Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

862.414/2–1648

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

confidential

Washington, February 16, 1948.

As was to be expected, the publication of the German War documents bearing on relations with Russia, 1939–1941,¹ has aroused widespread interest and comment both in the United States and abroad, except in those countries where the “iron curtain” has restricted freedom of expression on the subject.

Reactions in the United States

In the United States the reception has been preponderantly, if not overwhelmingly, favorable. The space given the publication by leading newspapers was probably unprecedented. On all sides, however, the volume was viewed as a propaganda piece in the so-called “cold war” with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, most would agree with Time that it has “the virtue of sober truth”.

Adverse criticism has gradually taken shape. Typical criticisms of one segment of opinion are (a) that the documents should have been published earlier; and (b) that, in view of the evidence, this Government should not have delayed so long in adopting a “realistic” policy toward the U.S.S.R. Other adverse critics, however, have alleged that (a) the release of the documents at this time only accentuates U.S.–Soviet tensions; (b) the documents thus presented are out of context and give a distorted picture of events; and (c) the Germans will conclude that they lost the war because Hitler made the mistake of breaking his agreement with the U.S.S.R. and that they should return to the Soviet alliance. There is no question, however, that the American public as a whole regards the publication of the documents as appropriate and necessary under the circumstances.

Repercussions in the United Kingdom and France

When, in December 1947, it was decided to publish the documents, the representatives of the British and French Embassies were informed (on December 24) of the Department’s intention to make the documents public. The information was given four weeks in advance of the date on which the documents were released to the press (January 21). When Mr. Henderson of the British Embassy inquired whether the Department’s decision was final, he was told that if his Government had important objections to raise these would certainly be taken account of by the Department. Mr. Wapler of the French Embassy was similarly informed.

Both secretaries informed their Governments of the Department’s action, and both reported back with replies. The British Foreign Office expressed regret that the “decision” was made without prior consultation, but made no objection of principle.

The French Government made no objection whatever to the publication, though it left the responsibility for the action with the Department of State. Mr. Wapler of the French Embassy informally stated that he was sure his Government would be pleased with the Department’s action, but that of course it would have to “wash its hands” of the affair.

In the United Kingdom the incident was not played up significantly in the press, though it received wide notice. Questions relating to the publication were raised in the House of Commons. On January 28, Hector McNeil, replying for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that “H.M. Government are considering whether any useful purpose will be served by issuing these documents separately at an early date”, but said that they wanted to avoid issuing “haphazard selections”.

On February 4 Mr. Churchill² raised the question whether the Government intended to make “a similar separate British publication”. Mr. Bevin, in reply, said that his Government had “the matter of a similar separate British publication under consideration”. He said he would not, because of its publication in another country, be rushed into “taking out of its context one particular thing without careful study of the rest”. He expressed doubt as to whether the American publication was the wisest way of dealing with this problem and said that he had understood that the matter was “going to be dealt with in relation to the other Allies as a comprehensive historical statement”, and he had no idea it was going to be published out of its context. He added that, “Whatever happened in 1939–41, I have got to study what is likely to happen in 1948”.

The above statements by Mr. McNeil and Foreign Secretary Bevin do not take account of the fact that the Foreign Office had been fully informed in December as to what precisely the Department was proposing to do.

The attitude of the British Government was explained confidentially by Mr. Henderson of the British Embassy, on the basis of a memorandum from the Foreign Office, which stated that Mr. Bevin had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the compilation, “but the fact that these German documents had been published in this way necessarily makes certain people in the United Kingdom suspect that they have been published not so much in the interest of historical accuracy as for an immediate propaganda purpose. Publication in this way also seems to have had the effect of provoking the Soviets into publishing documents directed against Great Britain. This does not especially worry the British Government inasmuch as they are in any case preparing to publish their own documents themselves, but they would have preferred to have been able to publish them first and not to have had the issue forced in such a way as to let the Russians get in first with their highly tendentious version”.

In France the publication of the documents was given widespread but not sensational attention. The patriotic press tended to follow the lead of the Government press agency in commenting that the unilateral procedure was not regarded as “normal diplomatic usage”, while the Communist wing branded the documents as “forgeries of the Nazi Gestapo”.

Ambassador Caffery reported from France that he had received many inquiries concerning a French translation which he would regard as useful. The French Government has limited itself to stating that it was not consulted prior to publication which, of course, is in line with their previously announced intention to wash their hands of responsibility.

The Soviet Reply

The Soviets began making replies to the documentary publication on February 10 and have issued four statements. The reports of these replies indicate that, while branding those responsible for publishing the documents as “falsifiers of history”, they do not challenge the authenticity of the documents themselves. They have rather sought to shift the spotlight by attacking the pre-war and wartime policies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The following charges are made:

1. The Allied documents policy was discriminatory against the U.S.S.R.

a. The claim is made that in the summer of 1945 the British rejected the Soviet request for participation in the study of captured German documents.

b. It is also claimed that in September 1945 the American officials proposed to the ACA in Berlin that all captured enemy documents in all the zones should be opened freely to representatives of the United Nations, but that this proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

2. The publication is propagandist. It covers only the period 1939–1941, and it is based exclusively on Nazi documents.

3. The Allies contributed to German rearmament against the Soviet Union. A “golden rain of American dollars fertilized the heavy industry of Hitler Germany”, and American industrialists were closely linked with German monopolists. This charge is elaborated at considerable length.

4. The British and French, in the pre-war period, adopted a policy of “appeasing” Hitler Germany while “the Soviet Union came forward as the initiator and champion of collective security”.

5. The Anglo-French policy sought to direct German aggression against the U.S.S.R.

6. The Soviet policy during the 1939–1941 period was merely a “fight for time”, forced on the U.S.S.R. as a result of its failure to reach an agreement with the Western Powers for a collective security front against Germany.

7. The United States, through Allen W. Dulles, conducted negotiations in 1943 for a separate peace with Germany.

8. The United States and Great Britain deliberately delayed opening a second front in the West in an effort to bleed Russia white and end her role as a world power.

Comments on the Soviet Reply

The Soviet charges are, for the most-part, red-herrings, employed for the purpose of diverting attention. They will, therefore, not all be considered at this time, although they do merit the attention of the Department in due course. The following comments are immediately relevant:

1. With regard to the charge that the United Kingdom and the United States discriminated against the Soviets in the use of captured German documents:

a. A British Government spokesman has denied all knowledge of a Soviet request in the summer of 1945 for joint exploitation of the documents.

b. On the other hand, the Soviet statement that American authorities proposed in September 1945 that all German archives be thrown open to the governments of all the United Nations is substantially validated by the records of the Department. Such a proposal was made, but the British representative asked for and was granted several delays in order to receive instructions, and the proposal was later withdrawn on the request of the American intelligence authorities in Berlin.

2. As to the charge that the documents are a distortion of the facts because they cover only 1939–41, it is to be regretted that these papers could not have been published as part of the regular series, which would, of course, have given a broader perspective on Nazi relations with all other powers. Time obviously did not permit this to be done. It, nevertheless, remains true that the documents are an accurate account of Nazi-Soviet relations during the 1939–41 period, and the truth which they contain is not obscured by the fact that they come from the German Foreign Office, since they were prepared at the time not for propaganda purposes but as accurate analyses of situations for the confidential use of Nazi authorities.

3. Regarding the charge that the British and French conspired to get Germany into war with the U.S.S.R., the documents thus far cited do not demonstrate the existence of such a conspiracy. Nor have the editors found any evidence of such a conspiracy. It is nevertheless possible that, by a careful choice of parts of documents, the Soviets could present a picture which would be convincing to those desiring to be convinced. It is assumed that the Soviets will attempt to do this.

4. The Soviets have announced their intention of publishing subsequently a collection of documents which will presumably substantiate the charges that have thus far been made. It was to be expected that some such riposte would be forthcoming, and the question arises as to what may be expected. It may be recalled that three volumes of German documents were issued by the Soviets in 1946, bearing on German relations with Turkey, Hungary and Spain. It is the opinion of the American editors of the German War Documents Project that the Soviets may have large parts of one of the higher files of the political division of the German Foreign Office, thereby being in possession of an important cross-section of the record of German foreign relations. The Soviets have not, however, yet shown their hand.

The precise extent of the Soviet holding of documents is not known by the editors, hence no accurate forecast can be made as to possible Soviet action.

Implications for United States Policy

The foregoing facts suggest the following considerations of policy:

1. Consideration might be given to offering access to the German Foreign Office Archives to Soviet scholars on a basis of the reciprocal right of access for the editors of the other participating powers to all German Foreign Office documents in the possession of the Soviet Government.

In this connection, a UP report of February 10 stated that a Foreign Office spokesman had invited the Russians to join Great Britain, the United States, and France in publishing without censorship the German Foreign Office documents on Hitler’s relations both East and West. This has not been confirmed, and the British Embassy states that the Foreign Office has made no statement that would support such a report.

It is reasonable to suppose that permitting representatives of the U.S.S.R. to join the German War Documents Project would complicate the task of the editors and impose serious delays in publication. This is well illustrated by a statement made by the Soviet reply of February 10 which refers to the alleged negotiations with the British in 1945 and which states that publication of the documents would be inadmissible “without careful and objective verification”, which, it stated, would have to be made jointly. The assumption lying behind this proposed “verification”, as envisaged by the Soviets, is contrary to the fundamental principle of scholarly objectivity on which the documents project rests. Joint “verification” suggests the right of individual veto for political reasons on the inclusion of particular documents. Serious differences of opinion would doubtless arise and the completion of the project would be jeopardized.

2. The situation clearly calls for the publication at the earliest possible date of the volumes containing a comprehensive record of the crucial years preceding and during the war. It is anticipated that in the Berlin meeting this April the editors will make the final selection of documents covering the period from mid–1937 to the outbreak of war in 1939. Other volumes will follow as soon as possible, bringing the record down through the war years.

The early consummation of this publication program should be pressed, for it will place pre-war and wartime diplomatic relationships in clearer perspective and provide a satisfactory answer to the adverse critics at home and abroad.

3. The Russian statements and documents issued in reply to the Department’s documentary publication should be carefully analyzed, annotated, and appraised, and relevant information should be prepared for use as circumstances may dictate.³

1. For text of a press release announcing publication by the Department of State on January 21, 1948, of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (publication 3023), see Department of State Bulletin, February 1, 1948, p. 150.
2. Winston S. Churchill, former Prime Minister.
3. The memorandum was referred to the Counselor of the Department, Charles E. Bohlen, who notified Mr. Russell that he did not think it would be wise to offer access to Soviet scholars but that the other two recommendations were all right. Mr. Hickerson concurred. (862.414/2–2348)