865.014/7–847

Memorandum from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Department of State

top secret

SWN–5543

Subject:

  • Disposition of the Italian Colonies
  • Reference: SWN–54361

In response to a request from the Department of State forwarded by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee in the above reference, the following has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a memorandum from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee dated 2 June 1947 requesting their views on the military implications involved in the disposal of the Italian colonies with particular reference to the British requirements for bases.

“It is in the interest of United States security to prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a firm hold in the Middle East and/or Mediterranean areas. Unfortunate and potentially catastrophic [Page 593] though it is, the USSR is our ideological enemy and our most probable enemy should war occur. Further, the USSR, militarily the strongest power in the world today with the exception of the United States, is engaged in improving its strategic position and increasing its military potential by attaching to itself states, peoples and areas to which it has no legitimate claim and to the great military disadvantage of the United States and our potential allies. The United States is now attempting to check this unwarranted expansion of Soviet control. Therefore, it would be contrary to announced United States policy and to United States military interests to accept any disposition of the Italian colonies which gave the USSR either unilateral or joint control of any of the colonies in question, even though this control were obtained in the guise of trusteeship under the United Nations.

“The objections to unilateral Soviet control are too obvious to warrant discussion. The objections to joint control stem from our previous experiences in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria where the Soviets have not hesitated to negate almost completely the effects of United States participation in joint control by means immoral, contrary to previous agreements with the United States and disadvantageous to the state concerned. If allowed to participate in joint control of any of the Italian colonies, the Soviets would be most likely to employ like tactics to gain for themselves complete control in all but the legalistic sense.

“The Soviets could exercise effective control of any of the colonies if a satellite or a non-satellite communist government were granted control. It would, therefore, be militarily disadvantageous to the United States to allow Italy to resume control of any or all of her colonies unless it had previously become clear that the future government of Italy will be non-communist and affiliated with the Western Democracies. This consideration is over and above the consideration of whether Italy would be able to maintain peace in the colonies, which, in view of the armed forces granted her by the treaty of peace, appears doubtful unless appropriate increases in her armed forces were authorized. In view of the strong ties existing between the various states of the Arab world, armed conflict between Italian forces and Arab forces native to the Italian colonies would threaten world peace.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Great Britain and her Empire to be our most probable and most important allies, in the event of war with the USSR. A firm hold in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean is one of the basic tenets of British strategic policy. Facilities must, therefore, at all times be available somewhere in the area Palestine–Egypt–Cyrenaica which will enable United Kingdom sea, land and air forces to operate effectively in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The future of Palestine is obscure. The revision of the 1936 treaty between Great Britain and Egypt is deadlocked. Cyrenaica is, therefore, more important than ever for the successful implementation of British strategic policy.

“However, there is doubt that the British can, within the next ten years, deploy sufficient land, sea and air forces in the area to insure, with a reasonable degree of certainty, adequate protection of Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of this and in view of the great strategic importance [Page 594] of this area to the United States and to the United Kingdom, retention of British forces in the area is, from the security point of view, the least objectionable alternative to

  • a. Joint United States-United Kingdom responsibility for the military security of the area, or
  • b. Assumption by the United States of unilateral responsibility for the military security of the area.”

For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee:
W. A. Schulgen

Acting Secretary
  1. Memorandum of June 2, 1947 from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitting the text of the memorandum of May 29 from Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, p. 583.