Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

859B.20/5–2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Denmark

top secret
u.s. urgent

Washington , May 27, 1947—4 p. m.

313. Dept concerned over developments reported urtel 344 May 22¹ and 347 May 23. Acquiescent attitude PriMin toward Communist resolution (urtel 347) seems inconsistent with attitude reported para 4 urtel 238, Apr 18.²

May 24 Kauffmann informed public and official opinion in US would be profoundly shocked by passage Communist resolution and should Dan Govt acquiesce in passage we could not avoid conclusion such action carried implied charge US had in some way failed to live up to its international obligation or obligations to Den. He was informed we appreciated steps already taken by Dan Govt to prevent Green issue coming to a head publicly and felt sure it would find some means to move towards solution Green problem other than to fall in with Communist plan for passage above mentioned resolution.

Adverting to reports from various sources that Danes might consider bring Green matter before UN, Kauffmann was told that we were unable to understand what would be the purpose or basis of such action: If it were to be brought forward as question endangering international peace and security this would be tantamount to haling US before UN as guilty of threat to peace and as violating international agreements and accordingly such a step could only be regarded by US as matter of utmost gravity; it would inescapably carry with it conclusion on part US that Den had deliberately chosen associate itself with world forces presently striving in every way embarrass US in its efforts uphold UN and promote peace and security for all nations.

Foregoing is for your info and background use only in event PriMin should take initiative in further discussing matter with you as result of report he may receive from Kauffmann. As events may move rapidly, we do not wish run risk crossing wires by simultaneous conversations Copenhagen and Wash but will continue keep you fully informed content conversations with Kauffmann.

Marshall

1. See footnote 2, to telegram 347, p. 660.
2. Not printed; it reported that Prime Minister Kristensen appreciated that Greenland could not be left a military void and that Denmark could not maintain the required facilities. Ambassador Marvel expressed the belief that the Prime Minister would support the maintenance of the Greenland Defense Agreement (859B.9243/4–1847).