Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

740.0011 EW (Peace)/6–647: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Rome, June 6, 1947—1 p. m.

1437. Now that Senate has approved ratification of Italian Treaty¹ Department may wish to give very careful consideration as to the time when the ratification will be deposited (ref Deptel 322 March 6). A very serious situation would arise (see my 444, March 1²) if the treaty were to go into effect as a result of the deposit of ratification by the Four Principal Powers and Yugo had not ratified. Commitment made to Italy by military authorized by CCS (see our 752 April 7³ and Caserta’s 14 January 22⁴) would be in direct conflict with our strict obligation under treaty to withdraw our troops from all of Venezia Giulia except the Free Territory of Trieste.

It seems most important that if Yugo does not ratify soon Big Four discussions contemplated by Department should be initiated and deposit of ratification be delayed pending outcome of such discussions.

Dunn

1. On June 2, 1947, Senator Vandenberg, having consulted with leaders of both parties, requested the unanimous consent of the Senate that, as in executive session, it take up the Italian peace treaty as “unfinished business”. There being no objection, the treaty was read for the second time. The treaty was debated on June 3, 4, and 5. On June 5, by a vote of 79 for, 10 against, and with six senators not voting, the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Italy. Congressional Record, vol. 93, pt. 5, pp. 6154–6409.

   On June 5 the Senate, having read for the second time the treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, respectively, passed without debate resolutions recommending their ratification, ibid., pp. 6415, 6420, and 6427.

2. See footnote 1, p. 533.
3. For text, see vol. iv, p. 68. Telegram 752 reported that an officer of AFHQ had, at the direction of SACMED, informed De Gasperi in a personal and confidential letter that if Yugoslavia failed to ratify the treaty, the Anglo-American forces would remain in Pola and on the Morgan Line.
4. Not printed; it reported that SACMED had received a formal inquiry from De Gasperi asking whether the Anglo-American forces would withdraw from the Morgan Line, including Pola, if the Treaty were to go into effect without Yugoslavia’s signature or ratification, and that SACMED had referred the question to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (740.0011 EW (Peace)/1–2247)