Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

862.414/9–3047

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell)¹

confidential

Washington, 9/30/47.

Subject: Publication of the German War Documents Relating to the 1939–1940 Discussions Between the Russians and the Germans, Particularly the Molotov-Ribbentrop Conversations

There are various possibilities with respect to what might be published at this time:²

a. The report of November 1940 from the German Ambassador to Moscow of a conversation between him and Molotov, setting forth the conditions upon which Russia would adhere to the Three Power Pact. This document has, as far as we know, never been published or even referred to publicly. It is extremely damaging to the Russian position. It delineates the territories in Europe and the Near East that Russia insisted would have to come under Russian domination and provides for the definite alignment of Russia with Germany, Italy, and Japan.

b. In addition to a., Nazi reports of a series of four conversations between Molotov, Ribbentrop, and Hitler in Berlin in November 1940. These have been referred to publicly on a number of occasions but “have never been published in full. These are not as strong in their effect because they portray Molotov as opposing many of the arguments of Ribbentrop and Hitler.

c. The account of Ribbentrop’s first visit to Moscow in August 1939 and the text of the Russo-German Secret Agreement of that month. The text of the Secret Agreement has been published unofficially but no mention has been made of the existence of this detailed account of the conversations between Stalin, Molotov, and Ribbentrop which accompanied the signing of the Pact of August 1939.

d. All the important 1939–1940 Russo-German papers might be published. These, in the opinion of the editor of the German War Documents Project,³ would create a much greater cumulative effect than any selection from the correspondence. They show the length to which Soviet Russia went in aiding Germany on the eve of and during World War II. They cover the period from the spring of 1939 to June 1941.

If no special decision is made at this time, this material would in the normal course of events not be published until around 1950.

The editor of the German War Documents Project would be willing to have d. above published as a part of that project. Most of these documents have already been translated. It would take one month to complete the translation and annotations. Under normal procedure it would require another two months to prepare the manuscript for the printer and complete the publishing. Consideration might be given to obtaining Congressional priority in the printing, in which case it might be published within a week or two following the completion of the editing. If publication of d. were to be decided upon, although the agreement with the British (to which the French have also adhered)⁴ does not require agreement by them to such publication, there is an oral understanding between us and the British and the French that any party will notify the others of its intention to publish any of the documents covered by the Project.

The editor of the German War Documents Project would not approve as a part of the Project the printing of a., b., or c. above separately. If publication of these documents were decided upon, they should be released by the Department in some other form, not as a part of the Project.

The Russians have copies of the documents in the German Foreign Office archives. If we print a dozen or so documents, they would undoubtedly print others which would show that Russia at times resisted German pressure. This country might then be accused of giving a one-sided picture.

It will be recalled that the Spanish were able to show that The Spanish Government and the Axis did not tell the whole story and thereby to undermine the effectiveness of that publication.⁵

The cumulative effect of all of the documents referred to in d. above is very strong and it would be difficult for the Russians to rebut them.

The decision with respect to whether any of the above should be published at this time is, aside from the considerations mentioned herein, purely a political decision. It was decided by Under Secretary Acheson on May 28, 1947 on the basis of political considerations at that time not to publish these documents out of order and apart from the regular program. The appropriate political officers should now make the decision whether supervening events indicate that this decision should be changed. It should also be taken into account whether such a decision would involve the Department in the necessity of publishing other documents of particular interest, such as those relating to the Grand Mufti.

The Russians are in possession of a great number of German Foreign Office papers and the question might arise whether they would follow any publication of ours by the publication of any embarrassing material in their possession. The editor of the Project states that the material examined so far shows nothing which, if published, would embarrass this government seriously.

F[rancis] H. R[ussell]

[Enclosure]

Summary of Negotiations Between the Russians and the Nazi Government 1939–1941

The German documents on Russia become interesting in April 1939 when there began feelers for a political understanding. For some two months, the Germans and the Russians eyed each other suspiciously, anxious to make friends, but each afraid of the other. When it became evident that the British and the French were not willing to allow Russia a free hand in the Baltic, the Russians quite suddenly dropped their reserve and invited Ribbentrop to Moscow. The discussions there are treated in a very long memorandum which recreates the spirit of the occasion very well. As a result of these discussions, there emerged the public pact and an economic treaty for the exchange of Russian raw materials and German armaments. There was a secret agreement dividing spheres of influence, leaving everything in the Baltic north of Lithuania to Russia, together with Bessarabia.

After the Polish campaign, Ribbentrop again went to Moscow. There, the Russians agreed that they would press for a peace favorable to Germany. A new division of the spoils was arranged, Germany taking more of Poland, Russia getting all of Lithuania, except a small region in the south which was to go to Germany. In the succeeding months, there were extended economic negotiations which are of some interest because they show the great contribution which Russia made to the German war effort. Russia greeted in these documents the German invasion of Norway with enthusiasm and relief and applauded the invasion of Belgium and Holland. When, however, the speed and the extent of the German victory became apparent, the Russians moved very rapidly to claim their share of the spoils, while Germany still needed Russian support. The Russian occupation of the Baltic states occasioned some bad feeling, particularly when Russia took the part of southern Lithuania which had been promised to Germany. German resentment was increased when Russia suddenly moved into Bessarabia and, more important, into the Bukovina.

When the collapse of France was complete, the Germans began to strike back at the Russians. They encouraged the Finns to resist new Russian demands, and they aroused the Russians to fury by guaranteeing the new frontiers of Roumania. Russian anger turned into panic on the news of the Three Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. On receiving news of this Agreement, Molotov abandoned his earlier reluctance to visit Berlin and arrived there in November 1940. He had two interviews with Ribbentrop, and two at which Ribbentrop and Hitler were both present. Hitler and Ribbentrop tried to force Russia to join the Three Power Pact and to accept the Asiatic territory south of Russia to the Indian Ocean as her sphere of influence. On his return to Moscow, Molotov said that he would be willing to join the Three Power Pact if all the territorial demands of Russia were met.

The Germans never replied to Molotov’s counter-proposal. Instead, they secretly circulated in December 1940 the first detailed plans for the invasion of Russia.

Through the early months of 1941 the Russians at least outwardly continued to hope for peace and for admission to the Three Power Pact along with [the?] lines proposed by Molotov in the previous November.

Throughout the documents, there are quoted very uncomplimentary Russian remarks concerning the French, the British, and the Americans. It was the opinion of the best informed Germans that Russia would much rather have an alliance with Germany than with the Western democracies.

1. Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman), to the Directors of the Offices of European Affairs (Hickerson), of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), and of Special Political Affairs (Rusk), and to the Legal Adviser (Gross).
2. For previous documentation on the interest of the United States in the disposition of German Foreign Office archives, captured in 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iii, pp. 1099 ff., and 1946, vol. v, pp. 200 ff.
3. Raymond J. Sontag.
4. For information on this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, p. 200.
5. For documentation on the release of this pamphlet in March 1946, see ibid., pp. 1042–1043, 1054–1055.