ration with a natural deterioration in morale. The period until the harvest is crucial and although some temporary relief may be expected after the harvest the food situation will be critical for at least another year. Furthermore, the price index of foods has risen sharply in the last three months largely as an indirect result of the winter wheat freeze and grain shortage. Lack of coal and low labor productivity both tend to retard the imperative expansion of both industrial and vital agricultural production. The ever present threat hangs over the government of an uncontrolled inflationary spiral which will occur unless the wage level is held and production increased. Administrative inefficiency, unsound control mechanisms encourage a highly developed black market and the tendency to hoard food and consumer goods makes matters worse.
The task facing the Ramadier Government would be difficult enough if all parties, including the Communists, were solidly behind it. But not even this is the case. While the Communists now in the opposition are acting with great circumspection and are not expected in the near future to resort to extreme action which might serve to force the Socialists further away from them and which would lay them open to charges of seriously crippling French economic recovery solely for their own political ends, it goes without saying that beneath the surface they will do everything in their power to torpedo the Ramadier Government. (My 1883, May 81.) (Already the Communist press is warning against accepting any further aid from the US on the grounds that this would be at the sacrifice of France’s independence.) [Page 711] They are counting, until after the US elections in 1948, on our following a policy of economic retrenchment with drastic budgetary cuts which will not permit adequate aid to our friends and subsequently on an economic collapse which will make later aid impossible. In other words, on our following an economic policy of “too little and too late”. It is essential to the Communists that Ramadier fail so that they can prove that France cannot be governed without them and they can subsequently reenter the government with increased authority and influence.
Consequences of a failure of the Ramadier Government on the French internal as well as international situation are too evident to require detailed elaboration. Insofar as the Socialists are concerned, both Ramadier and Blum showed great courage and were largely responsible for the reluctant Socialist decision to head a government excluding the Communists. The fact that they were able to persuade the National Congress of their party, even though by a bare majority, to accept this decision is an encouraging sign and one which certainly would not have been possible six months ago. In this connection the President’s policy toward Greece and Turkey was probably one of the decisive factors.2 On the other hand, there remains a serious division in the Socialist Party on the question of participating in, let alone leading, a government without the Communists. If Ramadier’s Government fails, the very strong and vocal left-wing Socialist opposition to the policy of the present leadership will be greatly reinforced. It is almost certain that in such an event the Socialist left-wing will take over the direction of the Socialist Party.
In addition to the lessening of influence of anti-Communist Socialists within the Socialist Party, the fall of the Ramadier Government would almost inevitably weaken the newly-forged ties which for the moment at least link the forces of the center and left in the present government, particularly since both the MRP and RGR would find it infinitely more difficult to cooperate with highly doctrinaire left-wing Socialist leadership. But the major disaster attending a collapse of the Ramadier Government would be the happening [opening] of a division of France into two hostile extremist camps—the Communists on the one side and De Gaulle on the other—with an inevitable struggle to the finish between them.
Too many unknown factors are involved to permit accurate speculation at this juncture on the ultimate outcome of such a showdown between De Gaulle and the Communists, but it is at least clear that the struggle itself would have the most far-reaching and dangerous repercussions [Page 712] and from our point of view could not lead to a happy conclusion. If the Communists won, Soviet penetration of Western Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean and Middle East would be greatly facilitated, and our position in our zone of occupation of Germany rendered precarious, if not untenable. If De Gaulle won, France would be headed into a new and unknown adventure which by the nature of the forces generated in such a struggle would make the practice in France of democracy as we understand it difficult if not impossible for some time to come.
It would appear vital to our security to do everything we can to prevent France from falling under Communist domination. Sooner or later we may have to extend such support and the danger of failing to give such support now if it is feasible and warranted is that if the Ramadier Government collapses and a showdown with the Communists follows, we may then be obliged to support French elements which represent infinitely less in terms of democracy and public backing.
With regard to the short range situation, I believe that it is in our interest to continue to make every effort to give material assistance to France (particularly wheat and coal) during this critical period when the Ramadier Government is very definitely on trial. Anything we can do along these lines during the next two months should help to post-pone and thereby enhance the chances of preventing the collapse on which both the Communists and De Gaulle are counting.
Our long term studies should include a reappraisal of the Monnet3 Plan which has been accepted as the blueprint for French recovery. In this connection, it now seems fairly apparent that even if France’s financial resources in the next few years held to the level on which the plan was based, the plan itself would not be more than 65% completed by the end of 1950. Actually some of the basic assumptions of the plans were unrealistic in character (notably with regard to labor, assets from immigrant remittances and tourist trade, and a too optimistic view of French agricultural recovery). There has also been an unanticipated deterioration in the economic situation since last October as a result of which important assets have had to be spent on increased wheat and coal imports, etc. In the circumstances, and granting the fact that for political reasons the Monnet Plan must be retained at least as a reflection of the aspirations of the French people which might conceivably be attainable in time, serious study should be given to the question of whether there should not be a complete readaptation of the Monnet Plan to place immediate emphasis on, for example, recovery of agricultural production; increase in production for internal use of goods essential to the masses including housing; and increase [Page 713] of winter coal allocations for household use. France’s economic recovery is currently checked by extremely poor productivity. The present Monnet Plan places chief reliance on the remedy of technological improvement of the means of production. The new approach to which I have alluded would give at least equal consideration to greater productivity through the rehabilitation of the physical condition and psychology of France’s laboring and small salaried groups. While such a program would further delay the achievement of the position envisaged by the Monnet Plan, it might well enhance the chances of ultimate success by bringing about an early improvement in living conditions which should in turn bring about an achievement in the political atmosphere so necessary if extremist solutions are to be avoided. Further details on this aspect of the program will be submitted by mail.
Sent Department 1927, repeated Geneva for Clayton as 30.
- Not printed.↩
- For documentation regarding the policy of President Truman toward Greece and Turkey, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Jean Monnet was Commissioner General of the Plan for Modernization and Reequipment of the French economy.↩