865C.01/5–347

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John E. Utter of the Division of African Affairs

confidential

While in New York on a week-end visit, I had an opportunity to renew friendly relations with Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the [Page 578] Arab League, at present in that City for the United Nations Assembly session on Palestine,1 when I called at his apartment at the Essex House late on Saturday2 afternoon.

As I entered, Azzam was listening to the speech of Mr. Gromyko3 before the United Nations Assembly defending the hearing of the Jewish Agency before that body. At the end, Azzam remarked that the Soviets were trying to back two horses. He commented with approval on Mr. Austin’s4 previous declaration on the subject and went on to expatiate on the Anti-Communist position of Egypt. According to him, the Egyptian Government wishes no truckling with Communism and rather fancies itself as the bulwark in the Middle East against Soviet expansion. Azzam hoped that an early solution to the Anglo-Egyptian problem would be found and when the question was placed before the United Nations, that the United States would play the role of mediator between the United Kingdom and Egypt. He again repeated to me his desire to see relations between these two countries on a friendly and equal basis and an alliance formed which would also include the United States. Azzam has on previous occasions, talked of a Middle East regional group of Arab states under the United Nations which would include Great Britain because of its extensive interests in that area.

Libya

participation in commission of investigation

I then brought up the question of the Italian Colonies and Libya in particular, by referring to the note of March 31, 1947 presented by the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to the United States Ambassador in Cairo.5 This note referred to the extraordinary session of the League at Bloudan and to identical cables addressed on June 11, 1946 to each of the Foreign Ministers of the four Big Powers stating the League’s concern with the rights and future status of Libya, and referring to “plenary powers expressly vested in them (the Arab League) by the Libyan people”. Participation in the Commission of Investigation to be sent to that territory by the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers was requested. The note even went so far as to cite a declaration of the Arabs of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica “that they shall disregard any commission of inquiry on which the League is not represented”.

[Page 579]

Azzam did not make quite clear on what basis “plenary powers” were vested in the League by the Libyan people, although I gathered that this originated from the request of supposedly representative leaders of the territory. My main concern was to let Azzam know in an informal and friendly way that we could not favor Arab League participation in the Commission of Investigation. I cited the position that this Government had taken when approached by Italy with a similar request, namely that we would support a procedure whereby governments having direct territorial claims, such as Italy, Egypt and Ethiopia, could present their views and data before the Commission as well as before the Deputies, but would oppose such governments taking an active part in the Commission. As for political groups in Libya disregarding any commission on which the Arab League is not represented, I chided Azzam on such a dog in the manger attitude. The Libyans themselves would be the only losers if they failed to cooperate. He agreed, and said that these people were prompted by the fear that they would not be able to express themselves openly without incurring reprisals from the local governments. Unless there were someone on the Commission who could defend their interests before the world, in case they were coerced either during or subsequent to the visit of the Commission, they might be reluctant to state their views and wishes frankly. I assured Azzam that the vigilant presence of the Arab League should not be necessary. In the first place the British Military Administration was not a Fascist government, ready to pounce on any individual who might express an idea contrary to the Administration’s views. Secondly it was my understanding that the representatives of the Four Powers should hear the views of the inhabitants jointly and coercion of any sort would scarcely be tolerated. Publicity would certainly be given to any such coercion if known or reported.

When Azzam inquired whether a representative of the Arab League would be heard by the Deputies, I informed him that this could be done only with the consent of the four Deputies, and it seemed to me doubtful that this could be obtained. The Arab League was not a recognized government, but could as an alternative have one of its member states, an “interested government” act as its spokesman. In that case, Azzam remarked that he could be named by the Egyptian Government as its representative. Due to his knowledge of Libya and close contact with the territory over the last thirty odd years, he considers that he is the most competent Arab to present the Arab point of view with respect to Libya.

future of libya

While admitting the unrealistic thesis of immediate independence for Libya, Azzam none the less starts from this point, not only because [Page 580] it is the watchword of the Arab League, but also because the inhabitants of Libya themselves have proclaimed their wish to be free. Next to independence he believes that the Libyans would favor being attached to Egypt. Azzam proceeded to discourse at length on the political, ethnical, religious and economic ties between Egypt and Libya. He stated that there are some six hundred thousand people of Libyan origin who have settled in Egypt over the last 150 years, and the figure could go as high as two million if the migrations of several centuries were taken into account. These people are still closely linked to the tribes in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Egypt is a natural market for the cattle, wool, and oil produced in Libya, and it has been customary from time immemorial for the Libyans to drive their herds to the markets in Egypt. I told Azzam that we would be very glad to receive full and authoritative data on the subject of inter-relationship of tribes in Libya and Egypt, and he promised to substantiate his arguments by furnishing facts and figures.

The third possibility for the future of Libya acceptable to the local population might be a United Nations Trusteeship, thoroughly international in character. It should, to be popular, include technicians from Arab states. Egypt, Lebanon and others would be in a position to furnish teachers, doctors, etc.

Finally, Azzam asked if the United States would not be willing to take over the trusteeship. Might this not be a furtherance of the present policy of the United States in the Mediterranean? Azzam said that the Arabs would welcome the United States for they would know that the latter would have the money, specialists and ability to develop the country toward self-sufficiency and the people to self-government. While admitting what he said, I expressed my doubts as to any support of such a proposition in this country.

division of libya

Azzam Pasha believes that Libya should not be divided. It might well be a federation and separated into two administrative units, with Cyrenaica under Sayid Idris as Amir, and Tripolitania under its own leaders. Azzam declared himself to be in agreement with Sayid Idris despite reports to the contrary from British sources. Here again, however, the link with Egypt was brought up. Azzam feels that Sayid Idris as well as all of the Senussi confraternity would prefer being under a Moslem rather than under a Christian crown (the British). Under such an arrangement, Azzam still feels that Great Britain could obtain bases in Cyrenaica.

political parties

In Tripoli there has been a considerable evolution in the political picture. As I suspected, the solidarity fostered in May 1946 (Discussion [Page 581] of Council of Foreign Ministers) by the danger of that country’s being returned to Italian rule has faded. No longer does the United Tripolitanian Front act in unison. Azzam explained that now the factions had broken up into Watania, Kubla, Tripolitanian-Egyptian Union, etc. To realize some sort of unity in the face of the coming investigation of the wishes of the inhabitants, Azzam told me that he had formed a Committee for the Liberation of Libya, representative of all political elements in Libya. As reports from Cairo from British sources have indicated that this Committee was neither representative nor composed of men of political stature, I inquired who were in this group. The following among others were named by Azzam:

Mahmud Bey Muntasser, wealthy land owner, wielding great political influence over untutored Arabs in large areas.

Taher Bey el Morayed, merchant, educated in French Lycée in Cairo.

Ali Regeb, Sheik.

Bechir Saadowi, Tripolitanian Minister to Ibn Saud.

Garagni, also with Ibn Saud.

These are important men but, of course, may be only the cream of the Committee of Liberation. Through this group Azzam hopes to influence the thinking of the Libyans and their answers to the Commission of Investigation. He declares that his only concern is for the future welfare of the Libyan people and would appreciate advice of any kind from us which could help them.

Discussions Between Italian Government and Arab League

To my surprise, Azzam informed me that exploratory conversations on Libya had been held between an emissary of Nenni,6 when he was Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and himself. According to him, the Italian Government was prepared to relinquish any political claim over Libya, provided that Italian nationals residing in that territory were given equal rights and allowed to participate in the administration. The Arab League’s attitude is entirely sympathetic to the principle, and took the position that such Italians could and should become Tripolitanian citizens, just as they adopt the nationality of other states in which they settle. The small Italian farmers in Libya were already appreciated and were closely akin to the Arabs. Azzam believes that the Italians are eager to resume friendly relations with the Arab states and was hopeful that something might be worked out with Sforza,7 who, he states, is following the same policy as Nenni in this matter. I pointed out that if the Italians through some understanding with the Arabs were willing to renounce political aspirations in Libya in any [Page 582] form whatsoever, the French might automatically be faced with the necessity of withdrawing their proposal to place this territory under Italian trusteeship.

Eritrea

When asked whether the Arab League was interesting itself in the fate of Eritrea, Azzam admitted interest though lukewarm in comparison to that shown in Libya. He knew of the formation of the Moslem League in Asmara and said that the Arab League had received petitions for support from this group. Azzam was most vehement in criticizing Ethiopian Government administration, and expressed the hope that guarantees would be demanded from Ethiopia if any part of Eritrea were given to that state. He even went so far as to say that the Eritreans would probably be better off under the Italians than subjected to the reactionary and benighted rule of Addis Ababa. Azzam did, however, feel that Ethiopia should be given an outlet to the sea.

Azzam mentioned the pleasant and interesting talk he had had with Mr. Loy Henderson, and said that he was planning to come to Washington after the present session of the United Nations Assembly. He looked forward to meeting officers in the State Department and to becoming acquainted with the capital of the United States. He also remarked when I was about to leave that he would like to discuss the French North African situation with me, and assured me that he had been counseling patience to the Arabs there as the time was not yet ripe for action and open rebellion could only be deplored and would certainly end in failure and oppression for the North African Arabs. The Arab League, he said, had communicated with the French Government regarding the North African countries under French administration but as yet had received no reply.

  1. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the Palestine question in 1947, see vol. v, p. 999 ff.
  2. May 1, 1947.
  3. Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Representative to the United Nations General Assembly.
  4. Warren R. Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations.
  5. See telegram 414, April 4, from Cairo, p. 576.
  6. Pietro Nenni, Italian Foreign Minister, October 1946–February 1947.
  7. Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister from February 1947.