[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in
France (Caffery)
secret
[Paris,] March 6,
1947.
Although the present Government by nature of its broad
coalition basis enjoys the appearance of a large
parliamentary majority, nonetheless there are a number of
critical questions which could lead to serious dissension
within this uneasy parliamentary majority. Questions such as
wages and prices, revision of the press laws, balancing the
budget, French overseas colonial policy (particularly in
Indo-China), strictly controlled economy versus economic
liberalism, are among the more acute problems on which
different elements within the Government are in basic
disagreement. A knockdown-dragout fight on some of these
issues could easily result in the withdrawal of support by
elements which at present are participating in the
Government, thus causing a serious political crisis.
For the moment, and particularly until the termination of the
Moscow Conference, it is generally believed that none of the
political parties participating in the Government will wish
to precipitate a serious political crisis because such
action would greatly weaken the hand of the French
Delegation at Moscow, when critical discussions on Germany,
involving French security, are occurring. After the
termination
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of the
Moscow Conference, however, the situation will again become
fraught with possibilities, particularly if French economy
deteriorates further.
Insofar as the general public is concerned, there is
uneasiness and a lack of confidence in the present
Government. Reports from many prefectures in France,
particularly from those areas where food is scarce and
living conditions difficult, indicate that while at present
there appears to be no danger of any disorder or trouble
originating in such regions, there is considerable
discontent, and should there be trouble in Paris there would
probably be rapid repercussions in these areas. There is
also general discontent with the Government because it seems
incapable of governing effectively. This has led in some
cases to the development of an unhealthy state of mind to
the effect that since democracy as it is practiced in France
does not seem to be effective, an authoritative Government
is needed.
In this connection it is interesting that de Gaulle2 has decided to take the initiative and
actively reenter the political arena. He has announced that
he will make several speeches during the month of March.
This decision has resulted in a series of rumors among his
opponents of the extreme Left and his supporters of the
Right that some form of manoeuver looking to the
establishment of an authoritarian Gaullist régime is in the
offing. Actually the present Gaullist game is to break down
the party discipline of the parties of the Center and Right
so that the membership thereof will desert the group to
which they now belong and form a coalition headed by de
Gaulle which will be anti-Communist in fact but not in name.
His chances of succeeding in such a manoeuver in the
immediate future do not appear bright but he has
unquestionably gained support for the idea recently among
the ranks of parliamentarians belonging to the Rassemblement
des Gauches, the MRP and the
Independent Republicans. Should a situation arise where the
French people are given a choice only
between de Gaulle and the Communists, a majority would
certainly back the General. On the other hand, should a
crisis of the first magnitude develop it seems probable at
this juncture that Blum (who is holding himself on the
sidelines) might, because of his recently increased
prestige, first be called back to try to solve it, and there
is little doubt that Blum and certain elements of the Center
have such a possibility in mind. Should Blum fail, the
choice might necessarily be between de Gaulle and the
Communists.
The Communists, for the moment, are behaving themselves.
Apparently on instructions from Moscow they entered the
present Government
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with a view to influencing the French Government’s foreign
policy, particularly during the Moscow Conference. While
maintaining the outward fiction of being a “Government
Party” they continue their undermining and infiltration
tactics. What the Communist position will be after the
Moscow Conference is not certain and may depend to a
considerable extent on what actually transpires at Moscow as
well as in France itself.
From the foregoing it should not be assumed that there will
be serious trouble or disorder in the period of the next
several months. The French people tend to be either
over-optimistic or over-pessimistic, and with the advent of
Spring, with warmer weather and easier living conditions,
their present feeling of pessimism may undergo change.
However, this will depend to a great extent on the
Government’s ability to solve the most critical economic and
financial problems in such a fashion that the French people
believe that although living conditions are difficult, the
Government has a sound financial and economic program
through which French recovery may be effected. At this
juncture it seems evident that the possibility of adopting a
sound economic program depends on gaining real support of
the Communist Party and its auxiliary, the CGT. Failing this, it is
difficult to see how a serious political crisis can be
avoided.
