859B.20/10–2247

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
top secret
Participants: Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, Danish Foreign Minister1
Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Ambassador
The Secretary

In raising the subject of termination of the agreement of April 9, 1941 for the defense of Greenland the Danish Foreign Minister referred to an impression in Washington and London that his Government was subject to Soviet pressure for termination of the agreement. He said that no such pressure had been brought to bear by the Soviet Government, the only time the matter had even been mentioned was on [Page 681] one occasion when the Soviet Minister at Copenhagen had asked him as to the truth of press reports that the United States Government was attempting to buy Greenland. He was then in a position to refer the Minister to the public statement Mr. Rasmussen had made a few days earlier to the effect that Greenland was not for sale. The Soviet press and radio had been critical of the United States for continuing to maintain forces in Greenland but had not yet criticized the Danish Government. I observed that the Soviet Government was too astute to use direct pressure when it had at its disposal local means of exerting influence and pressure. Mr. Rasmussen said that pressure for termination of the agreement came from various sections of Danish public opinion [in] addition to the Communists. I recognized that this was a subject on which the Communists could easily get general support. He hoped it would be possible for him to say that the consultations provided in Article 10 of the agreement were making progress, as for example to announce that the weather stations were progressively being transferred from American to Danish hands.

I developed to him forcefully and at some length the importance of Greenland as a vital and vulnerable link in the defense of the Western Hemisphere as a whole. If the Danes could defend it adequately that would be fine but they clearly were not in a position to do so. We could not afford to have it undefended. Enemy occupation of Greenland would not only endanger our whole system of hemispheric defense but would expose our vital industrial areas. I said I had hoped that the Danes would understand its importance to us and be able to make suggestions as to how our defense needs could be met in a form that would be politically possible for them. I had hoped that Ambassador Kauffmann would bring such suggestions on his return from Denmark.

Mr. Kauffmann stated that time was needed to solve the problem and that an improvement in the present international atmosphere would help. Three types of installations were involved: the weather stations, the air fields, and the proposed radar installations in the north. He liked the approach indicated in the Department’s press release of May 29, 1947 in which we indicated readiness to explore with the Danish Government the basis of a new agreement “in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations which would take fully into account Danish sovereignty over Greenland and legitimate United States and hemispheric defense requirements”. He also saw possibilities in a regional defense agreement to include Canada and possibly other countries of this hemisphere.

I indicated that this regional approach including Canada might be explored. Referring again to the imperative need for adequate defense of Greenland, I suggested that the Danish political problem might be [Page 682] met by a formula similar to that which we had been prepared to offer the Australian Government in connection with Manus Island, namely that we would be prepared to make annual payments to the Danish Government to enable it to maintain installations which we had erected in Greenland during the war in return for the right to use those facilities as needed and to station a few men there to look after supplies. I pointed out that we would not be in a position to maintain substantial forces there in peace time.

The Foreign Minister did not reply but the Ambassador repeated that time would be needed to work out an agreement. In the meantime the 1941 agreement continued in effect and the conversations would continue.

(After the conversation had ended Mr. Achilles2 asked the Foreign Minister whether he considered the suggestion of annual payments in return for the right to use the installations a promising one from the Danish point of view. He replied that he must necessarily speak personally since he was not even sure that he would be in the new government to be set up following the elections on October 28, but that he personally thought the approach a very good one.)

  1. Foreign Minister Rasmussen arrived in New York on October 17 to serve as head of the Danish Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 16–November 29, 1947. The Secretary of State headed the United States Delegation.
  2. Theodore C. Achilles, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.