840.48 Refugees/12–1947

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I should like to bring to your personal attention a matter which may seriously impede our negotiations with Denmark for base rights in Greenland.

The Danish Government has requested the United States to receive in the U.S. Zone of Germany some 8,000 Germans who are refugees in Denmark. The Department of the Army has indicated that it cannot concur in complying with the Danish request. The Danish Government has firmly indicated to the Department of State that Danish feeling in this matter is so intense that refusal by the U.S. to meet the Danish request is likely to make it impossible to obtain the base rights in Greenland which I understand is a matter regarded as highly important from a national security standpoint. In these circumstances I believe the problem is essentially one of weighing the inconvenience and burden which receiving these refugees would place upon the administration of the U.S. Zone against the danger to our negotiations for the Greenland bases which would result from refusing the Danish request. Although it is my own view that the greater interests of the U.S. will be served by agreeing to the Danish request, I feel that the question is one of primary concern to the Department of National Defense. I should, therefore, appreciate your guidance. Because of the interest of the Army, Navy and Air Force in this matter, I am sending copies of this letter to Messrs. Royall, Sullivan1 and Symington.2

The German refugees in question are among some 70–75 thousand who remain from some 200,000 Germans who fled to Denmark during the war. The maintenance of these refugees has been a heavy and distasteful burden upon Denmark, which has repeatedly urged the Occupying Powers to absorb them. The Department of State has been informed by the Danish Ambassador that the Soviet Zone will absorb half of the refugees if the Western Zones will absorb the remaining half. The Western Zones have thus far absorbed some 62,000, of whom 12,000 were taken by the U.S. Zone, although no obligation rested on the U.S. to do so. Of the 70–75 thousand remaining, Denmark regards the Soviet Zone as obligated to take 50,000 and has requested the three Western powers to take 20–25 thousand, the U.S. Zone’s share being approximately 8,000.

The Danish Government has stated that the other Western powers are willing to take their share, conditioned upon our agreement to take [Page 687] our share. The British Government has made a proposal in the Coordinating Committee in Berlin3 to complete the solution of this problem. This matter is now before a subcommittee of the Coordinating Committee and the U.S. must take a position on it in the near future.

This matter has been discussed thoroughly with representatives of the Army Department here and by Ambassador Douglas and Assistant Secretary Saltzman with General Clay in London.4 The Army’s position is based upon the acute housing and food situation in Germany; the effect which affirmative action would have upon the Germans in our zone and upon other countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary which have been anxious to send their German population into our zone; the lack of obligation to accept the refugees; and the fact that the U.S. Zone already had accepted the previous group without such obligation. These objections are valid and understandable from the point of view of the administration of Germany. They must be weighed, however, against the effect of U.S. rejection of the Danish request.

The Department of the Army has suggested that if definite assurance can be obtained from Denmark that the base rights would actually be obtained as a result of possible action on the Danish request, it would be prepared to reconsider the whole question. We have considered this suggestion but have concluded that under the circumstances it should not be attempted since its effect would probably be adverse rather than favorable.

Our position will be considerably improved if we are able to give the Danes a favorable reply promptly. I should, therefore, appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

Acting Secretary
  1. John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy.
  2. W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force.
  3. An agency of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. For documentation on the problems of quadripartite control in Germany, see vol. ii, pp. 831 ff.
  4. Lewis Douglas, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Charles E. Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, and Gen. Olay were serving as advisers on the United States Delegation to the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London, November 25–December 15, 1947.