859B.20/6–647
The Ambassador in Denmark ( Marvel ) to the Secretary of State
No. 182
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s Top Secret telegram No. 318, May 29, 1947,1 and to previous telegrams relating to the note presented by Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann on May 27, 1947, requesting the initiation of consultations as provided by Article Ten of the 1941 Treaty of Greenland. It may be helpful to the Department if I set forth below certain facts relating to this subject and certain observations made by me during the past months.
The Department has been kept informed of the increasing interest throughout Denmark during the past recent months regarding the [Page 666] status of the 1941 Treaty relating to Greenland. This interest has undoubtedly been accelerated by the present relationship existing between Denmark and Russia. Fear of Russia on the part of the Danish officials is not entirely confined to intangible possibilities. While the Prime Minister, in conversations with me, has often referred to the possibility of the Russians returning to Bornholm and the Foreign Minister has expressed the fear that the Russians might demand bases in the Faroe Islands—both statements being based upon American activities in Greenland—I am assured that no direct threats as to carrying out these possibilities have been made to any Danish official. There are, however, two important phases of Denmark’s relationship with Russia which could be acted upon by the Russians immediately, and which would be most detrimental to Denmark. These two phases relate to (1) the debt owed by Russia to Denmark as the result of operations under the Danish-Soviet Trade Agreement and (2) the matter of German refugees in Denmark.
- (1)
- Trade between Russia and Denmark has not materially changed since the situation was reported in the Embassy’s despatch no. 871, February 28, 1947.2 There is, at the present time, owed to Denmark by Russia a balance of approximately 45 million kroner. One effective method of retaliation against Denmark’s acquiescence to American activities in Greenland would be the refusal or prolonged delay in making payment of this indebtedness. This is a matter which the Danes realize and is a large factor in their attempt to maintain friendly relations with Russia.
- (2)
- The fear of the Russians’ refusal to aid in the removal of the German refugees from Denmark is also a present and realistic reason for the maintenance of Danish effort to continue friendly relations with Russia. The presence of these refugees in Denmark places a large financial drain on the Government. The Russians now are in the process of removing from Denmark 36,000 refugees. Of these approximately 6,000 have already departed and the remainder are leaving Denmark at the rate of 2,000 per week. There is the constant fear on the part of the Danes that any unfriendly act on their part would result in the stoppage of the deportation of the German refugees by the Russians. Even though the commitment as to the 36,000 refugees above mentioned was not affected, the Danes believe no further aid would be forthcoming from the Russians as to the removal of the remaining German refugees.
As the Department is aware, Gustav Rasmussen, the Danish Foreign Minister, has never expressed to me his personal, or Government’s reactions to his conversations with Secretary Byrnes on December 14, [Page 667] 1946. … any negotiations with a view to exploring the basis for some new agreement relating to Greenland undoubtedly must be undertaken with the view that the political leaders of the Danish Parliament must be taken into consideration—a fact which, at times, the Foreign Minister appears to overlook.
As I pointed out in my despatch no. 372, September 4, 1946,3 it is my view that Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann’s views on Danish-American relations carry much weight and will be followed by the Foreign Minister. At the same time, Mr. Kauffmann has considerable influence with Hans Hedtoft, leader of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Hedtoft’s views were expressed in my Top Secret telegram no. 969, December 27, 1946,3 and, so far as I know, they have not changed. He then stated that, if Danish sovereignty over Greenland and its citizens were acknowledged by the United States, an agreement for bases for a long-term period could be arranged, so long as emphasis was placed on Greenland being a link between the United States and the United States Forces in Germany. The Prime Minister, Knud Kristensen, holds somewhat similar views but is less explicit and definite than Hans Hedtoft. The Prime Minister will rely almost entirely on the Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, for his final decision. In fact, he has so stated this to me.
It is, therefore, my view that the key man in the picture is Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann. His views will, in my opinion, be adopted by the Foreign Minister who, in turn, will pass them on to the Prime Minister. At the same time, Ambassador Kauffmann has decided influence with Hans Hedtoft, and the combination of the present Government forces in Parliament with the Social Democrats would assure passage of any agreement approved by these leaders. My view that Ambassador Kauffmann is the key man is fortified by a conversation I had with Director Hvass of the Foreign Office, in the absence of the Foreign Minister who is convalescing from a minor operation, on June 2, 1947. Director Hvass told me that he was awaiting a report from Mr. Kauffmann and that the Danish Foreign Office would take no steps with respect to consultations which were requested in the Danish note of May 27, 1947, until Kauffmann’s recommendations were received. I, therefore, cannot stress enough the importance which I give to the manner in which this subject is handled with Ambassador Kauffmann. My own opinion is that he will be amenable to the American viewpoint. … I am advised that he expects to return to Denmark in July of this year and, undoubtedly, he will discuss the Greenland situation with me. I accordingly request that I be kept fully advised as to the Department’s conversations with him as background in the event [Page 668] he approaches the subject while here in Denmark, and I again emphasize that the approach to Ambassador Kauffmann must be made with the present Danish fears of Russian reaction in mind. They cannot be brushed aside.
Respectfully yours,